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Abstract
The thesis analyses the role of education in affecting the 
course of social change in Bolivia from 1930 to 1953.
Initially, the thesis discusses the three main research 
strategies currently employed in historical sociology and 
argues that the subsequent analysis accords with the 
strategy favoured by the analytical historical 
sociologists.
After a brief descriptive account of the geography and 
political economy of Bolivia, the thesis analyses the 
relationship between ideology and education, emphasising 
the fact that the concept of ideology plays a crucial role 
in clarifying the way in which education functions to 
reproduce the social relations of production.
The thesis then sets out the apparent consensus view of the 
role of education in developing countries and shows how 
this view is justified by reference to the relationship 
between Latin American states as peripheral zones and their 
economic/political centres.
Theories of underdevelopment are reviewed with particular 
reference to contemporary Third World countries, the thesis 
arguing that cognizance needs to be taken of these theories 
in order to fully understand the relationship between 
education and social change in Bolivia.
Agrarian structures, together with the concepts of 
peasantry and peasant consciousness, are then discussed 
because recognition needs to be made of the actions of the 
actual people involved and, at that time, the majority of 
the Bolivians were peasants.
The thesis then relates how, in the 1920s and 1930s in 
Bolivia, there existed the conditions which allowed the 
challenging of the status quo by various discontented 
factions and which created an environment responsive to the 
call for an education programme for the peasants. The 
growth of peasant consciousness is demonstrated and its 
impact on Bolivia is shown through the development of an 
indigenal education programme.
The thesis concludes that in Bolivia between 1930 and 1953 
there developed an education movement which was the focus 
of anti-government and subversive activity and which played 
a considerable part in the promulgation of a land reform 
law in 1953 which was instrumental in bringing about a 
major change in the social structure of Bolivian society.
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Publication
Most of Chapters Four and Five have been published together 
as an Occasional Paper by the University of Manchester 
Press. The details are as follows:-
Theories of Underdevelopment : Their relevance to an
analysis of the relationship between education and social 
change. Occasional Paper No 14. University of Manchester 
1984.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
This thesis will seek to analyse the role of education in 
affecting the course of social change in Bolivia from 1930 
to 1953.
The term 'social chahge' is very difficult to define. It 
is concerned with what is by historic or contemporary 
standards rapid and significant social change. 'Social 
change' can comprise both changes of the type normally 
referred to as 'modernisation' or 'industrialisation', and 
major social revolutions or upheavals. In this thesis it 
is used in the second sense to refer to major social 
revolutions in which thè dominant hegemony is broken down 
and replaced by another.
The definition of education is not a narrow formal one 
which only involves the development of literacy and 
numeracy, but one which involves the conscient!zation of 
the recipient. Freire used 'education' in this sense to 
mean the learning to perceive social, political and 
economic contradictions and to take action against such 
contradictions if they appear oppressive (Freire 1972)1. 
Education is fundamentally more wide reaching than literacy 
and numeracy, and it needs to be located and understood in 
the context of an analysis of ideology.
Ideological analysis attempts to reveal the 'hidden 
curriculum' which operates behind all forms of knowledge 
and to bring to the surface the social structure which is 
regenerated in its development. Because of this it differs
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fundamentally from the philosophical analysis of ideas 
which leaves out of account the social interests behind 
them and which maintains, implicitly at least, a belief in 
value neutrality. The concept of ideology is again 
difficult to define but it is used here in its widest sense 
to include all systems of ideas about society which 
determine social and political action.
The relationship between education and social change was 
very concisely expressed by Archer in the introduction to 
her book 'Social Origins of Educational Systems'. In this 
introduction Archer identifies and answers two fundamental 
questions about the nature and development of education
systems. She writes
f  why does education have the particular inputs,
processes and outputs which characterise it at any 
given time? The basic answer is very simple. 
Education has the characteristics it does because of 
the goals pursued by those who control it. The second 
question asks why these particular inputs, processes 
and outputs change over time. The basic answer given 
here is equally simple. Change occurs because nôw 
educational goals are pursued by those who have the 
power to modify previous practices. As we shall see, 
these answers are deceptively simple. They are
insisted upon now, at the beginning because ....
education is fundamentally about what people have 
wanted of it and have been able to do to it.' (Archer 
1979)2.
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This definition is very useful because it draws attention 
to, firstly, the centrality of goals and interests as the 
bedrock which an analysis of social movements and trends 
must reveal; secondly, a reminder of the complexity of the 
interrelationships between education policy, practice and 
outcomes; and lastly, and most importantly, the necessity 
to incorporate an analysis of the politics of educational 
control in any study of specific instances of shifts in 
educational thinking and provision.
Therefore a key dimension of this thesis is that particular 
educational innovations in society are directly related to 
changes in the control mechanisms in the political centre. 
It is, though, not as simple as that. It is not just thatj 
educational developments are seen as consequences of 
revisions in the politics of educational control. It is 
the view of the nature of these revisions that counts, and 
this involves seeing them as not merely superficial changes 
in how educational control is achieved and defended, but as 
fundamental changes in what those in control wish to 
achieve through education, goals which are inevitably 
related to their overall social vision and ambitions.
Consequently there are a number of very complex interplays 
between education and social change. When, as defined 
here, social change is characterised by a breakdown of the 
dominant hegemony and its replacement by another, rare 
historical moments are created whereby radical education 
experimentations can occur because the weight of existing
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educational institutions and practices have been lightened. 
Revolutions require that the residual education systems 
which reflect the structure, philosophy and continuance of 
the old orders must be transformed in order to bring them 
into harmony with the new political philosophy. If this 
fails to happen it is likely that a revolution will be 
undermined because it is the education system of a 
particular country which is responsible for reproducing the 
social structure of that country. Revolutionary leaders, 
therefore, look upon educational change as an active and 
essential component of their struggle.
Precisely how education systems evolve and develop has been 
the subject of extensive analysis using a variety of 
difference theoretical perspectives, of which two are 
particularly important. The first of these, the 
functionalist theories, and their modernisation derivatives 
specifically designed for use in developing countries, 
emphasise the role of consensus in social development. The 
second of these, the conflict theories, either of a 
Weberian or neo—Marxist slant, emphasise development 
through continual conflict between competing groups. Both 
of these perspectives tend to focus on advanced 
industrialised societies, or on their dominant effect, 
whether benevolently, as in modernisation theories, or 
malevolently, as in dependency theories, on developing 
societies (after Stoer and Dale)3. Further, both of these 
major perspectives tend to polarise types of society and 
they fail to give credence to the fact that, firstly, the
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complexity of the societies of developing countries means 
that within these societies there are elements capable of 
resisting or transforming the demands of interested 
developed countries or multi-national corporations and,* 
secondly, that the developed countries themselves are not 
as autonomous as is commonly perceived, being conditioned 
by the external demands that are continually made upon 
them, particularly those demands that are either economic 
or political or both. Consequently, for both of the major 
theoretical perspectives, the strength of their analysis of 
the interaction between different groups in both developed 
and developing countries is reduced.
It is the intention of this thesis, therefore, in analysing 
the role education plays in effecting social change in 
Bolivia earlier this century, to explain the evolution of 
its education system with reference not only to the
economic relationships both within Bolivia, and between
Bolivia and other countries, but also with reference to the 
specific ideological and political conditions that affected 
Bolivia's internal and external economic relationships, 
both favourably and adversely.
In this thesis Chapter One looks in broad terms at the
three main research strategies currently being employed in 
the field of historical sociology, and argues that the
analysis contained in this thesis accords with the strategy 
favoured by the analytical historical sociologists.
Chapter Two provides a brief descriptive account of the 
present physical and human geography and political economy 
of Bolivia, the intention being to provide a useful 
framework on which to hang Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine, 
which specifically relate to the historical development of 
Bolivian society.
Chapter Three analyses the relationship between ideology 
and education, emphasising the fact that the concept of
ideology plays a crucial role in clarifying the way in
which education functions to reproduce the social relations 
of production. This relationship is located within the
specific social structure found in Latin America.
Chapter Four sets out the apparent consensus view of the 
role of education in developing countries and shows how 
this view is justified by reference to the relationship 
between Latin American states as peripheral zones and their 
economic/political centres. The relationship depends on 
the maintenance of the status quo within the Latin American 
countries in order that the centre-oriented local elites in 
the dependent states can continue to provide surplus 
capital for the centre rather than the periphery.
Chapter Five reviews theories of underdevelopment with 
particular reference to contemporary Third World countries, 
and argues that cognizance needs to be taken of these
theories in order to fully understand the relationship 
between education and social change in Bolivia.
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Chapter Six briefly looks at agrarian structures and the 
concept of peasantry. This is because the majority of the 
Bolivian people are and were peasants, as here defined. In 
order to fully understand the relationship between 
education and social change it is necessary to take full 
cognizance of all the 'actors' involved in this 
relationship. In Bolivia during the period under 
investigation the vast majority of the 'actors' were 
peasants.
Chapter Seven relates how, in Bolivia in the 1920s and 
1930s there existed the conditions which allowed the 
challenging of the status quo by various discontented 
factions and which created an environment responsive to the 
call for an education programme for the peasants.
Chapter Eight describes the philosophy of the indigenal 
education programme. The growth of peasant consciousness 
is demonstrated and its impact on Bolivia is shown. In 
this chapter the growth of Ucurena as a centre of anti­
government activity prior to the revolution of 1952 is 
chartered. This growth is linked to the development of an 
indigenal education centre and a peasant sindicato 
(syndicate).
Chapter Nine concludes that in Bolivia between 1930 and 
1953 there developed an education movement which was the 
focus of anti-government and subversive activity and which 
played a considerable part in the promulgation of a land
10
reform law in 1953 which was instrumental in bringing about 
a major change in the social structure of Bolivian society. 
The indigenal education movement of Bolivia became a force 
which was an important element in social change in Bolivia 
rather than being a mechanism by which the status quo might 
be maintained.
There arè a number of important limitations to this thesis. 
In the first place I have been unable to visit Bolivia and 
therefore I have not been able to consult primary sources 
and obtain empirical evidence. Consequently this work is a 
synthesis with an almost exclusive reliance on secondary 
sources. Further, these secondary sources have either been 
written in English, or translated from Spanish to English, 
and perforce the thesis has had to be based on incomplete 
information. Secondly, the conditions that lead to social 
change as defined above, are various, complex and 
intertwined, with no one condition being easily isolated. 
There are, for example, tremendous difficulties in trying 
to tease out the educational strand from the socio-economic 
equation because developments and changes in education both 
condition, and are conditioned by, changes that take place 
in the social, political and economic structures of 
society. Thirdly, there are currently a number of 
different research strategies employed in historical 
sociology. As I argue in Chapter One, this thesis will 
doncentrate on the analytical historical approach, to the 
virtual exclusion of the others. Lastly, two components of 
the work have had to be simplified in order that the thesis
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achieves a reasonable balance between theoretical and 
factual analysis. These two are the theories of 
underdevelopment in Chapter Five, and the concepts of 
peasantry and peasant consciousness in Chapter Six. An 
important consideration throughout, therefore, has been a 
necessity to pay careful consideration to varying 
histriographical interpretations, and to ask questions 
about situations that are other than the obvious ones.
12
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C H A P T E R  O N E
RESEARCH STRATEGIES EMPLOYED IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY
In discussing the role which education might play in social 
change in developing countries it is necessary, at the 
outset, to define the specific research strategy being 
employed and to justify the reasons for its use. The focus 
of this thesis is on an analysis of the role of education 
in affecting the course of social change in Bolivia earlier 
this century. The work, therefore, is historical in 
nature, and, in common with other historical studies, asks 
questions about social structures or processes understood 
to be concretely situated in both time and space; it 
addresses processes over a period of time; it analyses the 
interplay between meaningful actions and structural 
contexts in order to make sense of the unfolding of 
unintended as well as intended outcomes in social 
transformations; and it highlights the sequential patterns 
of social change.
There are three main research strategies used by 
contemporary historical sociologists in order to explain 
historical events (after Skocpol 1984)1. The first of 
these is the application of a single theoretical model to 
one or more of many possible instances. This research 
strategy was very common in the 1950s and 1960s when the 
discipline of sociology was assumed to be capable of. 
formulating a general theory of society which was 
universally applicable, and history was assumed by 
sociologists to be concerned with a collection of facts, 
and was not considered to be problematic. Therefore the 
application of a general model to one or more historical
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instances was the kind of historical sociology most 
likely to be "empirically rigorous and theoretically 
relevant in mainstream disciplinary circles" (Skocpol 
1984)2. An example of this type of approach is Eriksonfs 
historical analysis of New England entitled 'Wayward 
Puritans : A study of the sociology of deviance' in 1966 3. 
Erikson in this work states that "The data gathered here 
has not been gathered in order to throw new light on the 
Puritan Community in New England but to add something to 
our understanding of deviant behaviour in general, and thus 
the Puritan experience in America has been treated in these 
pages as an example of human life everywhere. Whether or 
not the approach taken here is plausible therefore will 
eventually depend on the extend to which it helps explain 
the behaviour of peoples at other moments in time, and not 
just the particular subjects of this study"4.
The exponents of this strategy are chiefly interested in 
demonstrating and elaborating the inner logic of a general 
theoretical model. Consequently it is very valuable to 
apply a specific historical case or cases to this model 
because it provides the theorist with actual examples that 
can be used to complement and increase the plausibility of 
abstract concepts and theoretical propositions. On the 
other hand, the application of a theoretical model to 
actual specific instances is very arbitrary because the 
model must, of necessity, be prior to the historical 
instance. In addition, a myriad of facts about a 
particular instance are selectively filtered by the author,
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and only those that fit the theory are provided.
The second research strategy employed by contemporary 
historical sociologists is that of using concepts to 
develop meaningful interpretations of broad historical 
patterns. The works that fall into this category are an 
overt self-conscious critical response to those theorists, 
of whatever political persuasion, to apply putatively 
against general models to history. Consequently they are a 
reaction to the very general deterministic tendencies found 
in both the structural-functionalist and traditional 
economic Marxist theories.
The 'interpretive' historical sociologists, as they are 
called, seek to obtain a meaningful interpretation of 
history. They do this by paying careful attention to 
"matters of conceptual reorientation and conceptual 
clarification, and they always use explicit concepts of 
some generality to define their topical concerns and to 
guide the selection and presentation of historical patterns 
from one or two or more cases" (Skocpol 1984)5. For 
example, Thompson puts forward (in polemical opposition to 
economic-determinist views) a concept of class as "an 
historical phenomenon", "an active process which owes as* 
much as to agency as to condition", and then uses this 
concept to order selected narratives of events in early 
nineteenth century Britain (Thompson 1978)6. Interpretive 
historical sociologists often compare one study with 
another, invariably choosing opposites. Bendix, for
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example, believed that comparative studies "increased the 
visibility of one structure by contrasting it with another. 
Thus European feudalism can be more sharply defined by 
comparison, say, with Japanese feudalism, (and) the 
significance of the Church in Western Civilisation can be 
seen more clearly by contrast with civilisations in which a . 
comparable clerical orientation did not develop" (Bendix 
1977)7. Elsewhere, Bendix further elaborates this way of 
using historical comparisons : "By means of comparative
analysis I want to preserve a sense of historical 
particularity as far as I can, while still comparing 
different countries. Rather than aim at broader 
generalisations and lose that sense, I ask the same or at 
least similar questions of divergent materials and so leave 
room for divergent answers. I want to make more 
transparent the divergence among structures of authority 
and among the ways in which societies have responded to the 
challenges implicit in the civilisational accomplishments 
of other countries" (Bendix 1976)8.
The use of comparisons to highlight the particular features 
of each case study leads interpretive historical 
sociologists to choose case studies that will offer the 
greatest contrasts. Thus their aim is to clarify 
particularities through contrasts, not to prove the worth 
of a particular theoretical model by using example after 
example, as with the first group of theorists.
There are many positive aspects of the approach of
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interpretive historical sociologists. Their work is easily 
written, much of it in a narrative form, with the orienting 
concepts being succinct. There is no need to move from a 
theoretical, abstract model to specific material that could 
appear selective or arbitrary. In addition, they give full 
rein to the actions of people as well as the institutional 
and cultural contexts in which they operate.
Despite these points, interpretive historical sociological 
analyses suffer because they are unconcerned about 
establishing valid explanatory arguments. Both the 
concepts deployed by interpretive historical sociologists, 
and the descriptive narratives on which they rely so 
heavily, assert or imply all sorts of casual connections. 
Therefore, for those concerned with casual validity, 
interpretive works which are concerned with specific cases 
only, can be misleading because they are not concerned to 
establish explanations that hold across more than single 
cases.
The third research strategy employed by contemporary 
historical sociologists is the discovery of casual 
regularities that account for specifically defined 
historical processes or outcomes and explain alternative* 
hypotheses to achieve this end. They are collectively 
known as analytical historical sociologists. Their aim is 
to develop an adequate explanation for a well-defined 
outcome in history. Consequently historical facts are not 
analysed according to any preconceived theoretical model.
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There is, therefore, no commitment to any existing theory, 
but to the discovery of 'concrete casual configurations' 
(Skocpol 1984)9 adequate to account for important 
historical patterns. For example, how important was 
education in social change in Bolivia?, which is the 
question this thesis attempts to answer, or why did some 
commercialising agrarian monarchies end up as democracies 
and others as fascist or communist dictatorships?, as 
Barrington Moore asks in 'Social Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy' (Barrington Moore 1967)10, or what accounts 
for the similar causes and outcomes of the French, Russian 
and Chinese Revolutions, and why did episodes of political 
crisis and conflict in other modernising agrarian states 
not proceed in the same way? as Skocpol asks in 'States and 
Social Revolutions' (Skocpol 1979)11.
The discovery of casual regularities often involves 
comparative studies. This is also true of the interpretive 
historical sociologist's strategy but the emphasis is 
different. Interpretive historical sociologists tend to 
ask what happened, and they use comparisons to highlight 
differences; analytical historical sociologists ask the 
question why something happened and they look for 
generalisable explanatory principles. They, therefore, use 
comparisons to get general causes. Barrington Moore, for 
example, states that "Comparisons can serve as a rough 
negative check on accepted historical explanations. And a 
comparative approach may • lead to new historical 
generalisations", and "too strong a devotion to theory
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always carried the danger that one may over-emphasise the 
facts that fit a theory beyond their importance in the 
history of individual countries" (Barrington Moore 1967)12.
Because wide-ranging comparisons are so often crucial for 
analytical historical sociologists, the sources they use 
are often secondary rather than primary. This is in direct 
contrast to the interpretive historical sociologists who 
use primary sources in their in-depth studies of particular 
cases. If a topic is too big for purely primary research, 
and if excellent studies by specialists are already 
available in some profusion, secondary sources are 
appropriate as the basic source of evidence for a given 
study.
It is necessary though, for comparative historical 
sociologists who use secondary sources^ to pay careful 
attention to varying histriographical interpretations. The 
questions that a comparative historical sociologist needs 
to ask about every one of the cases included in his or her 
study may not correspond to the currently fashionable 
questions historians are asking about any given case. Thus 
the comparativist must be very systematic in searching 
through historical literatures to find evidence for and 
against the hypotheses being explored. As Lijphart has 
shown, through his six difference approaches to the study 
of single cases, many single case studies, as for example 
this thesis, are in fact extensions of the comparative 
method.13
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Secondary research is usually supplemented by carefully 
selected primary investigations or reinvestigations. It is 
also necessary to be familiar with the primary evidence on 
which the secondary sources have built their conclusions. 
This can either re-inforce the views of the secondary 
sources or, alternatively, call into question some of these 
sources. One potential problem that needs to be avoided is 
that of being swamped with detail and, consequently, 
aspects of cases are highlighted according to their 'casual 
configurations' currently under discussion.
There are, though, two main limitations to the 
effectiveness of analytical historical sociology. The 
first of these is credibility. To be credible any analysis 
needs to be underpinned with theory. Some theoretical 
ideas always need to be used to set up the terms of an 
analytical historical investigation, even if an honestly 
even-handed effort is made to examine the alternative 
hypotheses in the course of the investigation. Secondly, 
much of the wording used needs to be taken at face value. 
For example Barrington Moore's book 'Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy'14 relies on the taken-for- 
granted significance of the words 'democracy' and 
'dictatorship'. The casual arguments in this book stem 
from the willingness, on behalf of the reader, to accept 
the alternative routes of fascism, communism and democracy 
at face value.
This thesis is an example of analytical historical
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sociology because it attempts to effectively combine the 
concern to address a significant historical problem, namely 
the relationship between education and social change in 
Bolivia during the period 1930-1953, with an effort to 
build better social theories. It, therefore, combines 
aspects of the research strategies employed by the 
interpretive historical sociologists and those who have 
applied general models to history, and, at the same time, 
avoids the extremes of particularising versus 
universalising that limit the usefulness and appeal of the 
other two approaches. This thesis, therefore, in the words 
of Stinchcombe attempts to build "as a carpenter builds, 
adjusting the measurements as he (or she) goes along, 
rather than as an architect builds drawing first and 
building later".15
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C H A P T E R  T W O
THE GEOGRAPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BOLIVIA
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Land and People
Of all the Latin American countries it is Bolivia that 
faces the most intractable geographical and economic 
problems, not only because of its poverty and its excessive 
dependence on the export of a few primary products , but 
also because of its position as a land-locked state, and 
its lack of internal cohesion. Neither the export economy 
nor metropolitan dominance have succeeded in creating for 
Bolivia a strongly established nodal region that might 
serve to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of its 
peripheral regions.
The historical development of Bolivian society has been 
significantly influenced by its geographical setting. 
Bolivia is a large country, with a land area of 1.1 million 
sq km. The country is situated in the remote interior of 
the continent and is composed of two distinct parts, a 
mountainous region (Mountain Bolivia) and a relatively flat 
region (Lowland Bolivia). Mountain Bolivia comprises the 
Altiplano, the great central plateau of the Andes, 
stretching across 8 degrees of latitude, enclosed by fold 
mountain chains to the west and north east. The Altiplano 
is actually composed of a large number of high altitude 
basins, between 3,500 and 4,200 metres above sea level, 
separated by mountains some 4,000 metres higher. The 
Altiplano is one of the highest permanently settled regions 
in the world, and it is Bolivia's heartland with 70 per 
cent of its population. The Altiplano basins are cold and
25
desolate and little is able to grow in these barren 
inhospitable surroundings. The majority of the population 
are Indian who practice subsistence or quasi-subsistence 
cultivation. The main mining areas of Bolivia are in the 
Altiplano.
To the west of the Altiplano is the Western Cordillera 
chain of the Andes which rises above 7,000 metres in 
places, and is virtually uninhabitable. To the north east 
is the North Eastern Cordillera which again rises above
7,000 metres. The North Eastern Cordillera is, though, 
dissected by deep valleys created by tributaries of the 
Amazon and Paraguay rivers. These valleys are called the 
Yungas. They have a humid sub-tropical climate, are rich 
agriculturally, and consequently are quite densely 
populated. To the east of the North Eastern Cordillera is 
the Eastern Bolivian Highland. This is a mountainous 
region, although lower than the Andes, dissected by deep 
valleys and enclosing numerous basins and plateaus. The 
basins in particular are well watered and quite densely 
populated.
Lowland Bolivia (Oriente) comprises the vast region to the 
east of the Eastern Bolivian Highland. It is a very large 
plain about 230 metres above sea level, and it is divided 
into two distinct zones. Towards the north the plain is 
humid and is covered with alternating patches of grassland, 
tropical forest and marsh. The area is usually flooded in 
the rainy season from December to April. To the south is
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the Chaco, dry sandy plains with scattered scrub forest 
extending to the borders of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. 
Altogether the lowlands make up 70 per cent of Bolivia's 
surface area but contain only 29 per cent of its population 
and the Chaco itself is virtually uninhabited.
Bolivia, with a total land area about the size of France 
and Spain combined, had a population of about 1.8 million 
in 1900, 3 million in 1950, 4.6 million in 1976, and 6.1
million in 1983. The great majority of the population has 
always lived on the Altiplano and in the Yungas, although 
in recent years there has been migration to the eastern 
lowlands. This shift of the centre of gravity of the 
population, and of its social and economic interests, to 
the east has meant that the Altiplano, with its long 
standing pre-occupation with mining and subsistence 
farming, is becoming depopulated at the expense of the 
Oriente. In 1950 the Oriente had 20 per cent of Bolivia's 
population, and in 1976 this had risen to 29 per cent. The 
average rate of population growth is 2.7 per cent per 
annum, which is relatively low for Latin America. This 
figure disguises the fact that the rate is below 1 per cent 
on the Altiplano (except in La Paz and Oruro) , and over 3 
per cent in the Oriente (and 6.9 per cent in Santa Cruz). 
33 per cent of the population are classified as urban in 
Bolivia, that is living in towns of over 5,000 people, and 
the remaining 67 per cent are rural. It is estimated that 
80 per cent of the population live at altitudes above 3,000 
metres. The largest towns are La Paz, the seat of
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government and the effective capital city, with a 
population of 1 million, and Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, 
agricultural centres with populations of 376,000 and
282,000 respectively (1984 figures). The legal capital is 
Sucre, with a population of 80,000 in 1984.
History
The physical environment is, as indicated, very difficult 
for human occupation. Many of the settlement nuclei are 
widely separated by distance and barriers of high relief, 
deserts or thick forests, and poor surface communications 
between them inevitably leaves much of the country s 
periphery within the economic orbit of neighbouripg states. 
Further, centrifugal tendencies are exacerbated because of 
the long established policy of developing a pattern of 
communications which linked settlement nuclei outside 
Bolivia. This pattern was conditioned by the export 
routes, for example the railway from La Paz to Antofagasta, 
Bolivia's port in Chile. Consequently the external 
communication links are much better than the internal ones. 
There is, for example, still no rail connection between 
Santa Cruz and Cochabamba. Part of the problem has been 
the fact that the profits from Bolivia's exports have not 
been used for the country's internal infrastructure.
Despite this problem, political and cultural unity has been 
repeatedly imposed over large parts of the region, not 
least in the pre-Columbian period during the time of the
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Incas. The continuing strength and vigour of the Indian 
population owes a great deal not only to the isolation of 
scattered communities, but also to the legacy of the high 
Indian cultures and the sheer weight of their numbers 
compared with those of their Spanish conquerors. More than 
anywhere else in Latin America the social and economic 
problems of integrating the Indian population into national 
life have proved difficult and intractable. Some have 
thought to restore the dignity of the Indian by an appeal 
to the great tradition of the Indian past, and have 
considered the Incaic tradition as an important element of 
distinctive nationality. But the dominant theme has 
usually been the Hispanicization of Indian groups - by the 
'formal' process of conquest, conversion to Christianity, 
and education, or by 'informal' processes such as racial 
mixture, conscription, migration to the cities, and the 
penetration of commercialisation into remoter regions.
When the Spanish arrived in Peru in 153 2 they found an Inca 
empire stretching from North Equador south to North West 
Argentina and Central Chile. The Inca empire had a high 
degree of unity - it had a very effective road system; it 
had a system of massive forced labour migration whereby 
young men aged 17 — 30 were liable for military and labour 
service in any part of the empire; it had a system whereby 
whole populations were resettled or exchanged in order to 
ensure the subjugation of recently conquered or potentially 
rebellious territory; and it had one language. Quechua. 
Further, the Inca empire was quite highly populated, many
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of the people being very skilled in either agricultural 
techniques or in the production and working of precious 
metals. A large number of the population were urban, 
socially stratified, and ruled and exploited by an urban 
elite. It was this urban elite, the religious and 
administrative structure, that was the main target of the 
Spanish conquest, with the ultimate replacement of the 
indigenous urban tradition by the Mediterranean urban 
culture of the Spanish.
The conquest of Peru (which at that time included present- 
day Bolivia) led to a number of social and economic 
changes, two being of particular importance. The first of 
these were the changes to agricultural practices. 
Initially the Spanish introduced the system of encomienda, 
by which they granted themselves the right to labour 
services in various forms from the Indians of specified 
areas or villages. Initially a right to labour, the 
encomienda soon became a right to tribute, and then to a 
money payment and ultimately to land ownership. The 
annexation of land to newly founded townships formed the 
nuclei of some Spanish estates, and the crown also had the 
right to dispose as it wished of the waste and abandoned 
lands, formerly belonging to the Indians. Many of these 
lands were abandoned as a consequence of the operation of 
the mita, the forced labour system by which a population of 
Indians were liable to be drafted from their native 
villages for labour in the mines, and in construction work 
in towns. The second important change was the creation of
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a, hierarchy of new towns, many of them mining towns, and, a 
concomitant communications system. These towns and 
communications had very little in common with the Incan
ones
Bolivia itself came into existence in 1825, carved from the
Viceroyalty of La Plata. At its creation it contained
approximately 2.3 million sq km, stretching from the
Pacific to a rather indefinite northern boundary in the 
Amazon Basin, and across the Gran Chaco to an equally
indefinite boundary to the south-east. Now, with an area 
of 1.1 million sq km, it covers less than half of its 
former extent as a result of the loss of territory to all 
its neighbours. Brazil and Peru appropriated unexplored 
and sparsely populated rain—forest, swamp and savanna in 
the north and north-east during the nineteenth century when 
the search for cinchona and wild rubber gave sudden but 
temporary economic value to these remots forested areas. 
To Paraguay, Bolivia lost much of its claim to the 
scrubland of the Chaco as a result of its humiliating and 
crushing defeat in the war of the Chaco (1932—35). But the 
most important loss, to which Bolivia has never been 
entirely reconciled, was the loss of its access to the 
Pacific Ocean to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-83). 
As a consequence of the war, in place of its former 
territories stretching to the Pacific Ocean, Bolivia had to 
be content with two railway lines, linking it with the 
Chilean towns of Arica and Antofagasta on the c o a s t . 
Bolivia thus became the land-locked state it now is, and
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the creation or the maintenance of external links by the 
building of railways and roads, or by the improvement of 
river navigation has continued to pre-occupy Bolivian 
policy ever since. In fact, the pattern of events in 
Bolivia continually reveals the interplay of political and 
economic factors against a background dominated by 
immutable problems of location - a remote mid-continental 
hinterland of extreme physical difficulty, its core 
secluded to the point of isolation within the Andean 
Cordilleras.
There were two very important effects of the land-locked 
position Bolivia ultimately found itself in. The first of 
these was that Bolivia failed to share the advantages pf 
direct contact with the new ocean steamship routes in the 
nineteenth century, and the effective world-wide lessening 
of distance they initiated. Consequently, very few 
investors or overseas immigrants settled in Bolivia at this 
time. The country, therefore, failed to experience any 
significant modification to its essentially colonial 
population structure. The 1950 census, for example, showed 
that out of a population of 3 million, only 35,471 or 1.1 
per cent were born outside Bolivia (and 10,269 of these 
were born in Peru). Today about 70 per cent of the 
population is Indian, which is the highest percentage in 
Latin America. This percentage has remained fairly 
constant - for example, a report by J B Pentland in 1826 
estimated the Indian population to be 800,000 or 73 per 
cent of the total. The second effect of Bolivia's land-
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locked position was that the country failed to 
experience or benefit directly from the increased mobility 
afforded by the first phase of railway construction in 
Latin America. It, therefore, remained isolated from two 
of the most important technical advances bearing on the 
growth of State organisation and State power during the 
nineteenth century.
Access to the coast, by direct or indirect means, thus 
became a priority in the conduct of Bolivia's external 
affairs, and it was attempted in various ways - by proposed 
exchanges of territory; by improved access to the navigable 
portions of international waterways (suggested or 
confirmed); by demands for a corridor to the Pacific; and- 
by free port and free transit agreements. Bolivia has 
spent much of its time and energy in trying to solve this 
problem, but without success. In fact "Bolivia was to 
bargain intermittently for the cession, exchange or 
purchase of Arica from Peru or Chile for more than a 
century" (Fifer 1972)1.
This particular problem has had two quite different, and 
yet profound, effects on Bolivia. Firstly, there is little 
doubt that the attempts to retain a readily accessible 
outlet on the Pacific seriously retarded the country's 
development in the nineteenth century, and provoked a 
situation from which recovery remains slow. In fact, 
taking a long term view, the failure to incorporate Arica 
within its own territory at the time of independence must
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be regarded as Bolivia's greatest single impediment to 
subsequent economic progress. Secondly, and conversely, 
the denial of independent access to the sea has had a very 
large emotional effect upon that small be vociferous 
section of politically conscious Bolivians. In a country 
beset with internal problems, considerable mental energy 
has been continuously expended on the obsessive aspiration 
for a Bolivian Pacific port. It is the one topic with 
which there is universal agreement. It became one of the 
most easily projected principles upon which to focus, or 
attempt to focus, Bolivian nationalism. Negative though 
such an attitude may be in the search for national identity 
and political unity, Bolivians derive an element of 
national and political cohesion from the memory of their 
misfortunes (after Fifer 1972)2.
Ever since independence in 1825, Bolivia's location 
resulted in its subsequent external policies being 
dominated, rightly or wrongly, by the struggle to secure 
ports and establish practicable outlets to the sea. This 
created a paradox for Bolivia because the securing of 
outlets either to the sea or to the continent's major 
navigable waterways would, at the same time, involve it in 
the control and organisation of the most remote and alien 
parts of its territory. Efforts to establish routes to the 
sea, and efforts to sustain historical claims to peripheral 
areas were facets of the same problem. As long as these 
peripheral areas remained unknown, be they desert, forest 
or mountain, the inherent weakness of Bolivia's position
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was, to some extent, concealed. Fringe areas could provide 
frontiers of separation, conveniently insulating rival 
national interests. Indeed, for the stronger powers, there 
were obvious advantages to be gained in the avoidance of 
detailed boundary decisions until more was known of the 
frontier's economic potential. Where these regions, and 
the routes they contained, acquired economic and thus 
political significance, however, former wastelands were 
reappraised and de jure claims to ownership had to be 
supported by a degree of internal territorial organisation 
which Bolivia could never produce. The exploitation of 
guano, nitrate, rubber and oil were all at some stage to 
become economic flashpoints on Bolivia's borderlands, and 
emphasis tended to shift from the ports and routeways vital 
for Bolivia's trade to the sudden economic revenue the 
frontiers could yield at that time.
Consequently the conduct of Bolivia's foreign relations has 
been persistently clouded and largely determined by its 
international boundary problems. Nevertheless, while 
Bolivia's five neighbouring states have, in varying 
degrees, trimmed back approximately one half of the 
inherited claims, Bolivia's role as a South American buffer 
state has been simultaneously confirmed. Its central 
location and the consequential reduction points of direct 
contact and possible friction it has afforded between the 
major powers, have helped to ensure its survival.
No less important that the vulnerability of the land-locked
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State is the internal lack of cohesion within the existing 
boundaries. Bolivia is a country of cultural diversity, 
with few policies commanding widespread loyalty or support. 
Ratzel's theme of a 'State - Idea' - a body of traditions 
and clearly defined purposes to which the majority of the 
population willingly subscribe, and which help to unify and 
distinguish a group of people within a politically 
organised nation-state - is very difficult to achieve in 
Bolivia. There is a need for the population as a whole to 
support, and gain fellow-feeling from, a unifying concept 
and purpose; where serious conflict of spirit, or of ethos 
exists, the cohesion of the body politic is completely 
destroyed. "The strongest States", Ratzel concluded, are 
those in which the political idea completely fills the body 
of the State in all its parts. The sections of the State 
in which the idea does not gain acceptance fall away." 
(Ratzel quoted in Fifer 1972)3.
In Bolivia the core area could do little to withstand the 
disintegrative forces on the perimeter. Highland Bolivia 
forms a complex watershed region, deeply scored by the 
headwaters of the Amazon and Parana — Paraguay river 
systems whose middle and lowers courses have always lain 
outside Bolivian territory. Given the inadequacy of 
internal communications, the economic effects of these 
waterways, despite their navigational hazards, tended to 
become centrifugal rather than centripetal. Physically, 
the asymmetry of the principal continental divide results 
in nine-tenths of Bolivia draining towards the Atlantic.
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But at the same time, proximity to the Pacific seaboard 
dictates that Bolivia be classed and regarded as a Pacific 
state.
Government and Political Structure
Bolivia is a constitutional republic with a two-chamber 
legislative. It has a history of extreme political 
instability, having had as many presidents as it had had 
years of independent existence. (The country witnessed 189 
coups in the first 164 years of its independence.) It Kas 
been under military rule for most of the last thirty years, 
although at the time of writing it has a civilian 
government.
The government's attempts to bring in economic packages to. 
curb Bolivia's inflation have always been thwarted by 
popular discontent and by strikes. Real wages in 1983 were 
only 65 per cent of 1978 levels, and consequently living 
standards had been severely eroded. There are now wage 
negotiations every six months, or after consumer prices 
have increased by 40 per cent or more. The COB, 
Confederacion Obrera Boliviana, the Bolivian workers' 
confederation, is very powerful and the country's miners, 
comparatively few in number, exert a disproportionate 
pressure within the COB.
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structure ot tne Economy
There is an ironical saying in Bolivia that the country is 
'a beggar on a throne of gold'; a sparse population lives 
in poverty amidst rich natural resources. There is a 
striking discrepancy between the occupational structure of 
the population and the foreign trade situation; 50 per cent 
of the workforce is employed in agriculture, mainly 
subsistance or quasi—subsistance, and 95 per cent of the 
total exports are from the mining and hydrocarbon
industries.
Bolivia relies very largely on loans and grants for 
development, from the UN and other international funding 
bodies. Low international commodity prices have negatively 
affected the export revenues from hydrocarbons and 
minerals. Its main consumer for natural gas, Argentina, 
has its own economic problems and its payments are often 
sporadic and in arrears.
Mining, oil and gas, ore smelting and agriculture are 
officially Bolivia's main economic activities, but the 
'black economy', particularly of cocaine, is estimated to 
account for around three-quarters of the country's economic 
product.
The economy suffers from hyper-inflation. The inflation 
rate was estimated at 8,900 per cent per year in mid 1985 
and is fuelled by regular currency devaluations and large
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wage demands. Domestic problems are made worse by the 
foreign debt situation. Large debts were contracted in the 
boom years from 1974—79, and the total foreign debt is 
around US $3.6 billion. Debt repayments due in 1984 
totalled US $977 million, compared with estimated foreign 
exchange earning of US $800 million. No payments on the 
debt have been made since early 1984 and negotiations with 
the International Monetary Fund continue.
Zuazo's government attempted to ease the problem with a 
series of economic programmes.. Its economic package in 
early 1984 was undertaken with the backing of the political 
opposition. A 75 per cent devaluation was combined with 
100 - 500 per cent price increases on food and fuels, and 
other austerity measures were taken.
The government faces considerable opposition in its 
programmes for the people. The COB is disinclined to 
co-operate, blaming the soaring inflation on speculators 
and middlemen. Labour unrest is itself a cause of poor 
economic performance, and an additional problem for the 
government.
Economic devastation reached such a peak in 1984, following 
a major agricultural disaster and a 10 year low in mining 
output, that Bolivia was described by western diplomats as 
'a tinderbox ready to explode'. So far the explosion has 
not happened.
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Agriculture
This sector is important to Bolivia's economy and 
represents 20 per cent of its GDP. About 45 per cent of 
the economically active population are engaged in 
agriculture. Despite this it is an industry beset with 
problems - yields are low; traditional practices persist; 
there is a lack of credit; and there is a lack of 
investment in, for example, irrigation and the improvement 
of stock breeds.
The main export crops are sugar cane, cotton, coffee and 
coca leaf. The coca leaf crop in the major growth area 
with about 75,000 tonnes produced per annum. Some is 
legally consumed, a little is exported for medical 
products, and the rest is sold illegally and smuggled out 
of the country. The government seems powerless to stamp it 
out, although Bolivia signed the July 1984 Quito 
Declaration, together with Colombia, Venezuela and Equador, 
to clamp down on smuggling and to carry out substitution 
programmes for the growers. These measures were funded by 
the United States, but they were fiercely resisted and 
subsequently abandoned. The US provided a drug squad to 
operate in Bolivia; its members were implicated in the 1984 
attempted coup d'etat. The Chapare region is the coca 
growing centre, an inaccessible area where control is 
impossible. Some 100,000 peasants are estimated to be 
involved in growing it, and coca earns over US $200 million 
per year. Coca leaf acreage increased to 100,000 hectares
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in 1983, three times that of 1980.
Manuf acturing
Manufacturing accounts for about 15 per cent of the GDP and 
employs one-tenth of the labour force. The main 
manufacturing activities are non-durable consumer goods 
like food, beverages, textiles and tobacco, which account 
for 60 per cent of the total manufacture, with the
remaining 40 per cent consisting of handicrafts, 
intermediate goods and oil refining. Production is mainly
for the domestic market and it has not expanded
significantly in recent years due to the low purchasing 
power of the majority of the population.
Mining
Mineral ores, particularly tin, have always been Bolivia's 
economic mainstay, providing the largest export product, 
although now natural gas has overtaken tin as the country's 
main export earner. The outlook for mining is not-
encouraging. A combination of poor technology, little 
exploration and weak international metal market prices 
serves to curtail expansion.
Tin output is falling. Bolivia was once the world's 
largest tin producer, but now it is third to Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Its tin is mined at high altitudes on the 
Altiplano. Reserves are becoming exhausted and mining
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depths are increasing. Conditions are worsening, leading 
to labour unrest. The ores have a low metal content and 
Bolivia is a high-cost producer, therefore margins are thin 
as tin prices have recently fallen to historically low 
levels.
The leading tin producer is COMIBOL (Corporacion Minera de 
Bolivia), the state-owned national mining company, which 
produces two-thirds of the country's output. Prior to 
nationalisation in 1952, three family empires controlled 
the tin industry, the Patino, Hochschild and Aramayo 
families. The Patino empire provided 50 per cent of the 
public finance of the country, and over 80 per cent of 
Bolivia's foreign currency in 1965 (Klein 1969)4.
Bolivia has other minerals besides tin. It is a 
potentially word-class lithium producer, with 70 per cent 
of the world's reserves, and it has 14 per cent of the 
world's antimony reserves.
The building of smelters is being carried out at an 
increasing pace. COMIBOL plans to have its total ore 
output smelted at home by 1990.
Energy
Hydrocarbons are Bolivia's second most important industry. 
Oil is sufficient to meet national demands. Natural gas is 
Bolivia's main export, and it is piped to Argentina, or
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sent in liquid gas form to Brazil. A pipeline to SSo Paulo 
in Brazil is planned for the future.
The hydrocarbon industry has suffered from political 
uncertainties and the vicissitudes of policy. For example, 
the oil companies were nationalised in 1937 ; in 1956 
Bolivia was again opened up to foreign companies, but in 
1969 the major foreign producer was expropriated, and 
foreign participation only became possible again after 
1972. Of the 15 foreign companies attracted by these new 
arrangements, only two remained in 1980.
Transport
Bolivia lacks an integrated country-wide road system. 
Moving goods, particularly farm products, to markets is 
difficult and many roads are not of an all-weather 
standard. Air transport is vital because much of Bolivia 
is inaccessible by other means.
Foreign Trade
Bolivia normally achieves a surplus on its balance of 
trade, but at the cost of cutting back on imports, and* 
there is always a serious shortage of raw materials and 
machinery. The current account of the balance of payments 
is generally in deficit because of the increasing debt 
service costs.
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Balance of trade US Smillion 1983
Exports - 755 (Minerals 232; Natural gas 378; Sugar
8; Coffee 18)
Imports - 545 (Mainly food and manufactured goods)
Trade balance - 210
Colonisation of the East
The colonisation of the Oriente in recent times has solved 
a number of Bolivia's problems. It has led to the 
redistribution of population, particularly by reducing the 
overcrowded rural population of the northern Altiplano, it 
has increased domestic food supplies, which has reduced 
imports and conseguently released foreign—exchange reserves 
for other more important imports of capital goods; and it 
has strengthened national unity.
Both the Bolivian Development Corporation, which has 
financed settlements in the Department of Alto Beni in the 
north east, and the Army, which has developed settlements 
in the frontier region near the Brazilian and Paraguayan 
borders, have been instrumental in planned developments in 
the Oriente. Eleven military projects were underway in 
1977 in the Department of Santa Cruz. The barracks are the 
nuclei around which the army has been responsible for the 
building of schools, providing a water supply and building 
roads, churches and markets. Agro-industrial enterprises 
have followed with massive land concessions, particularly 
north of Puerto Suarez on the Brazilian frontier.
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Obviously this planned colonisation is expensive, and heavy 
investment is particularly needed in transport developments 
in order to open up new lands and provide access to the 
markets. The question of whether or not scarce capital 
should be invested in the eastern settlements poses a 
number of fundamental problems. Is there a political 
necessity to settle the national territory effectively? 
Where can markets be found for tropical crops once internal 
domestic markets have been satisfied, and if so what crops?
Is the return on capital and effort in the eastern 
settlements likely to be greater than the return on similar 
expenditure incurred in programmes of agricultural 
intensification in older settled regions? Is the existence 
of available land for peasant Settlements in the Oriente an 
adequate alternative to, and substitute for, a programme of 
land reform in older settled areas? As yet it is very 
difficult to answer these questions.
Conclusion
For decades Bolivia's economic performance has been harmed 
by governmental economic policies that have swung like a 
pendulum between the orthodox and the populist, neither of 
which is capable of generating sustained growth in an 
economy that has such an unbalanced productive structure. 
For any improvement in the future there needs to be 
flexibility on the part of Bolivia's external lenders, 
particularly a willingness to extend debt repayment 
schedules, and to explore ways of lowering its interest
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burden.
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E
IDEOLOGY IN LATIN AMERICA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO EDUCATION
The basic premise of this thesis is that the education 
system in contemporary capitalist societies is a 
"historical creation of the bourgeoisie in power, 
fulfilling specific functions which are realised in the 
general function of the reproduction of bourgeois society 
and its modalities of exploitation" (Sharp 1980)1. (The 
term 'capitalism' is used here to delineate a mode of 
production. "Capitalism is founded upon a class division 
between proletariat, or working class, on the one hand, and 
bourgeoisie, or capitalist class, on the other. These 
classes are in endemic conflict as regards the distribution 
of the profits of industrial production. Wages on the one 
side, and profits on the other are determined by the bitter 
struggle between capitalist and worker, in which those who 
own capital are easily dominant" (Giddens 1971)2).
The specific functions of education are developed in two 
principal dimensions: the creation and development of
'skills' and talents; and the imposition and diffusion of 
the dominant ideological forms. In the first of these 
dimensions the skills and talents which the education 
system develops do not correspond to an objective need of a 
certain technical division of labour (ié a product of 
objective requirements for the organisation of production), 
but rather they respond to a social division of labour (ie 
a product of a society in which private property governs 
the means of production and, consequently, the exploitation 
of the labour force) generated by the historical 
development of the capitalist society. The education
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system on producing the skills and talents which the social 
division of labour demands, reproduces a social 
organisation of production which entails not only differing 
skills and expertise (and hence a division between mental 
and manual labour), but also hierarchies, privileges and 
differences in income and power.
With the 'production' of specific skills and talents the 
education system helps in reproducing labour power. This 
reproduction can be seen from two aspects. In its most 
immediate form this is achieved by giving the labour force 
the material means with which it can reproduce itself - the 
wage. The wage represents only part of the value produced 
by the outlay of labour power which is indispensable for 
its reproduction. It is the means for paying for the 
house, food etc through which the proletarist reproduces 
itself (Althusser 1971)3.
The wage alone, however, does not guarantee the 
reproduction of labour power. The labour power must be 
'competent' to be able to work in the complex processes of 
production which characterise modern industry. The 
education system is responsible for the production of 
talents and skills which labour power needs. Consequently, 
in addition to the techniques and know-how which are needed 
for the development and production of these skills, 'norms 
of good conduct', attitudes which should be respected by 
all in the division of labour in accordance with the work 
destined - are learnt.
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In other words, the reproduction of labour power not only 
requires the reproduction of its skills but also — at the 
same time - the reproduction of its submission to the 
established order. The agents of exploitation thus 
reproduce the submission to the dominant ideology by the 
workers and reproduce the abilities for manipulating the 
dominant ideology in a concrete way4. This leads the 
discussion on to the second dimension of the education 
system : the imposition and diffusion of the dominant
ideological forms.
All societies need some form of socialisation and it is one 
of the functions of the education system to provide that 
socialisation; but it is not possible to speak of a culture 
of society in a society divided into classes. All 
societies have a system of domination and a system of 
social division, through which the culture of the society 
or the institutions of the society, correspond to the 
culture and to the institutions imposed by the dominant 
class. They belong to the society because they have been 
imposed by the system of domination of the society. Thus 
the culture which the individuals acquire in their transit 
through the education system is the dominant culture of 
society — the culture of the dominant class. Marx, for 
example, states that "the ideas of the ruling class in 
every age are the dominant ideas"5 because "the class which 
has the means of material production at its disposal has 
control at the same time over the means of mental 
production so that in consequence the ideas of those who
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lack the means of mental production are, in general, 
subject to it" (Marx 1939)6. In other words, the function 
of socialisation can be defined as the process of 
assimilation by individuals of the dominant ideologies of 
the society.
It is now important to analyse the concept of "ideology" 
and some of its implications, particularly its reality and 
its function in society. Towards the middle of last 
century, Marx and Engels, on analysing capitalist society, 
showed how the base of social life is constituted by human 
2^ 0 la.-t,ions with a view to the production of material goods 
necessary for existence. Hence we can speak of a social 
infrastructure : a material support, on top of which and as 
a dialectical function is established a superstructure, 
that is to say, a set of conceptions and ideas (political, 
judicial, philosophical), organisations and institutions 
(political parties, churches etc) which appear and exist in 
a determined period. The relationship between the 
infrastructure and the superstructure is not one of cause 
and effect. One cannot form a simplistic reduction which 
would make explicable all the superstructural 
characteristics by those of the economi c infrastructure. 
To do this would be to analyse the relationship between the 
two in a very crude and deterministic way because, in order 
to analyse the relationship between productive activities 
and superstructure, it is necessary to simplify this 
complexity by studying it at one point in time. This 
treats both the infrastructure and the superstructure as
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static, and therefore the process from one to the other is 
lost.
Ideology is conceived of in two senses in this thesis 
(after Hobsbawm and Sharp).? The first is a formulated and 
generally recognised system of beliefs about society from 
which programmes of social action can be or are derived, 
for example liberalism as articulated by Locke, Bentham or 
J S Mill. These are socio-political theories or 
theoretical ideologies. Ideology used in this sense
requires a consistent shared perception of reality in order 
to sustain a common cause of social action. The second is 
something much wider - a similar system of beliefs which 
are not formulated as much or consciously held, but which 
nevertheless forms the basis of social and political action 
of a given group of men. These are the way individuals 
live their relationship to their real conditions of 
existence, invoking a sense of ideology as lived experience 
rather than mere thought (Althusser 1971)8. These are
systems of action or practical ideologies. In this sense 
members of a society can, and often do, entertain 
incongruous world views without endangering social
interaction or indicating social disintegration. Nash, for 
example, has shown that pre-conquest myths, the rituals
that re-enact them, and modern political ideologies not 
only can co-exist but can give strength to the self 
determination of the indigenous people of the Andes (Nash 
1977)9.
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There is a dialectical relationship between these two 
levels of ideology, with the latter being historically and 
analytically prior. The insistence upon the analytical 
priority of practical ideology is supported by the fact 
that there are no examples in history of completely new 
systems of thought which develop in isolation from some 
pre-existing changes in social arrangements (Sharp 1980)10. 
The concept of practical ideologies invokes a socially 
defined way of thinking and acting, a set of conventions 
and assumptions which make meaning possible. But practical 
ideologies have a material reality and a material force as 
well, and they need to be located within an analysis of 
production relations, not in the sense that the latter 
mechanistically determine the former, but in the sense of 
their inseparability. By this it means that "practical 
ideologies both develop within and are a necessary element 
of definite social relations of production and they are 
reproduced and reinforced in the ongoing routines of the 
labour process" (Sharp 1980)11.
'Ideology', therefore, includes not only the ideologies 
commonly recognised and labelled as such, whose 
significance may be confined to a minority section of 
society (eg the educated), but âll systems of ideas about 
society which determine social and political action. This 
is particularly important in Latin America where 
theoretical ideôlogies may be unknown or incomprehensible 
to the majority of people, and where there is for many 
people a striking divergence between the meaning of such
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ideologies within the context of their country of origin 
and their meaning within the real context of Latin American 
politics.
In a class society, the practical ideologies within which 
people live their everyday lives occur within specific 
relations of domination and subordination which are related 
to the distribution of power. Thus everyday practical 
ideologies are structured, and intersected, by the forms 
and themes of dominant meanings and values. In order to 
analyse this situation fully it is necessary, following 
Gramsci (1971)12, to discuss the concept of hegemony. 
Hegemony refers to a set of assumptions, theories, 
practical activities, a world view through which the ruling 
class exerts its dominance. Its function is to reproduce 
on the ideological plain the conditions for class rule and 
the continuation of the social relations of production. It 
provides the fundamental categories of thought and 
perception of the social word which bind individuals 
together within one society. To the extent that it is 
internalised by ordinary people it becomes part of their 
common sense.
Hegemony, therefore, both supposes something truly total 
and emphasises the facts of domination. It is, in 
Williams's words "truly total, not merely secondary or
superstructural, ....  but lived at such a depth which
saturates society to such an extent, and which even 
constitutes the limits of common sense for most people,
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that it corresponds to the reality of social experience 
very much more clearly than any notion derived from the 
formula of base and superstructure" (Williams 1973)13. In 
this sense, ideology permeates every level and element of 
society - my thinking, and that of the adversary are both 
determined by the ideology which permeates my reality. No 
thinking can be independent of the dominant ideology.
Though hegemony deeply saturates the consciousness of 
society and permeates to every level and every element, 
society is not static. The concept of ideological hegemony 
does not mean that non—dominant classes are ideologically 
manipulated through and through in some overdetermined way. 
On the contrary, Gramsci stressed that hegemony has to be 
fought for against opposing tendencies produced by the 
structural location of the working class in the labour 
process; indeed, he emphasised the contradictory nature of 
common sense (Gramsci 1971)14.
Common sense is, thus, never simply and purely the result 
of hegemony. As Sharp has suggested, "it contains elements 
spontaneously generated, residual elements handed down 
intergenerationally (evén though the conditions which 
produced them by now may have disappeared) and borrowings 
from inter—class contact, as well as being intersected and 
moulded by the operation of hegemony into some kind of 
contradictory unit. Moreover, common sense responds to 
changes in the socio-historical process" (Sharp 1980)15.
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Hegemony then "is not singular, indeed it has its own 
internal structures which are complex and have continually 
to be renewed, recreated and defended; and by the same 
token they can be continually challenged and in certain 
cases modified" (Williams 1973)16. Hegemonic practice 
succeeds when it has produced an unquestioned taken-for- 
granted attitude towards how things are, and when the 
members of society, operating unconsciously within the 
limits prescribed by the dominant ideology, maintain and 
help to reproduce the status quo. But this is the ruling- 
class ideal. In practice society is dynamic and new 
ideological initiatives are continually emerging, some 
oppositional and some counter-hegemonic. All elements or 
movements in a society which pose some threat to the 
dominant set of social relations, either new movements
(emergent) or old movements (residual) will be incorporated 
into the dominant value system, since society has qualities 
of determination to follow a set line of development - it 
is self directing and self regulating. According to,
Williams the "selective tradition continually makes and
remakes the dominant culture in response to changing 
initiatives, in a manner which tries to safeguard the 
fundamental relations of production through a drive to 
incorporate and thereby transform any initiatives which 
threaten the capital relation and promise to weaken the
bourgeois state" (Williams 1973)17.
But hegemonic practice is not always successful. There is, 
of course, a tendency for dominant meanings to prevail,
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given the control by the hegemonic class over the means 
whereby practical ideologies are structured and moulded : 
nevertheless, hegemony can break down particularly in time 
of acute social crisis. Those elements which do pose some 
threat to the existing set of relationships will be either 
modified and incorporated into the central value system, 
totally opposed and destroyed or, when the crisis of 
hegemony is omnipresent, will be successful.
This thesis will attempt to analyse the reasons for the 
breakdown of the prevailing hegemony in Bolivia during the 
period 1930-53, paying particular attention to the role 
which education played in this breakdown.
It is now necessary to look more closely at the case of 
Latin America in general and Bolivia in particular. An 
analysis needs to be made of theoretical ideologies in the 
context of Latin America's capital accumulation process and 
the class struggle. This is because the differences in the 
context of theore tical ideologies which influence the 
nature of educational knowledge, cannot be understood 
without realising the very different genesis of capitalism 
in different national contexts, the changing class 
compromises and alliances which were characteristic of that 
process, and the variations in the pre-capitalist mode of 
production with which the developing capitalist mode was 
articulated. The different historical conditions in 
different countries is reflected in the differences in the 
content of the hegemonic ideology in each country.
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Traditional interpretations of the roles of ideologies in 
Latin America, especially operative during the struggles 
for independence and during the successive phases of 
'nation-building' and modernisation, suffered from a strong 
idealistic bias - they were limited by an exclusive focus 
on the social consequences of idea-systems. Basically 
there were two interpretations, the liberal, which stressed 
the modernising consequences of the adaptation of Western 
ideas throughout the different stages of Latin American 
development; and the nationalist, which denounced the 
adoption of Western ideas believing that they led to 
further subordination of Latin American societies to 
European and United States imperialism. The polemic 
between the two shed little light on the understanding of 
the actual social structure of ideas in Latin America.
This thesis will concern itself with social structure as a 
locus of ideas, with the focus being on both the national 
society and the international context — "the word- 
historical totality that characterises development and 
under-development as interacting opposites rather than as 
polar terms of an abstract continuum" (Corradi 1977)18. 
This leads to an integrated approach to Latin American 
development which takes cognizance of the international 
context, its central focus being the concept of dependence. 
Since an integrated analysis derived the structural, 
features of Latin American societies from the changing 
patterns of their dependence vis a vis developed societies, 
its interpretation of ideologies is two pronged : on the
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one nand it investigates how dominant ideologies 
legitimise the dependence of Latin America on metropolitan 
powers like the United States (Hamilton 1981)19; on the 
other, it investigates how they also legitimise the 
internal rule of classes and elites that occupy strategic 
positions in the networks of dependence within local
societies.
Consequently an examination is necessary of how Latin 
American development has been related to the principal^ 
aspects of world capitalist development in each of its 
historical stages - colonial, imperialist and neo 
imperialist. The phases correspond to the divisions of the 
epochs of capitalism into commercial-mercantilist, 
industrial laissez-faire, and monopoly capitalism. An 
analysis of this kind sheds light on the basic problem of 
the role of advanced capitalism in maintaining and 
reinforcing underdevelopment in the Third World. Until the 
middle of the twentieth century the usual mechanisms of 
control and economic dependence were mainly loans, 
financial ties, the penetration of extractive industries by 
foreign concerns, and also the foreign development and 
control of infrastructural facilities in most Latin 
American countries. During the second half of the century, 
the emergence of United States capitalism as a major world 
force has inaugurated a new pattern of dependence in the 
area, under the aegis of multinational corporations.
Therefore instead of focusing attention on capitalist
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expansion as an external cause of backwardness, attention 
needs to be focused on the constitution of dependent social 
structures. This necessitates an analysis of the social 
structures of Latin America and their processes in terms of 
changes that have taken place in the more inclusive system 
of international stratification. Social structures and 
idea-structures can then be studied as substructures of 
this more inclusive system. The function of ideologies and 
the corresponding behaviour of their bearers need, 
therefore, to be studied in- terms of the position of 
different groups in the network of dependence. At any 
given moment, these ideologies reflect a two—fold 
condition - both national and international.
The patterns of cultural dependence have changed following 
the different modes of insertion of Latin American 
societies in the evolving international system of 
stratification and the structures which this insertion 
generated. Studies of Latin American dependence often 
distinguish between different periods of development each 
one determining different structural peculiarities for 
these societies. The processes of 'nation-building' 
correspond to the period of outward growth of Latin 
American economies, ie the period of expansion of exports 
and their primary products under the coincident or 
successive hegemony of England and the United States, 
externally, and internally under the hegemony of an 
oligarchy of agrarian and commercial groups. Liberalism 
prevailed and the ideological climate was by and large
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optimistic and oriented towards the reception of European 
culture since the expansion of European, and above all 
British, capitalism entailed the corresponding expansion of 
local exports. And insofar as the internal differentiation 
of Latin American societies had not yet reached the point 
in which other groups could challenge the superiority of 
the oligarchies, the latter were able to maintain their 
privileged position through the political medium of semi­
liberal institutions. The consciousness of dependence was 
largely non-existent and backwardness was perceived as the 
internal obstacle to westernisation (Spalding 1977)20.
The consolidation and the very success of the pattern of 
outward growth soon led, however, to the internal 
differentiation of Latin American societies. Urbanisation, 
and the emergence of middle sectors and of a rudimentary 
working class as a result of subsidised industrialisation, 
determined the appearance of a larger variety of outlooks 
and ideologies and led to the emergence of new types of 
intellectuals, and to the organisation of oppositional 
movements of some consequence. Greaves, for example, has 
suggested that in Viru, Peru, the transition from patron - 
client relations to contractual relations generates a 
proletarian consciousness (Greaves 1972)21. While 
liberalism crystallised into positivism - thus reflecting 
the consolidation of the processes of 'nation-building' - 
both oppositional and reactive ideologies made their 
appearance; nationalism, socialism, communism etc. The 
social structure was now perceived as susceptible to
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crisis. converging with these developments, the pole of 
dominance of the international economy shifted 
particularly after World War 1 - to the United States.
Up to that point the dominant elites had managed to 
establish a political organisation fitted both to the 
internal needs of oligarchic rule and to the external 
demands of the world market. The 'liberal-oligarchic' 
state had served their requirements and a liberal and 
humanistic culture had sanctioned their rule, as long as 
there was no political mobilisation of other groups in 
their societies. Yet the very operation of this system 
within the established international division of labour had 
stimulated social change and internal differentiation 
(Halper and Sterling 1971)22. As will be shown, this was 
particularly important in Bolivia after the disasterous 
results of the Chaco War. Here nationalist ideologies 
became more prevalent - it was no longer the early reactive 
nationalism of the traditional groups, but the bourgeois 
'developmental' nationalism which assumed strong populist 
features. This new nationalism was the expression of an 
urban middle class making a bid for social and political 
hegemony through a complicated system of class alliances, 
while the oligarchic rule was weakened.
In order, therefore, to fully understand the relationship 
between ideology, education and social change in Bolivia it 
is necessary to incorporate into the analysis the concepts 
of dependency and underdevelopment. In the following two
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chapters the relationship between education, dependency,
underdevelopment and social change in Latin America will be
more fully explored.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R
EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA
In discussing the role which education might pluy in social 
change in developing countries it is necessary to consider 
the social and political constraints on the development of 
formal education. The following chapter will look in more 
detail than previously at the way in which education in 
many Latin American states is related to the social, 
political and economic ties between Latin America and the 
developed world.
Many studies concerned with the relationship between 
education and socio-economic development analyse the 
relationships between the stage of education, measured 
usually by the percentage of illiterates, education levels 
of the population, the percentage of the population 
registered in the different levels and branches of the 
education system etc, and the level of development of the 
country concerned, measured by indicators such as per 
capita income and the percentage of the population classed 
as urban. In all of these studies several assumptions are 
held with regard to 'modernisation' and development with 
which comparisons are made and thus it is thought possible 
to establish a 'continuum' between 'backward' education 
systems and 'developed' education systems, where the 
position of each system can be measured according to such 
yardsticks as the percentage of illiterates etc.
These studies provide abundant empirical information but, 
as Sharp suggests, their explanatory capacity is limited by 
the fact that these comparisons are operated independently
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of the actions carried out by specific social groups in a 
concrete historical setting (Sharp 1980)1. The education 
system and the processes involved in it, do not constitute 
universal facts, in that we can speak of an 'education for 
a 'society' independently from specific situations and, as 
such, valid for any historical period or any society.
As stated in Chapter Three, the basic premise of this 
thesis is that the education system in contemporary 
capitalist societies is a "historical creation of the 
bourgeoisie in power, fulfilling specific functions which 
are realised in the general function of the reproduction of 
bourgeois society and its modalities of exploitation 
(Sharp 1980)2.
The basic premise is supported by the following additional 
premises. The first of these is that the education system 
is an integral part of the economic, social and political 
activities of a society. Schooling does not take place in 
a social vacuum. More specifically the essential nature of 
the relationship between schooling and other social 
institutions is caught in Marx's statement that it is not 
the consciousness of men which determines their social 
being, but, rather, their social being which determines 
their consciousness. That is to say that it is men's 
experiences of living in the world which influence how and 
what they think about the world. Man's world is formed in 
his consciousness but the consciousness itself is formed by 
the conditions of his material existence in the world (Marx
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1939)3.
The second additional premise is the fact that the inter 
relationship between the education system and the rest of 
society's components is dynamic, such that the education 
system is subject to continual transformation resulting 
from changing economic, social and political pressures.
Thirdly, control of the education system is very important 
to competing groups, since schooling is seen to both 
reflect and promote the interests of these groups. The 
form, content and distribution of education reflects the 
distribution of power in society, and therefore, change in 
education always follows on from changes in the 
distribution of power.
Fourthly, education is so heavily conditioned by 
constraints and compromises of the past that it has to be 
seen as reproducing three societies simultaneously, the 
past, the present and the future.
Fifthly, the relationship between the education system and 
the economy of a country is much more complicated than one 
of direct "correspondence". It has been argued by, for 
example, Bowles and Gintis (1976)4, that the education 
system is characterised by a "correspondence" between the 
hidden curriculum of the school and the structure and the 
hierarchy of the place of work thereby assuring industrial 
concerns of a workforce whose attitudes have been
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conditioned to the requirements of industry. This view is 
too deterministic, because education systems in all states 
have a degree of autonomy from either their economic 
requirements or their political demands and, consequently, 
the relationship between an education system and that 
country's economy needs to be focused on the relationship 
of each of them respectively to the state, which is the 
immediate provider and controller of education.
It is also important to realise that the state's influence 
on educational practice is, by no means, wholly the result 
of consciously planned educational policy. This discussion 
of the relationship between both the education system and 
the economy to the state in a particular country, leads to 
the difficult question of defining what is meant by the 
'state'5. Despite the difficulties of definition this 
analysis is crucial because it helps to explain how, as 
well as why, the needs of capitalism are imposed on 
society.
Sixthly, political ideology plays a significant role in 
defining the nature of the education system in a society 
because there is, inherently, in any substantive ideology 
an education programme that conforms at a theoretical level 
to the principles of that ideology and, at the same time, 
seeks to foster and sustain those principles throughout the 
society.
Therefore in studying the relationship between education
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and social change it is important to focus on the class 
structure of the period to be analysed, and the changing 
pattern of class alliances. Further, in Bolivia, the 
education system and the processes carried out within it 
possess distinctive characteristics in contrast to other 
(non-Latin American) education systems, given the specific 
character of its 'dependent' socio-economic formation. 
This is because no modern state stands in isolation from 
the rest of the world. All societies are connected with 
one another historically, economically, culturally and 
ideologically. Development in different parts of the world 
is strongly influenced by the dynamics of the total world 
economy. Consequently, as Wickham has shown in Eire 
(Wickham 1980)6, an effective understanding of an education 
system can only be accomplished if the nature of the wider 
international contexts within which it is embedded is also 
understood. This is, despite the contributions of Wickham 
and others, generally a very difficult goal to achieve. 
Anderson, for example, states that "comparison between 
complex societies is, so to speak, logically impossible yet 
scientifically imperative". (Anderson 1959)7.
The concern of this thesis is, therefore, on the one hand 
with the reality of Bolivian society with its un^Dalanced 
distribution of wealth, opportunity and power consequent on 
its exploitative mode of production, and on the other, with 
setting the structure of Bolivian society within its global 
context.
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The conditions of underdevelopment and dependence in 
Bolivia, and her education system, do not belong to 
different spheres of reality but are part of a single 
phenomenon whose components are strongly interconnected at 
internal and external levels. This is because each country 
has its own, unique, development problems that are dictated 
by both external and internal conditions. In trying to 
analyse this fully it is necessary to apply conceptual and 
analytical tools such as class conflict, in order to unveil 
the hidden structural roots of the underdevelopment of the 
country.
Education systems both shape and are shaped by the patterns 
Of development which govern the way in which different 
societies change through time. The question of how 
important they are in promoting or hindering development is 
a very difficult one to answer. It is a question that 
needs to be analysed against a broad understanding of the 
interconnections which tie education in with all the 
different types of social structure. This is because any 
education system is directly affected by the mechanisms of 
income and resource distribution, and these mechanisms 
mould education programmes thereby either inhibiting or 
promoting development g o als. Consequently the
understanding of education systems needs a broader set of 
techniques than the hitherto often used narrow and rather 
crude techniques of economics. Economics appears to be, as 
Balogh indicates, too 'mechanistic' to grasp the subtleties 
of the education - development,equation (Balogh 1974)8. In
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fact, broad generalisations about education and economic 
growth have no credence unless account is taken of the 
institutional and other factors in an economy and society 
which mould education.
Consequently, what needs to be analysed is, first, the way 
in which the social and political structures in Bolivian 
society (including the state itself) respond to and mould 
patterns of educational investment, and secondly, what are 
the results of that investment. According to Williamson 
(1^79)9 and others, the argument that Third World societies 
require education in order to grow economically founders 
when the actual consequences of education investment and 
policies are examined. This can be illustrated with 
reference to four issues, each of which is connected to 
each other.
The first issue concerns the rural-urban imbalance in 
educational provision. Smith and others have shown that 
the possibilities of upward social mobility through 
education clearly discriminate against people from rural 
areas. For example, rural areas in general, in Latin 
America, have a higher illiteracy rate, shorter duration of 
schooling, fewer schools per head of population, fewer, 
classrooms per school, and fewer grades offered per school, 
than urban areas (Smith 1964)10.
The geographical concentration of the economy in urban 
areas thus has strong correlations with the geographical
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concentration of school opportunities. Secondary and 
university education are almost totally urban phenomena. 
Pearse, for example, has shown that there is a tendency for 
the educational institutions Already established in urban 
areas to obtain a disproportionately high percentage of 
educational resources and consequently deprive rural areas 
of any real share in the growth of education (Pearse
1974)11.
There are a number of reasons for this concentration of 
education in urban areas. For example, towns and cities 
obviously have large population concentrations in 
relatively small areas. It, therefore, costs less, pro 
rata, to educate an urban as opposed to a rural child. 
Further, there are indeed fewer children to educate because 
urban occupations have less use for child labour than have 
agricultural occupations.
The advantages of geographical location, which are caused 
by the economic functions of these locations as production 
centres, are also reflected in the university system. Even 
though the Universidad Nacional in Colombia is a public 
institution with very low fees, more than half of the 
student population live in cities with over 100,000 
inhabitants, while the total population of these cities 
represents 32% of the total national population, whereas 
rural areas or towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants, 
which represent 50% of the national population, provide 11-^  
of the university students. The pre-university origins of
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these students show up this disparity even more clearly. 
75.3% of the university students originate from towns with 
over 100,000 inhabitants whereas from towns with less than 
10,000 only 1.3% of university students originate (1978 
figures). Moreover, admissions examinations represent 
class discrimination which is orientated to the high and 
middle class culture.
The second issue concerns the relevance of the curriculum 
to the majority of the pupils. Tibor Mende, for example,
has argued that
"As a matter of fact, much of education now dispensed
in poor countries is not only irrelevant to the
solution of the problems they face but tends to be
positively harmful. It perpetuates contempt for menial
tasks, and widens the gulf between the privileged
minorities and the under-educateà or illiterate
masses". ,(Tibor Mende 1973)12
In addition, the World Bank has reported that
"Serious imbalances are observed between the skills 
generated by education systems and actual needs of 
most developing countries. In some areas, the number 
of graduates surpasses the absorptive capacity of 
labour markets, while in others critical shortages of 
skills continue to create problems.
These discrepancies between the supply of, and demand 
for, skills are caused by a complex set of social,-
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cultural and political conditions and aspirations 
which condition the development to respond to 
countries' needs is accentuated by the fact that 
education institutions have been borrowed from 
developed countries and have not acquired an 
indigenous character" (World Bank Report 1974)13.
There is, therefore, a marked contrast between manpower 
needs and educational output, and this often leads to 
either the use of imported trained labour, or the sending 
away of able students to developed countries to train. 
Many of the latter do not return to their own country to 
work.
Additional problems are caused by the fact that when formal 
education is regarded as crucial to the maintenance of 
social status, the interest of those in power is likely to 
be in preserving a form of education that guarantees that 
status. In almost all Latin American countries, for 
example, secondary education is, in terms of the projected 
economic needs of the countries, disproportionately centred 
on traditional academic education strongly emphasising the 
humanities. This academic education is mainly concentrated 
in private schools and is the usual preparation for 
university entrance.
The third issue concerns the inequality within society 
which is maintained and legitimated through education. The 
literature relating to this issue is extensive both in
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relation to 'developed' and Third World countries. Taking 
one example to illustrate the point, the World Bank Report 
in 1974 described the situation thus:
"The regressive character of educational systems and 
policies is a prevailing feature in most cases,* 
irrespective of the level of development of countries. 
Educational systems not only fail to ensure mass
participation ....  they also practice discrimination
in their process of selection, promotion and future 
determination of careers. They show an elitist bias, 
favpuring urban upper - and middle - income groups at 
the expense of the rural and urban poor". (World Bank 
Report 1974)14.
The fourth issue centres around the view expounded by 
Roberts, that a Third World education system "is itself a 
social product whose form is determined by the sequence of 
social changes now occurring \n many developing countries" 
(Roberts 1974)15. Consequently, an education system 
changes by responding to both the social and economic 
strategies of people as they themselves undergo social 
change. For urban living, especially in large cities, 
makes it less easy for parents to look after a growing 
child when both of them may work, and when relatives are 
not likely to be resident close by as they are in rural 
settlements. Under these conditions the school becomes 
more significant as an instrument for controlling children 
as well as for educating them. These social and economic
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strategies, therefore, are often in direct or indirect 
conflict with rational economic planning.
The situation is aptly summed up by Acosta - "Education is 
institutional inasmuch as it is concentrated in the 
secondary and higher levels of the system; regional, in the 
urban sections; and social, in the middle and higher 
sectors" (Acosta 1974)16. The education system thus 
discriminates in terms of those people to whom education is 
offered, but it is also selective within the groups which 
have some access to educational opportunities.
The people in society who suffer most as a consequence of 
the issues outlined above are the poor. They are denied 
educational resources and opportunity, and they are unable 
to perceive the structures which cause these denials. 
Paulo Friere has termed this lack of perception the 
' culture of silence'. He came to realise that the 
ignorance and lethargy of the poor was the direct product 
of the whole system of economic, social and political 
domination and of paternalism - of which they were victims. 
Rather than being encouraged and equipped to know and 
respond to the concrete realities of their world they were 
kept 'submerged' in a situation in which such critical 
awareness and response were practically impossible. And it 
became clear to him that the whole education system was one 
of the major instruments for the maintenance of this 
culture of silence (Friere 1972)17.
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In attempting to analyse the relationship between education 
and social change it is important to clarify some of the 
main factors which shape education systems in Third World 
countries. The first pair of factors are the 
interconnecting ones of politics and ideology, and they 
express themselves collectively most readily in 
developmental programmes. Developmental programmes , among 
other things, have a very direct 'influence' in shaping the 
pattern of growth of education, the distribution of life 
chances throughput a population, the form and content of 
schooling and, in particular, the standards of educational 
selection which operate to decide who shall have access to 
the different types and levels of education available. The 
emphasis here is on the world 'influence' - developmental 
programmes are the main intervening variable between the 
type of society and the education system of that society. 
That is not, though, to say that there is a direct 
penetration of ideas from one to the other. In other 
words, developmental programmes cannot be viewed as* 
conceptual devices bridging the gap between the microscopic 
processes of cultural transmission and the macroscopic 
interrelationships between education and social change. 
Indeed, the complex linkages .between the micro and macro 
levels in any country need to be analysed with reference to 
the actual data of that particular country. It is, 
therefore, the intention of this thesis to focus on actual 
Bolivian material when attempting to draw together the 
linkages between the two.
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The purpose of the education system in a developmental 
programme is to produce a social structure that will be 
required for the future development of that society, so" 
that the future of the society can be guaranteed. This 
purpose is essential because the developmental programme is 
that used by a ruling group to manage and to direct 
economic and social change and, consequently, it embodies 
the dominant social values of a society. Developmental 
programmes express the sense of where the dominant groups 
in a society want to be in the future. They, therefore, 
express the direction and manner of change in a society.
Developmental programmes are usually defined in ideological 
terms, and they do not exist in an historical vacuum. In 
consequence, a country undergoing rapid social change often 
has one developmental programme superseded by another. 
This particularly occurs in conditions of political 
instability where programmes of change derived from a 
particular development model have not been fully or 
properly implemented or are, in fact, unsuccessful. It is 
important, therefore, to be aware of how institutionalised 
a particular programme is - the greater its degree of 
institutionalisation and, by extension, the greater its 
support in society at large, is a reflection, to a very 
large extent, of the degree to which a dominant political 
group is in overall control of a country and can 
effectively mobilise mass support for its programme.
The third set of factors which shape education systems in
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Third World countries are the constraints on development 
which these countries face. Developmental programmes in 
all societies are constrained by the factors of limited 
resources and competing priorities. The distribution of 
educational resources is uneven and limited. The limited 
level of resources is not a cause but a symptom of the 
distortions which underdevelopment imposes on social and 
economic life. The developmental programmes and the 
constraints are dialectically related, with the constraints 
preventing particular programmes being realised. The four 
main constraints are those imposed by the structure of the 
economy, those which depend upon traditional patterns of 
economic behaviour, those which relate to the capacity of a 
political leadership to mobilise support for development 
and, most importantly, the constant struggle between 
various social groups for education control which 
determines the balance of power to define instruction at 
any given time.
The fourth set of factors are the demands made upon 
educational resources. What is provided as education in a 
society is the outcome of difference social groups either 
pressing on others what they^ think the others need, or 
demanding more of what kind of education they feel that 
they are entitled to. The resulting compromise between 
provision and demand is always unstable.
The function of education in development is based on its- 
value as a channel for social mobility, and thus as an
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efficient mechanism for egalitarianism, at least in terms 
of opportunity. Its development brings people out of the 
traditional hierarchy in their country, but it also brings 
them into a capitalist hierarchy. While this process has 
elements of liberation, it includes elements of dependency 
and alienation as well. Most importantly, the schools do 
not create the conditions in which the student can begin to 
liberate himself. Rather, the degree of liberation allowed 
by the school is controlled by the dominant classes. 
Consequently, mpst of the traditional mobility channels 
which have included educational, economic, bureaucratic, 
military, ecclesiastical and political channels become 
closed because of the concentrations of capital, income and 
land. There are some very specific exceptions to the 
general lack of mobility, such as the flows between the 
middle and ruling classes, or the appearance of 'new 
groups' of middle classes (Ratinoff 1977)18. However the^ 
appearance of 'new groups' and inter—class upward mobility 
must be dependent upon the ability of the society to adopt 
and facilitate these new elites. This situation can become 
explosive in a context in which populist movements and some 
leftish groups are organising the masses and provoking 
agitation. However, if mobility becomes politically 
necessary as a result of agitation then mobility through 
education is far less onerous and risky politically 
speaking, for the government than a programme of 
generalised mobility by means of the redistribution of 
capital, land and wealth.
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Education is then, in Latin America, a means by which 
peaceful social change may be brought about, a system by 
which covert redistribution of capital, land or income may 
be affected. According to Carnoy, "schooling (in dependent 
countries) serves as a tool to control social change" 
(Carnoy 1974)19. However, does this situation ever arise? 
In a study of education in Colombia the Departamento 
Nacional de Planeacion in 1970 concluded that 881 per 
thousand of the total school age population were excluded 
from social mobility and participation in development. 
However, in Colombia, many of the illiterates which the 
planeacion designate as 'resistant to change' are those 
which ANAPO, a political party , claims as their basic 
support. The participation in party politics by these 
marginal groups indicates some desire to participate in 
social change. Huizer has stated that 'resistance to 
change' of peasants is mainly a reaction of self-defence 
against the resistance of change of the traditional elites 
which fear to lose their domination over the peasants. He 
has shown that the peasants can be mobilised quite well, if 
this is done to change the present status quo for a system 
under which peasants can reasonably expect effective 
improvements (Huizer 1972)20.
'Resistance to change' is then not a personal problem, but 
a structural situation created by the economic situation in 
general and the education system in particular, both of 
which have excluded large marginal groups from education 
opportunities - it is the result of both overt and covert
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repression. Thus education in this sense is a regressive 
factor in development - it supports the structures of 
underdevelopment and it has served as an obstacle to the 
social mobility of the great majority of the population. 
Despite this, it is important to realise that 'resistance 
to change', rather than being an inherent peasant 
characteristic and an impediment to development and change 
can be the beginning of an effective peasant action for 
change. In fact, peasant distrust can be one of the most 
important promoters of change and development if it is 
utilised as a force that brings peasants together in a 
common struggle opposing the traditional vested interest of 
landlords and other repressive forces (Huizer 1972)21. As 
Weffert states, "The awakening of critical consciousness 
leads the way to the expression of social discontents 
precisely because these discontents are real components of 
an oppressive situation" (Weffert 1972)22.
The education structure is a mechanism for ensuring the 
stability of the system, a mechanism for educating the 
'right' person or groups or areas, and consequently it is a 
tool for implementing the needs of foreign interests. 
However, although the education structure has been an 
obstacle to the majority of the population by depriving 
them of opportunities to attend school it has also been an 
effective mechanism for adaption and change to the needs of 
dependency. By gearing itself to modernisation, or to the 
creation of a new technocracy to serve the interests of 
foreign investors in the industrial and public sectors the
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education sector has required large investments and this 
explains the growth of certain middle class groups and the 
expansion of the university and urban secondary school 
systems. In this sense the education structure can be 
viewed as a mechanism for change and adaption and a causal 
factor in underdevelopment and a maintenance of the status 
quo. It is then an internal contradictory structure. 
Education both maintains and destroys the status quo. It 
is a mechanism for elite status maintenance and also a 
mechanism by which new elite - aspirants are created.
However, this situation can be understood by analysing the 
role which the 'new groups' play in the social structure. 
The stabilising role which education plays mainly affects 
the class structure; it does this by offering certain 
possibilities of mobility to those groups which will 
enhance the position of the groups in power. Thus 
education h^s been instrumental in the formation of a new 
middle class or technocracy which plays a double role as an 
ideological supporter of the dominant class and as a 
functional mainspring in dependency, a phenomenon accepted 
and fostered by the dominant class. The dominant class is, 
however, itself dominated by the international pressures 
controlling the natural economy. The situation of the 
'dominated dominant class' represents a contradiction 
between the needs of national development and foreign 
interests which maintain this class in power but induces 
dependency and underdevelopment.
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The fact that the education system is at the same time a 
mechanism of change and of stabilisation can best be 
understood by an analysis of the contradictions 
('contradiction' in the Hegelian sense of the dynamics 
created by the clash of opposites (Hegel 1964)23.) which 
link the education system to society. The principal 
contradictions are, first, the contradiction in the basic 
nature of the capitalist system, ie class contradiction, 
and, second, the contradiction in the dependent situation 
of Latin American society as exemplified by the situation 
of the 'dominated dominant class'. These two
contradictions are highly inter-related and they are 
fundamental to dependency (lanni 1970)24. Education is 
thus a means of inducing the contradictions within society 
as well as containing its own internal contradictions. The 
basic contradiction of the education system is that it 
deprives one class of a chance of attaining a meaningful 
degree of formal education and grants to another class a 
high degree of formal education to be used as a form of 
control and power. The form of this relationship has been 
changing over time in Latin America. During the Colonial 
period the contradiction in education was revealed in 
distinctions made between the aristocracy, white and 
predominantly Spanish and Portuguese, and the native 
Indians, negroes and racially mixed peoples. To attend a 
seminary or a university the applicant had to demonstrate 
his 'purity' of blood for several generations. Education 
was the privilege of the Spanish/Portuguese and of their 
legitimate descendants, that is, the sons born of families
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married by the Catholic Church's rites.
After the end of the colonial period blood and racial pre­
requisites for education were weakened although they did 
not disappear. However, the education structure still did 
not allow a large proportion of the population to attend 
school. The lack of a generalised public primary school 
system made it impossible for the great majority of the 
population to enter higher education. With the development 
of the urbanisation process and 'modernisation' in the 
twentieth century there came an increase in the number of 
■universities and there developed a conflict between the 
dominant class and the new groups in the middle class. At 
the same time divisions developed within the dominant class 
which was made up of both the old landed aristocracy and 
the new industrialists. The latter felt the need for an 
education system geared to the training of rank and file 
workers in industry and services, particularly in urban 
areas. At the same time the middle classes were looking 
for a channel of mobility and the most accessible one was 
education.
The dominant class appears to hold two different 
conceptions regarding the function of education in 
maintaining the system. Some of them believed that it is 
an efficient way of keeping the 'masses' under control by 
keeping them in ignorance (Zeitlin 1967)25. Historically, 
ignorance has been used to stifle the development of 
anything approaching class consciousness or rich - poor
84
consciousness. Other believe that the most effective way 
to ensure the allegiance of the 'masses' is to subdue them 
in a class controlled process of socialisation leading to 
an internalisation of the value system of the dominant 
groups (Lipset and Solari 1967)26. Carnoy, for example, 
states that education expansion and reform were implemented 
in 'independent' Latin American countries when the liberal 
faction of the local elite perceived that its interests 
would be furthered by 'modernising' the economy (Carnoy 
1974)27. The first concept is often that which originates 
from the landed aristocracy, the second that which often 
originates from the new industrial elites, and the two 
views exemplify the wide gulf between the vested interests 
of the dominant class.
In the Bolivian education system these developments were 
clearly visible. However, in Bolivia one factor has caused 
a change in the overall development of the education 
process. It is fairly clear that in many Latin American 
states the education system has generally been used by the 
dominant class to fulfil whatever purpose served them best. 
At a time when a large native technocracy was needed higher 
education in Latin America expanded. The same development 
took place in Bolivia. However, what the industrial elites 
did not realise was that, firstly, once they had offered a 
degree of upward mobility to the new middle classes in 
order that they (the new middle classes) would support 
their (the industrial elites) own status, the new middle 
classes would not be content until they achieved the status
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of the highest echelons of society.
In addition, despite its primary function of selection and 
socialisation, education does produce individuals who are 
not only agents of change within the dependent system, but 
also some who want to break the dependent situation. Thus 
through increasing schooling the dominant groups in society 
may unintentionally create forces opposed to dependency and 
the dominance of the groups who live off the dependent 
system. Further, Landsberger has suggested that collective 
responses are generated when people have had their 
traditional values modified through education through such 
circumstances as participation in military service and war 
(Landsberger 1969)28. In Bolivia the creation of the new 
middle class groups coincided with the very expensive Chaco 
War (1932-35), and consequently the new middle classes used 
the loss which Bolivia suffered for their own benefit. The 
result of this movement and others were crucial to Bolivian 
society. It meant that not only did the education system 
allow for some degree of social change but it went 
considerably further than that. It had in effect acted as 
one of the tools by which the power of the ruling class 
could be modified — "it was a strategic class instrument in 
the struggle to achieve emancipation from oppression and 
the transformation of society" (Landsberger 1969)29.
The central problem in the revolutionary process is that of 
bringing about the participation of an oppressed group as 
divided, unauthentic beings. The mechanism by which this 
transformation may be brought about is the creation of the
86
"critical discovery that both they and their oppressors are 
manifestations of humanisation" (Freire 1972)30. This 
'critical discovery' is based on what Lukacs refers to as 
"explaining to the masses their own actions in order that 
actions might be understood in terms of the relationship 
between the action and the factors which prompted it" 
(Lukacs 1965)31. The 'critical discovery' is based on 
conscientization, and as such is, Freire notes, the only 
mechanism by which revolutionary action can be brought 
about. Conscientization is, as has already been explained, 
the learning to perceive social, political and economic 
contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive 
elements of reality - thus theoretical 'conscious-raising' 
activities have meaning only when united with action. 
Freire points out that:
"the insistence that the oppressed engaged in 
reflection on their concrete situation is not a call 
to armchair revolution. On the contrary, reflection - 
true reflection — leads to action. On the other hand, 
when the situation calls for action, that action will 
constitute an authentic praxis, only if its 
consequences become the object of critical reflection
  Political action on the side of the oppressed
must be pedagogical action in the authentic sense of
the word, hence action with the oppressed ....  The
correct method lies in dialogue. The conviction of 
the oppressed that they must fight for their 
liberation is not a gift bestowed by the revolutionary
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leadership but the result of their own 
conscientization" (Freire 1972)32.
In order that education might become a revolutionary
mechanism it is, therefore, necessary that education be
considered in terms of raising of consciousness.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
THEORIES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
The aim of this chapter is to review theories of 
underdevelopment with reference to contemporary Third World 
countries in general, and Latin America in particular. As 
a consequence of both the vastness and variety of the 
literature concerning theories of underdevelopment, this 
chapter can do no more than provide a brief critical 
overview of the various theoretical perspectives. It is 
also hoped that the chapter will show that the sociology of 
education can profit at a theoretical level from a 
broadening of its scope into comparative studies, and that 
the political and economic problems of underdevelopment can 
be illuminated by studies of education.
A number of difference theories have been proposed in an 
attempt to explain the reasons for underdevelopment. The 
earliest recognisable group of theories were based on the 
notion of social evolution and the implicit assumption that 
Third World countries would follow the same developmental 
path as that taken by Western European countries - the path 
from feudalism to capitalism. These so-called social 
evolution theories evolved directly from two ideas about 
social change; firstly, Weber's polar concept of 
traditional versus modern which was given a Third World 
dimension in this century by the anthropologist Robert 
Redfield in his theory of a folk - urban dichotomy; and, 
secondly, Comte's theory of social evolution in which 
modern society was the culmination of a series of stages of 
human development from a traditional society (Klaren and 
Bossert 1986)1. Thus evolution was conceived of in the
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Spencerian sense as 'a change from a state of relatively 
indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a state of relatively 
definite, coherent heterogeneity' (Carneiro 1968)2. This 
group of theories developed, in particular, after the 
Second World War. According to Myrdal, major recastings of 
economic thought have always been responses to changing 
political conditions (Myrdal 1968)3. The studies of 
development, therefore, which emerged in the late 1940's 
did not spring from an autonomous progression of social 
science theory, but rather from the Western preoccupation 
with the 'new nations' in the context of an emerging cold 
war between East and West (Hermassi 1980)4. In this 
perspective, the Third World countries were seen as 
potential allies by the two super powers and both the 
Soviet Union and the United States held up their own 
experiences as the correct and proper way to develop.
The basic economic tenet of the social evolution theories 
that developed in the West was the Harrod — Domar model 
which states that each increase in output provides the 
basis for further growth because part of the increased 
output is reinvested. At higher income levels the marginal 
propensity to save increases, an(^ therefore economic 
growth, once the process has started, will be self 
sustaining. Thus the problem of development was how to 
break loose from the fetters that prevented the 
underdeveloped countries from marching along the growth 
path, mathematically symbolised in the Harrod - Domar model 
(Hettne 1983)5.
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There was a dual focus in the social evolution theories - 
an attempt to discover the general trends in the 
development of all human societies, and, synonymously, ah 
attempt to analyse the particular "traps" (like high 
population and poverty) that prevented growth in some 
societies. The basic idea was that growth was considered 
to be a unilinear process which would continue eternally 
once momentum was gained. All societies would eventually, 
therefore, following the same path to development. Minor 
deviations from the well-worn path would be righted because 
the ideology behind these theories of development was 
supported by the major international funding agencies like 
the World Bank, the Ford Foundation and the International 
Monetary Fund. The ideology was based on the view that the 
worker is a holder of capital, as embodied in his skills 
and knowledge, and that he has the capacity to invest (in 
himself). By extension, therefore, the wage-earner, who 
holds no property and controls neither the process nor the 
product of his labour, is transformed into a capitalist.
As Comte stated, the unilinear path to development was 
believed to occur by means of a series of stages of 
development. The first of these stages corresponds to 
pre-industrial society where a ceiling exists on the level 
of attainable output per head as a direct consequence of 
the low level of technology. The second stage corresponds 
to a period during which the pre-industrial society starts 
to become transformed by advances in science and technology 
(for example, Britain in the late seventeenth century).
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The third stage corresponds to a time when there is rapid 
change from an agricultural to an industrial base in 
society (for example, the time of the Industrial Revolution 
in Britain). This is followed in stage four by a long 
period of sustained, if fluctuating, progress, whereby the 
regularly growing economy extends technology across all 
economic activities. It is a time when an economy 
demonstrates the capacity to move beyond the original 
industries which caused its rapid change and to broaden its 
technology. Lastly, in stage five, there is the time when 
real income per head rises to a point when large numbers 
gain command over consumption which transcends the basic 
needs of food, shelter and clothing, and where the service 
sector of the economy therefore, employs more people than 
the manufacturing sector (Berger 1976)6.
Social revolution theories had a very influential effect on 
Third World countries. There was both the open direct 
training labour by Western experts, and the more subtle 
importing of Western institutions like the judiciary and 
the police, the promotion of modern Western values and, as 
indicated above with reference to the international funding 
agencies, the imposition of a Western capitalist ideology.
These theories, although attractive, pose a number of 
problems. Firstly, they imply a simple sequence of stages 
through which all societies pass. This rarely happens in 
practice because contact between the underdeveloped and 
other countries leads to the reciprocal diffusion of
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interests and ideas from one to another, and these, being 
historically specific, mould the particular and unique 
development of the country concerned.
Secondly, no satisfactory explanation has been given for 
the mechanism which 'shifts' the society from one 
evolutionary stage to another because structural factors, 
internal or external, were rarely considered - is this 
mechanism a rational result of specific situations or is it 
accidental or random? As Eisenstadt has noted, "The first 
crucial problem concerns the extent to which change from 
one type of society to another is not accidental or random 
but, rather, evinces over-all evolutionary or developmental 
trends" (Eisenstadt 1968)7.
Thirdly, evolutionary theories are too general to explain 
the range of variation of institutions within a society. 
Overall, the problem with evolutionary theories is that not 
all pre-industrial societies are alike and, consequently, 
their wide range of social structures leads to differing 
dynamics of social change.
However, despite these obvious problems with evolutionary 
theory, more sophisticated variants developed, particularly 
technical - functional or modernisation theories. One 
particular example of this group of theories is that 
proposed by W W Rostow in his book 'Stages of Economic 
Growth : A Non-Communist Manifesto' (Rostow 1960)8.
Rostow's idea is that the transition from traditional to
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modern society takes place through five stages.
Rostow calls stage one 'The Traditional Society', defining 
it as one whose structure is developed within limited 
production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science and 
technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the 
physical world. This is followed by stage two 'The 
Preconditions for Take-Off', embracing societies in the 
process of transition; stage three, 'The Take-Off', the 
interval when the old blocks and resistances to steady 
growth are finally overcome; stage four, 'The Drive to 
Maturity'; and, lastly, stage five, 'The Age of High Mass 
Consumption'. This idea is developed from an analysis of 
the British Industrial Revolution, and is based on the 
central point that there is a need to increase the rate of % 
capital investment in a society to the point where growth | 
becomes 'automatic'. "Thus, with the correct economic 
policies, societies which are currently poor can, following 
a well-known trajectory, pass through the stages of , 
development to become fully modern industrial societies" j 
(Rostow 1960)9.
Another well documented theory is that proposed by 
Barrington Moore in his book "The Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy" (Barrington Moore 1966)10. 
This book is an excellent example of historically informed 
theorising, and it attempts a structural explanation of the 
various paths to modernisation for a society. Moore sees 
three routes to modernisation : the classical bourgeois 
revolutions which give rise to democracies; revolution from
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above, by a reactionary alliance between a landed 
aristocracy and a modernising elite, which gives rise to 
variants of fascism; and revolution from below, in which a 
peasant revolt becomes the vehicle for a communist-inspired 
drive towards modernity (Roxborough 1979)11. The central 
structural variables which Moore identifies, and which 
determine which path is followed, have to do with the 
nature of the class structure and, in particular, with the 
response of the landed upper class to the commercialisation 
of agriculture. Moore's theory provides an excellent 
analysis of the historical and structural explanations for 
social change, but it is only applicable to the large, and 
relatively self-contained, societies like China which Moore 
deals with. The theory is a model of endogenous change, 
the realisation of the potential that lies dormant in all 
societies and, as Moore himself notes, it is not capable of 
dealing with small societies which are subject to external 
influences.
Technical-functional or modernisation theories, like the 
two described above, have a number of features in common. 
Firstly, they are concerned with 'modernisation', which 
Berger defines as "the institutional and cultural 
concomitants of economic growth under the conditions of 
sophisticated technology" (Berger 1976)12, and is, for all 
practical purposes, equivalent to Westernisation, since the 
Western countries first reached maturity and, therefore, 
have served as models for the rest of the world. There is 
therefore, an identification of growth with the modern idea
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of progress. Secondly, the state in the Third World 
country has a central role to play in that country's 
development. Thirdly, they are concerned with how 
education contributes to economic growth - they are 
concerned with the relationship between economic growth (as 
measured by per capita GNP) and the level of education (as 
measured by, for example, literacy levels).
Technical-functional or modernisation theories have a 
number of distinct problematic areas, both in a general 
sense and, more specifically, in relation to education. 
They tend to be theories that exist at a high level of 
generality, and they, consequently, supply very little 
empirical evidence to back up their arguments. They also 
tend to imply that underdevelopment is a natural condition 
that will eventually disappear. Frank and many others have 
argued that underdevelopment is not a natural condition but 
is, in fact, a direct consequence of the specific actions 
of Western countries (eg Frank 1971)13. In addition, most 
of the theories are models of endogenous change and their 
analyses omit the discussion of change in the context of 
change. Since it is very rarely endogenous, the context of 
change must somehow be incorporated into the model itself. 
How a society moves from one stage to another will depend 
not only on the internal dynamics of the transition, but 
also on how that society is inserted into the world system 
at a particular point in the development of that system. 
An analysis, therefore, of social change within any given 
society needs an analysis of the way in which that society
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is articulated with the world system.
Further, it is implicit in these theories that Third World 
societies are composed of a modern sector and a traditional 
sector (a 'dualistic economy' (Hettne 1983))14. Frank, in 
contrast has argued that there exists a whole series of 
mechanisms whereby the modern sector exploits the 
traditional sector and thereby generates underdevelopment 
in the traditional sector. He therefore states that there 
are not just two distinct sectors, but rather, a continual 
chain of exploitative relations between the most advanced 
and the most backward sectors of a society (Frank 1971)15. 
It is probable that the answer lies somewhere between these 
two extreme views. There are modern and traditional 
sectors within Third World societies that have some degree 
of autonomy from each other. Equally clearly, there do 
exist all sorts of connections between these two sectors.
In addition, modernisation theories had idealist 
orientations. Drawing considerable inspiration from Weber, 
modernisationists tended to overemphasise the importance of 
values and value change in their development models. As a 
result they paid little attention to the structural 
constraints of class and to the economic realities that 
often made holding "unmodern" values quite rational for 
both peasants — who were caught in the corporatist patron — 
client relationship - and entrepreneurs - who could earn 
more through the state bureaucracy or foreign enterprises 
than they could through their own protestant-eth ic
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entrepreneurialism.
There are also problems created as a consequence of basing 
education systems on these theories. For example, 
education systems of Third World countries do not create a 
pool of skilled labour necessary for industrial "take-off", 
but, rather, they create a rise of 'credentialism', or as 
Dore put it, 'the diploma disease' (Dore 1976)16. In 
consequence, a large number of people with advanced 
academic qualifications are unable to get jobs commensurate 
with these qualifications, and they either emigrate or, 
often, are the leaders of alternative political movements 
within their own country (Foster 1965)17. Further to 
this, there is an assertion within the theories that formal 
schooling transmits the specific skills and/or; general 
knowledge for more highly skilled jobs. This presupposes a 
type of schooling which teaches and selects for skills and 
qualities leading to occupational success in an industrial 
economy. This is not generally found in Latin America 
where formal education continues to reflect the values of a 
traditional, aristocratic society. Schools tend to be 
academic and they emphasise the preparation for fields 
which offer high status, but are not directly productive in 
the economic sense. Indeed, they often foster a disdain 
for manual labour. It has, in fact, been indicated by 
economic cost—benefit analyses that in contrast on-the-job 
training is a much sounder investment (Machlup 1977)18.
In conclusion then, these theories are used to explain the
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relationship between education and the economy. Indeed, 
they do more than explain, they prescribe the optimum 
nature of that relationship, and, according to Karabel and 
Halsey, they do not do it very successfully (Karabel and 
Halsey 1977)19.
Despite the problems associated with modernisation 
theories, both generally, and with specific reference to 
education, many writers on Latin America, particularly 
those from the United States, have applied these theories 
to explain the region's development problems. Lipset, for 
example, was strongly influenced by the ideas of Weber and 
drew directly on the theories of Talcott Parsons in arguing 
the centrality of differing value systems to explain the 
disparity between the development of North and South 
America (Lipset 1967)20. For Lipset, echoing Weber, the 
lack of an entrepreneurial ethic, which he attributed to 
Hispanic feudalism, was crucial in explaining Latin 
American underdevelopment. Underdevelopment could be 
overcome, however, with the spread of a westernised 
education system throughout the region. Both Johnson 
(Johnson 1958)21 and Silvert (Silvert 1967)22 had similar 
views.
The second major group of theories that attempted to 
explain the reasons for underdevelopment are collectively 
termed the 'dependency theories'. The central insight of 
the dependency theorists was that it was of limited value 
to study the development of the societies of the Third
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World in isolation from the development of more advanced 
societies. They, therefore, treated the world as if it 
were a single system. With this as a starting point, the 
problem was to discover the manner in which the Third World 
countries were inserted into this single world system, and 
how this differentiated them from the historical pattern of 
1opment of the more advanced nations (Roxborough 
1979)23. This insight was not new - Marx, for example had 
stressed the importance of the development of a world 
capitalist economic system as a force linking the fates of 
the developed and underdeveloped societies to each other. 
Dependency studies "constitute part of a constantly renewed 
effort to re-establish a tradition of analysis of economic 
structures and structures of domination; one that would not 
suffocate the historical process by removing from it the 
movement which results from the permanent struggle among 
groups and classes, therefore instead of accepting the 
existence of a determined course of history, one looks at 
an open-ended process" (Cardoso 1972)24.
Two factors converged to form the 'dependency school'. The 
first of these were the discussions of underdevelopment 
in the 1950s that coalesced in the work of the United 
Nations Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and the 
second, the revision of orthodox Marxism. The 'dependency 
school' has never had a uniform doctrine shared by all, but 
certain ideas are common to it. Firstly, the most
important obstacles to deve1opment in t h ^  Third Wor 1 d
countries are not thought to be the lack of either capital
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or entrepreneurial skills - on the contrary , they are 
considered to be external to the country concerned, not 
internal to it. Economic backwardness is considered to be 
an historically based phenomenon, the outcome of the poor 
Third World societies having had their economies and social 
systems distorted and conditioned by the overseas expansion 
of capitalist enterprise. Underdevelopment, therefore, is 
not merely a process which is a concomitant of the 
expansion of mercantile capitalism and recurs under 
industrial capitalism, but as one which is actually 
generated by them (Cardoso 1972)25.
Secondly, because "dependency is based upon an 
international division of labour which allows industrial 
development to take place in some countries while 
restricting it in others and whose growth is conditioned by 
and subjected to the power centres of the world" (Dos 
Santos 1973)26, the international division of labour is 
analysed in terms of the relations between regions, of 
which two kinds - the centre and the periphery - assume 
particular importance27. Due to the fact that the 
periphery is deprived of its surplus^ development in the 
centre somehow implies underdevelopment in the periphery 
the "development of underdevelopment" (Foster-Carter
1976)28. Thus development and underdevelopment are 
described as two aspects of a single global process. All 
regions participating in the process are capitalist, but a 
distinction between central and peripheral capitalism is 
made (Hettne 1983)29. Thirdly, dependency itself defines
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the internal situation of a country and it is structurally 
linked to it. Therefore isolation from the rest of the 
world is not considered a solution for a country wanting to 
break away from the chains of dependency. Such action 
would cause chaos in a society which is of its essence 
dependent (Dos Santos 1973)30. The only real alternative 
open for a country is for it to change its internal 
structure. This is very difficult to achieve because it 
would inevitably lead to conflict with the international 
structure.
Dependency theories, therefore, have in common the view 
that economic backwardness is not a phenomenon intrinsic to 
pre-modern societies. Rather it is an historical, 
externally imposed condition. Further this imposition is 
reinforced internally by the willing compliance of 
political and commercial elites (Williamson 1979)31. 
'External' domination is, therefore, in its pure sense 
impracticable. It is practicable only when it finds 
support among those local groups who profit by it (Dos 
Santos 1973)32. The major implication of this view is that 
little fundamental change in Third World countries can take 
place without major realignments in the international 
economy. A consequence of poverty is that Third World 
countries are forced into both debt and aid dependencies 
(Williamson 1979)33. Both these combine to produce a great 
pressure for economic modernisation and for the development 
of a strong sector in the economy. This is the only way 
that these countries can hope to acquire the funds
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necessary for independent industrialisation. But in 
following such a path these countries reinforce their 
position within the capitalist world economy. Under these 
conditions, backed by western aid, the dominant groups 
within these Third World countries adopt western - 
orientated dependency models of development because these 
are the developmental programmes which legitimise the 
further receipt of aid and forms of trade which, in the 
long term, are most likely to be disadvantageous to the 
poorer people within the country concerned.
When analysed in detail, dependency theories fall into two 
distinct categories. The first of these is the approach to 
view dependency as some form of boundary interchange, the 
dependence of one system on another; and the second is the 
approach to view dependency as a conditioning factor which 
alters the internal functioning and articulation of the 
elements of the dependent social formation. The first 
approach views dependency as a relationship between 
difference parties, and the second views dependency as a 
set of structures. The crucial distinctions between the 
two is that in the second approach the internal dynamics of 
the dependent social formation are fundamentally different 
from the internal dynamics of the social formations of 
advanced capitalism.
One example of the first approach was that proposed by 
Frank in his analysis of the relationship between the 
United States and Latin America (Frank 1971)34. The
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process of dependency was, he considered, responsible for 
the underdevelopment of Latin America. The United States, 
Frank claimed, actively underdeveloped Latin America. 
Gerassi extended this argument and he explained that thé 
United States actively underdeveloped of Latin America in 
three specific, recognisable and analysable stages — first, 
by controlling the sources of raw materials for the benefit 
of the United States. Secondly, by controlling the markets 
in the Latin American countries for the benefit of the 
United States producers; and thirdly, by controlling the 
Latin American countries internal developments and economic 
structures so as to guarantee continued expansion of the 
first two stages (Gerassi 1972)36. This latter point is 
particularly important bearing in mind the fact that Marx 
had once warned that the first revolutionary waye in an 
imperialised country will come about as the result of the 
frustration by the national bourgeoisie, which will have 
reached a development stage where it will have accumulated 
enough capital to want to become competitive to the 
industrialising corporations. The United States is not 
allowing this to happen in Latin America.
Frank's analysis, while containing much that is useful in 
further our understanding of the dependency relationship, 
contains a number of problematic areas. Firstly, his 
analysis of colonialism purports to rest on the class 
relationships of capitalist exploitation, but in fact he 
treats these relationships as residual (Roxborough 1979)37. 
That is to say, the conceptualisation of class relations,
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which is present in the theory, is almost totally ignored 
in his analysis of the relations of domination and 
subordination. Consequently, he does not analyse the 
relationships of exploitation in terms of social classes, 
and he, therefore, does not explain different levels of 
development and underdevelopment - or, more appropriately, 
levels of exploitation between nations (Leys 1977)38. 
Secondly, according to Laclau (1971)39, Frank's definition 
of capitalism differs radically from the Marxist one, since 
it emphasises exchange and commercial relationships rather 
than the actual processes of production. In particular, he 
confuses participation in the world capitalist economic 
system with the dominance of the capitalist mode of 
production in Latin America (Roxborough 1979)40. It is 
implicit in this notion that dependent social formations 
were, to a certain extent, "passive victims" of their place 
in the world capitalist economy which was the single main 
determinant of the internal economic and class structure. 
This failure to recognise the significance of autonomous 
Third World histories, especially the process of class 
formation, or to highlight the resistance to colonialism, 
shows Frank's failure to understand the two-way nature of 
the relationships between social formations (Brenner
1977)41. Thirdly, although Frank uses sound evidence to 
demonstrate that the economies of Latin America produce 
primarily for the world market and have, in fact, being 
closely tied to this world market since the sixteenth 
century some of his conclusions are questionable. For 
example, Frank concludes from this that Latin America has
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been capitalist from the time of the Iberian conquest. The 
implication therefore is that if the Iberians implanted a 
capitalist society into Latin America in the early 
sixteenth century, then Spain and Portugal must themselves 
have been capitalist at that time. It is very debatable as 
Marx rightly said, to consider that capitalism developed in 
the Iberian Peninsula before it developed in England. 
Frank tries to overcome this problem by saying that it was 
the mercantile capitalist sector of Iberian society that 
was responsible for the implementation of capitalism in 
Latin America. This simply pushes the same problem back 
one stage further.
Overall, therefore, Frank simplified the debate, disdained 
the specificity of the situation, and failed to attempt any 
sort of theoretical scheme of a dialectical type that might 
draw together the general and the particular in a specific 
whole (Cardoso 1972)42.
In conclusion if, as Frank and others have argued, 
dependency is viewed merely as a relationship between two 
countries then, as Quijano says
"the concept would have no other function than to 
replace, for certain purposes, the concept of 
'imperialism', without providing the necessary 
understanding of how the articulation of elements 
produced by imperialist domination, giving rise to a 
determinate socio-economic formation subordinated to
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it, is carried out" (Quijano 1974)43.
This problem has been recognised by a number of dependency 
theorists who belong to the second category outlined above 
— those that view dependency as a set of structures. One 
example of an exponent of this approach is Dos Santos. He 
defines dependency as
"a situation in which a certain group of countries 
have their economies conditioned by the development 
and expansion of another economy, to which their own 
is subjected" (Dos Santos 1970)44,
and "dependency conditions a certain internal 
structure which redefines it as a function of the 
structural possibilities of the distinct national 
economies" (Dos Santos 1970)45.
Dos Santos' definitions contain two parts. The first part, 
which asserts that dependency is a relationship between two 
groups off economies (those that condition others, and those 
that are conditioned by them), does not constitute an 
advance on previous formulations of the problem, for 
example, the work of Frank. After all, all economies are 
interdependent and they condition each other in a 
reciprocal manner, therefore there is a need to specify the 
nature of the dependency. The second part attempts to do 
just this by stating that dependency is a certain internal 
structure different from that of the advanced nations.
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Problems, though, subsequently arise when attempts are made 
to conceptualise these structural differences. There have 
been two specific lines of approach to this problem. The 
first asserts that there is a mode of production in 
dependent countries which is different from that of 
advanced countries (the 'peripheral' and 'central 
capitalisms mentioned above). The second asserts that 
while the dependent countries have a capitalist mode of 
production, the articulation of this capitalist mode of 
production with the other modes of production in that 
country's social formation and with the economies of the 
advanced industrial countries, results in a different 
manner of functioning of that mode of production.
Turning specifically to Latin America, an adéquat^ 
conceptualisation of its history must take into account the 
diversity of historical experiences of the various 
republics. Only one example within the dependency 
perspective adequately meets this criterion. This is the 
work initially formulated by Cardoso and subsequently 
refined with the help of Faletto (Cardoso and Faletto 
1979)46.
The main theme of Cardoso and Faletto's work is the 
relationship that exists between political struggles of 
groups/classes, on the one hand, and the history of 
economic - political structures of domination, both 
internal and external, on the other. Thus, they argue, it 
is of less interest to us to catalogue events than to seek
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in them the meaning of basic structural relationships and 
the stages of their development in their double 
determination: on the level of local systems of domination 
and on the level of their relationship with the 
international order. Political and economic processes 
appear in the latter as if they were the expression of a 
struggle between nation states, but they also involve 
conflicts between social groups/classes (after Roxborough 
1984)47.
In order, therefore, to explain the historical process from 
the theoretical perspective of dependence, it is necessary 
to make explicit how international conflicts between states 
are linked with international political struggles as well 
as with the basic ways whereby, both domestically and 
internationally, the social organisation of economic 
production takes place. In other words, the key question 
is one of political power - how class alliances are formed 
and political decisions taken in each country in a given 
historical circumstance.
Specifically, Cardoso and Faletto indicate the key 
variables which enable the researcher to make sense of the 
multiplicity of developinent paths followed by Latin 
American countries. Their starting point is (x
differentiation of types of export economies in the 
nineteenth century into two basic types. These are enclave 
economies, for example, plantation and mining economies, 
where the ownership of the wealth of the country is
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foreign; and economies where there is a national control of 
the productive system. Cardoso and Faletto argue that this 
difference in the structure of the export sectors led to 
different trajectories for these two groups of countries. 
The key question facing Latin American states in the early 
part of this century was how the middle classes would be 
incorporated politically. In the enclave economies the 
state was under the exclusive domination of the oligarchy. 
As a consequence, the incorporation of the middle classes 
could proceed either by a breakdown of the oligarchic 
order, as occurred in Bolivia in 1952, or as a result of 
conflicts among the dominant classes, enabling a middle 
class challenge to succeed, as in Chile. In this path, the 
role of the state was a key to the success or otherwise of
the project.
In the societies where there was national control of the 
productive system, the state reflected a co—existence of 
the oligarchy and the bourgeoisie. Here also there were 
two possible routes to the incorporation of the middle 
classes. Where there was a substantial degree of unity 
among dominant classes, the incorporation of the middle 
classes would occur under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie 
as, for example, in Argentina. In countries where dominant 
classes were fragmented, for example, Brazil, there was 
only a partial incorporation of the middle classes. In 
both enclave and nationally owned export sector situations, 
middle class challenges to the system of oligarchic 
domination might fail, due to the resistance of the
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oligarchy and/or the weakness of the middle classes, for 
example, Colombia (after Roxborough 1984)48.
This, in brief, is the basic idea of Cardoso and Faletto. 
Variations in the structure of the dominant class are used 
to explain differing political outcomes in terms of the 
varying modes of incorporation of the middle classes.
Cardoso and Faletto's work advances previous dependency 
theory because a number of different political paths can be 
traced because it looks at two dichotomous variables 
(national versus foreign ownership of the export sectors, 
and the degree of dominant class unity). Despite this, the 
theory is in part defective. For example, the terms 
'middle class', 'bourgeoisie' and 'oligarchy' are not 
defined. This provides difficulties in analysing socio­
economic conflict because the key issues in the theory 
revolve around the degree of unity or otherwise of the 
dominant classes, and the relationships between them and 
the state. If the basic terms used are not adequately 
defined, conflicts tend to be inferred rather than 
demonstrated empirically.
Further, Cardoso and Faletto's theory concentrates 
exclusively on the dominant class. Social change is better 
analysed in terms of conflicts and tensions between and 
within dominant and subordinate classes (Henfrey 1981)49. 
Also, while the methodology of the work is excellent, their 
empirical analysis suffers from a number of serious
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problems. For example, they refer to class unity in 
Argentina. Others, for example Smith, disagree. Smith
argues that, particularly amongst the 'cattle people',
there are a number of different classes (Smith 1969)50. 
Cardoso and Faletto also argue that in Brazil the division 
within the ranks of the dominant class was sectoral, 
between the coffee oligarchy and industrialists. Others 
have argued that the divisions in Brazil were along 
regional lines. This had its origins in the changing 
pattern of Brazil's exports, the historical development of 
which meant that regions, and within them, regional 
oligarchies, rose and fell as their exports prospered and 
declined in the world market (Dean 1969)51.
Overall, the key variables of the Cardoso - Faletto model 
had to do with the structure of the dominant classes. This 
derived from the nature of the productive system, in 
particular, from the organisation of the export sectors and 
their linkages with the world market. This is an advance 
on previous writing on dependency because it enables the 
researcher to incorporate into a single theoretical 
framework both a, concern for situations of external 
dependency and a focus on the productive structures of the
particular Latin American country.
In conclusion, therefore, dependency can be regarded as a 
social formation defined by the complex articulation, both 
internal and external, of several modes of production. 
Continued backwardness is the result of the way in which
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these modes are articulated, and the specific articulations 
are the result, not of chance but of an historical process 
of imperialist domination. The overall result is that 
these different modes of production are articulated in such 
a way as to either discourage growth, or to transfer the 
benefits of growth abroad.
There are a number of general criticisms that can be 
levelled at all the dependency theories. For example, in 
the real world no country is either self-reliant, or 
develops merely as a reflection of another country. All 
countries are dependent on each other, and on the system of 
which they form a part. This dependency, though, varies 
from country to country in both kind and degree. This has 
led to most theoretical analyses that have developed in the 
wake of dependency theory to assume the existence of one 
strongly integrated world. Further, dependency theories 
fail to propose alternative paths to growth that do not 
depend on trade and foreign investment; they overemphasise 
the importance of the United States in Latin America, and 
are unable to distinguish between national security 
interests and United States economic interests; and, social 
classes are not defined with sufficient clarity 
generally, the theorists have failed to devote enough 
effort to the history and dynamics of the class formation, 
to the various forms of appropriating surplus within 
peripheral social formations, and to the class struggles 
which have characterised and continue to characterise these 
places (Forbes 1986)52.
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Turning specifically to the position of education within 
Third World countries, dependency theories, unlike the 
modernisation theories outlined above, contain very few 
prescriptions, implicit or explicit, for education because 
they concentrate mainly on purely economic factors. They 
therefore have a somewhat economic reductionist stance by 
taking education, and other 'superstructural' phenomena, to 
be largely determined by the economic base of a country 
(Dale et al 1981)53. It is fallacy to suppose that all 
other factors in society are determined by economic ones, 
as Williams has so cogently shown (Williams 1973)54. 
Education in Third World countries is also affected to a 
large degree by both internal political constraints and 
cultural traditions.
When education is mentioned by the dependency theorists it 
is viewed as contributing, not to development, but to 
increased dependency. According to Carnoy it is usually 
seen as a form of 'cultural imperialism' (Carnoy 1974)55. 
The main argument of cultural imperialism is that the power 
and influence of some states over others is not confined to 
strictly economic spheres, but to cultural spheres as well. 
This sees the education system of weaker countries as being 
shaped in the image of more powerful countries, either as 
part of their colonial legacy, or because it seems an 
important step in their development. It also involves the 
cultural penetration of their education systems by 
curricula and textbooks originally produced with the 
schools of the dominant society in mind. This
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influence and. penetration is from two sources the 
advanced industrial countries like the United States, and 
international organisations like the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank (Carnoy 1974)56. The main problem 
with 'cultural imperialism' is that it tends to homogenise 
both sides of the dependent - dominant country 
relationship, to blur the many subtle (and not so subtle) 
differences between modes of domination through education, 
and the ways in which it is received and consumed (Dale 
1981)57.
Many dependency theorists analyse the dominant - dominated 
situation in Third World countries (for example, lanni 
1970)58. Their theories tend to break down when they try 
to come to terms with the interconnection between the 
'internal' and 'external' factors. One radical way of 
dealing with the internal - external problem has been 
suggested by Wallerstein with his 'world—system 
perspective' (Wallerstein 1974)59. He abolishes the 
distinction altogether by making the world system his unit 
of analysis. He says that he
"abandoned the idea altogether of taking either the 
sovereign state or that vaguer concept, the national 
society, as the unit of analysis. I decided that 
neither one was a social system and that one could 
only speak of social change in social systems. The 
only social system in this scheme was the world 
system" (Wallerstein 1974)60.
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Wallerstein believes that the modern world comprises a 
single capitalist world economy, which has emerged 
historically since the sixteenth century, and which still 
0 xists today. Internal class contradictions and political 
struggles of a particular state must be understood by 
initially siting them in the world economy. The ways in 
which various political and cultural thrusts may be efforts 
to alter or preserve a position within this world economy/ 
which is to the advantage or disadvantage of particular 
groups located within a particular state, can then be 
understood. Therefore, Wallerstein's theory holds that the 
constraints are entirely economic, that the ability of 
developing societies to control their own destiny is 
entirely a function of their place in the capitalist world 
economy.
This is, in fact, similar to the position put forward by 
Frank. However, the notion of a world system forms the 
focus of Wallerstein's work in a way that it does not in 
the work of the dependent theorists, where it serves the 
primary function of defining a set of external influences 
which explain the under-development of the Third World.
The main argument against Wallerstein's theory is that the 
relationship between developed and underdeveloped is not as 
dependent as he would have us believe (Skocpol and 
Trimberger 1978, George 1980, Skocpol 1982)61. The single 
world capitalist economy in which all countries are 
structurally located has political as well as economic
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dimensions. Consequently, a Third World country has a 
degree of independence in its ability to play-off one 
powerful nation against another (Dale 1981)62.
To conclude, whatever version of dependency analysis is 
accepted, it must be recognised that much-needed reforms 
are impossible without a restructuring of the mode of 
articulation of the economy of a country with the world 
economy. Most dependency theorists argue that this 
restructuring will be opposed by the ruling class in the 
dependent country and by imperialism, and that this 
resistance will only be overcome by a revolution. 
Therefore dependency theorists argue that the only 
realistic alternatives are either revolution or continued 
dependence.
In recent years the dependency school has tended to 
decrease in importance and its demise has left an awkward 
theoretical vacuum. Its critics have generally been less 
successful in pointing out new theoretical directions than 
in criticising the old. A number of alternatives to 
dependency theory have, though, been developed. One 
example of these alternatives is the status - conflict 
theory, a theory derived from the work of Weber, and 
developed by a number of sociologists, in particular 
Collins with his work on the United States (1971)63. 
According to this theory, society is regarded as being 
characterised by cultural groups struggling continuously 
with each other for wealth, power and prestige. Membership
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of these groups gives individuals a sense of identity 
there is a general acceptance by group members of one 
another as status equals. The theory further maintains 
that the status groups use the schools to preserve and even 
strengthen their positions in society. The schools are 
able to do this because their main function is to teach and 
select for particular groups by imparting the values and 
culture associated with the group in control of the 
education system. Thus, as La Belle and Verhine state, 
"educational requirements for employment, rather than 
flowing from functional economic demands, enable the 
particular status group controlling schools to control the 
work place as well. By basing occupational attainment on 
educational attainment, the elite status group assures the 
selection of higher level employees from its own membership 
and lower level workers who at least have been 
indoctrinated to respect its cultural superiority" (La 
Belle and Verhine 1975)64. The status - conflict theory 
suggests that, because the number of qualified people in 
society increases over time, the educational requirements 
for particular jobs also rises. This is because other 
status groups, in particular the midole classes, demand the 
education that will enable them to compete with the elite. 
Consequently, employers raise their educational 
requirements to maintain the relative prestige of their own 
occupational position.
Therefore, the basic argument of the istatus — conflict 
theory is that "what explains the increase in educational
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provision is not the increasing need of the economy for 
skills, but rather conflict between various status groups 
within society for educational qualifications which provide 
access to desirable occupational and social positions". 
(Dale 1981)65. The theory highlights the fact that there 
are a multiplicity of causes for any education system, and 
these stem from a wide range of possible struggles between 
economic, religious and cultural groups for all kinds of 
domination, economic success and prestige (Dale 1981)66.
Thus the status - conflict theorists èee a far wider range 
of interests than purely economic ones playing important 
parts in shaping the patterns of educational provision. 
Education is therefore recognised as being involved with
cultural organisation as well as with the material economy, 
and that the relationship between the two is not one way. 
This argument is counter to the economic reductionism of 
both cultural imperialism and international organisations 
like the World Bank.
A refinement of the status — conflict theory has been 
proposed by Pomfret (1979)67 who combined Collins s theory 
of cultural markets with Wallerstein's 'world—system
perspective'. This combination was proposed because, while 
Collins's theory contained much of value, the cultural
markets in the theory were 'given', there being no attempt 
at an explanation of the composition and workings of the 
markets themselves and how and why they change
historically. Pomfret's theory is an advance on status-
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conflict theory, particularly with regard to the analysis 
of the central role played by education in society, but by 
incorporating the views of Wallerstein, much of the theory 
is again reducible to the economic.
Another alternative to the dependency theories is the 
revival of orthodox Marxism, particularly the idea that 
Third World imperialism is the pioneer of capitalism. One 
of its main exponents is Warren (1980)68. This perspective 
not only contradicts the whole dependency and 
underdevelopment tradition, but also much of what Lenin 
wrote about imperialism. Warren, in straight Marxian 
terms, restates the conventional wisdom of the 1950s and 
1960s, namely the industrialisation of the West initiated 
and accelerated modern development in the rest o f , the 
world. Thus the least industrialised countries of today 
can see in the so-called newly industrialised countries an 
image of their own future. It is arguable, though, whether 
this ever happens (Scheffer 1981)69. Even countries that 
have developed industrially along Western lines, countries 
like South Korea and Taiwan, have not taken the same path. 
In addition, both of these countries have been favoured by 
strategic considerations as 'free world' bastions in a 
highly sensitive area, and in South Korea in particular, 
the control of the situation is, in part, related to its 
political system — a repressive military regime. 
Therefore, it is becoming increasingly apparent that it is 
necessary to look at the development of a country in the 
context of the changing world economy.
122
Further alternatives are those theories within which the 
dependency perspective has been incorporated. There is, 
for example, the neo-structural approach of Sunkel and 
Fuenzalida (1979)70, based on the ideas of Furtado71, which 
concentrates on the 'transnational capitalist system'. 
This approach can be regarded as dualism at the global 
level since the most striking feature of the system is the 
polarised development of transnationalization, on the one 
hand, and national disintegration on the other. Starting 
with the first aspect, the capitalist system is in the 
process of change from an international to a transnational 
structure with "the transnational corporations as the most 
significant actors" (Hettne 1983)72. Looking at the other 
side of this dual global structure, the national societies, 
as a consequence of the transnational process, undergo a 
process of disintegration, implying a disruption of 
indigenous economic societies and a concentration of 
property and income. Indeed Cardoso argued that multi 
national corporations caused the 'internationalization of 
the internal market' (Cardoso 1972)73.
À number of recent neo-Marxist approaches to the problem 
have been formulated. They concentrate on the articulation 
of modes of production, and, following the failure of, 
particularly, the dependency theories to tackle the Marxist 
analysis of production relations or provide a focus for the 
micro-analysis of production relations, they have come to 
occupy a more central position in the debate on 
underdevelopment. Briefly, these approaches are based upon
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a theory of imperialism which sees the security of cheap 
labour supplies as the dominant impulse in the expansion of 
capitalism outwards from the centre. In the main though, 
they focus on the articulation of capitalist and pre­
capitalist modes of production in peripheral social 
formations, demonstrating the dominant role of capitalism 
within articulation and the way in which this dominance is 
used to 'conserve' and 'dissolve' the pre-capitalist modes 
of production74.
The most comprehensive recent attempt to develop a theory 
of the articulation of modes of production is by Taylor 
(Taylor 1979)75. He rejects the concept of under­
development and substitutes the notion of a transitional 
social formation "which is dominated by an articulation of 
(at least) two modes of production - a capitalist and a 
non-capitalist mode - in which the former is, or is 
becoming, increasingly dominant over the other" (Taylor 
1979)76. The result is that peripheral social formations 
are characterised by a series of dislocations between 
levels of the social formation . Thus Taylor substitutes a 
notion of restricted and uneven development for 
underdevelopment.
The 'articulation of modes of production' theories have 
been able to overcome the problems of scale implicit in, 
particularly, the dependency and world systems approaches. 
Nevertheless, these studies give pre-eminence in 
explanations of the underdevelopment of petty production to
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exchange mechanisms and the transfer of value which these 
bring about. As Brenner has argued, dependence on the flow 
of surplus across space puts stress on a quantitative 
process producing underdevelopment and masks the 
qualitative processes behind it (Brenner 1977)77. Just as 
accumulation begs the question of why the accumulated 
surplus should be used for productive investment, so the 
loss of economic surplus cannot provide the only 
explanation for the poverty and low productivity of the 
petty producers - what also needs to be considered are the 
role of the state (and, incidentally, the influence of 
external forces upon it) , the influence of the world 
economic policy, and the ideology of development (Kahn 
1974)78. Further, the concept of mode of production used 
fails to embrace the totality of a system of reproduction - 
it is a concept which adopts a reductionist approach. It 
transforms a complex and all-embracing phenomenon to a 
simplistic abstraction of an empirical observation, based 
on the delineation of the form of exploitation or the 
labour process. This reductionist error is responsible for 
the tendency to treat "articulation as a form of dualism, 
in which non-capitalist modes are defined as a specific 
kind of subjugation of labour deprived of their own laws of 
motion. Therefore there is a need to incorporate the laws 
of motion into a conceptualisation of a mode of production" 
(Banaj 1977)79. A third, criticism is that articulation 
theory is often reduced to crude economic determinism 
(Mouzelis 1980)80. Fourthly, articulation theory, by 
concentrating on the economic, fails to adequately tackle
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class formation, the importance of class domination, class 
struggle and the role of the State.
There is another group of theories which have developed 
recently, specifically with reference to Latin America. 
These are the corporatist theories. Corporatism is a very 
old concept of commünity and the state, and is based on the 
ideas of Comte and Durkheim. The classic example of a 
corporatist institution is the Roman Catholic church, which 
is organically and hierarchically organised with some 
residual autonomy at the level of the individual priest. 
According to modern corporatist theories (for example 
Wiarda 1974)81 Latin American underdevelopment is a product 
of this unique and enduring corporatist tradition, which 
not only stood apart from, but rejected, the revolutionary 
spirit that animated the West in the age of capitalism and 
modernity after 1500. Both anti-capitalist and anti- 
Marxist, corporatists reject what they see as the 
imposition of foreign, alien development models on Latin 
America. Development, if it is to come to the region, must 
be filtered through and adapted to what they see as a 
uniquely Latin American structure and tradition. For many 
the core of this distinctiveness is to be found in the 
authority of the state and the central role it has played 
in shaping the society and the economy. Some corporatists 
have thus envisioned a third, non-capitalist, non-Marxist 
path to development. This move is directed by a powerful, 
activated and interventionist state, but one that is within 
the essentially Catholic cultural and philosophical
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framework of Latin American tradition.
Corporatist theorists have been criticised on a number of 
fronts. For example, it is viewed by some, like Valenzeula 
and Valenzuela (Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978)82, as an 
apology for fascism, designed to repress conflicts, 
tensions and the general sociopolitical crisis unleashed by 
modernisation; and by others (particularly Marxists) who 
reject the corporatistes rigid denial of class conflict. 
By overemphasising the corporatist structures they downplay 
or ignore the class antagonisms that occur within or across 
such structures.
Outlined above are some example of the many diverse 
approaches that have been formulated to attempt to explain 
the reasons for underdevelopment. They range from the 
modernisation theories, through the dependency theories and 
their recent more sophisticated variants, to the neo- 
Marxist and other approaches. The analysis of these 
various approaches has determined the specific points 
around which studies of the relationship between education 
and social change need to focus.
The first of these is that development in different parts 
of the world is strongly influenced by the dynamics of the 
total world economy. This has subsequently led to a fairly 
widespread understanding of the fact that each çountry has 
its own, unique development problems that are dictated by 
both external and internal conditions.
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The second point is that in understanding the relationship 
between education and development in any country it is 
necessary to establish what the external constraints are on 
that country. There has been a tendency to suggest, 
particularly by the dependency theorists, Wallerstein, and 
the modes of production theorists that these constraints 
are entirely economic. In reality, the problem is more 
complicated because the constraints are economic, 
political, social and cultural. Further, they emanate from 
two sources, neither of which is mutually exclusive. On 
the one hand are the developed countries and on the other 
organisations like the World Bank, and they together, by 
their dependent nature , set the structure of a Third World 
society within its global context. These external 
constraints obviously influence internal factors. As 
states are drawn into international military and economic 
competition, substantial changes are engendered in a 
variety of aspects of domestic organisation - for example, 
states faced with increasing military competition often 
seek greater centralised control of resources.
The third point is that an explanation is needed of the 
differences that occur between countries that have operated 
under similar external constraints. This explanation, 
therefore, necessitates a detailed analysis and subsequent 
understanding of a country's internal structure, in 
particular the role and position of the state. This is 
because countries with similar external constraints have 
undertaken difference approaches to their problems - each
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individual country has its own internal political 
constraints and cultural traditions (Skocpol 1979)83. 
Turning specifically to education, the major cause of 
educational change in a country is the changing nature of 
the state. It is therefore necessary to examine how the 
state first became involved in the education process 
(Archer 1979)84; what the changing demands on the state in 
carrying out its basic functions are; and how these affect 
the structure and process of the education system. The 
role of the state in Third World countries is ambiguous 
since it co-operates with transnational corporations while 
at the same time trying to maintain a certain autonomy. 
Despite this ambiguity it is necessary to focus on the
state because previous attempts to explain why the 
education system is as it is, either from an
interactionist perspective or from a neo-Marxist 
perspective, separately or jointly, have failed.
The fourth point is that there needs to be an historical 
analysis of both the formation of the different social 
classes and the changing patterns of class alliances in the 
country concerned. In this way, the specificity of the
historical development of the various social formations can 
be highlighted. The class structure of Third World
countries differs from that of the developed nations in two 
main ways: it is more complex, and the classes themselves 
are usually much weaker. In addition the class structure 
is incomplete in the sense that a fraction of the dominant 
class, that which is externally oriented, is international
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rather than national. The 'foreign' section of the 
dominant class does not directly form part of the 
legitimate structures of the nation-state. This kind of 
class structure, which transcends the boundaries of nation­
states is a very good argument for not focusing on the 
nation-state as a unit of analysis, but of talking instead 
of a single world class structure.
The complexity of the class structure means that a great 
variety of forms of class alliance are possible85. This 
complexity has been brought about to some degree by the 
emergence of new social classes this century, in particular 
an urban middle class and a nascent proletariat. The 
complexity reveals itself most significantly in relation to 
the peasant social structure. Each agricultural system 
specifies a distinct set of rural social classes. How 
important the peasants are in social change needs careful 
analysis, bearing in mind the difficulty of viewing the 
peasants as a homogeneous group. Marx, for example, viewed 
the peasants as a conservative force in politics, and 
Banfield supported this in his work in Southern Italy 
(Banfield 1958)86. On the other hand, Caldwell, working in 
China, argued that there the peasants displaced the urban 
proletariat as the revolutionary vanguard (Caldwell 
1969)87. This point will be analysed in more detail in 
Chapter Six.
Once the class analysis has reached a certain level, it is 
necessary to complete it with an institutional analysis of
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the relationship between politics and social classes. This 
is because the politics of any social class are the 
function, not only of the structural characteristics of the 
class itself, but also of the structure of the field of 
action into which that class is inserted. There are 
determinate relationships between the development of social 
classes and the functioning of political institutions, and 
these relationships are not always direct and 
unproblematic.
The fifth point is that, in addition to an analysis of 
external constraints and internal social structure, it is 
necessary to look at the local level. Here there is often 
a distinct form of economy, as for example, tin mining in 
the Bolivian Andes, and these often give rise to a specific 
set of social classes and local political institutions. 
Both at the political level and the economic level there is 
some form of institutional link between the local and the 
national society.
The sixth point is that it is necessary to look at the 
interconnections between education and the rest of society, 
and therefore the way in which the social and political 
structures in society (including the state itself) respond 
to and mould patterns of educational investment. Further 
to this, the results of this investment need to be 
analysed. In studying these interconnections it is 
important to remind ourselves that there are a multiplicity 
of causes for any educational system; these stem from a
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wide range of possible struggles between economic, 
religious and cultural groups for all kinds of domination, 
economic success and prestige; and the interrelationship 
between the education system and the rest of society is a 
dynamic one.
Lastly, it is important to realise that many theorists of 
underdevelopment overgeneralise. They believe that they 
can construct a model of an underdeveloped country and its 
problems, as if there was a unique situation of 
underdevelopment, and all specific countries were merely 
variants of the model. There are two basic objections to 
this approach. The first is that the range of variation 
among contemporary underdeveloped countries is very great 
indeed. The second is that when a model of an 
underdeveloped country is taken and social processes within 
it are analysed, the approach is ahistorical.
It is ahistorical in that it de-emphasises two things. On 
the one hand, such a model plays down the importance of the 
changing international context in which development takes 
place. This changing international context has a very 
important bearing on change within individual Third World 
countries. On the other hand, most models de-emphasise the 
extend to which the changing economic structure produces 
structural changes in the class structure and gives rise to 
changing patterns of class alliances. These changing 
patterns have important repercussions at the 1eve1 of 
politics and the state (Roxborough 1979)88.
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Therefore,, the analysis of Bolivia which follows is 
historically specific both in terms of the development of 
the world capitalist system, and in terms of the way in 
which the articulation of Bolivia with that system has 
generated, over time, a specific class structure and set of 
social institutions with their own history.
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C H A P T E R  S I X
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY BOLIVIA : AGRARIAN STRUCTURES AND THE PEASANTRY
In order to fully analyse the role which education plays in 
creating social change in any country , it is necessary at 
the outset to understand both the different social groups 
and classes of people in that country, and the 
relationships between them. When a country is essentially 
a rural one as Bolivia is, the majority of its people work 
on the land and are generically terms 'peasants'. This 
chapter will briefly look at the agrarian structures 
prevailing in Bolivia prior to the revolution and, by 
extension, the concepts of peasantry and peasant 
consciousness.
An agrarian structure can be defined as a set of 
institutions, norms (both written and unwritten), and 
social, political and economic relationships governing the 
access to, and use of, land as a productive resource 
(Stavenhagen 1970)1. Agrarian structures, especially the 
land tenure system, condition the social and economic 
relationships between landlord and tenant. Around the 
basic pivots of man - land and man - man relationships have 
arisen legal norms, stratification hierarchies, patterns of 
social behaviour and political power systems (all of which, 
taken as a whole, are subsumed under the term 'agrarian 
structures'). From the peasant's point of view the 
agrarian structure has two aspects. It consists on the one 
hand of those productive units through which he pursues his 
livelihood and the institutional conditions of - and 
conflicts generated by - the several roles which he may be 
obliged to perform (like landowner, labourer, tenant or
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debtor); on the other hand, it consists of the landgroup, 
deeply moulded by the economic relationships required by 
the productive process, yet sustaining other roles 
involving values of motivational autonomy (Pearse 1975)2.
The pre-revolutionary agrarian structure of Bolivia owes 
much to three factors; its high altitude, the landlocked 
isolation of the country, and the economic importance of 
mining. The high altitude severely limited the 
agricultural potentialities and restricted the 
attractiveness of estate development, the landlocked 
isolation meant that agricultural production was of local 
interest only, and the importance of mining meant that 
there was a continual movement of labour from the land to 
the mines, and an increasing demand for agricultural 
supplies necessary for mining, like leather, meat, tallow 
and pack animals.
The 1950 agricultural census gives a rough idea of the 
landholding structure in pre-revolutionary Bolivia. There 
were about 7,000 holdings of over 500 hectares, 600 of 
these being over 10,000 hectares, and though this 
represented only 8 per cent of all production units these 
holdings controlled 95 per cent of the arable land in 
Bolivia, of which only 0.8 per cent was actually under 
cultivation. At the other extreme 69 per cent of the 
production units covered less than 10 hectares apiece and 
occupied only 0.41 per cent of arable land, of which one 
half was under cultivation. Between the two extremes were
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22.5 per cent of the production units, covering between 10 
and 500 hectares; they accounted for 4.5 per cent of arable 
land, of which 23.5 per cent was under cultivation (figures 
quoted in Cusicanqui 1987)3
The agrarian structure itself therefore had a number of 
components all interconnected like links in a chain. About 
one third of the peasantry lived in "communities". There 
were 3,779 communities (3.5 per cent of the agricultural 
units) with 26 per cent of the cultivated area in Bolivia 
according to the 1950 census. A community was a legally 
recognised landgroup in which formal possession of the land 
was vested in the collectivity, though in fact actual 
possession, with rights of inheritance, was held by 
individual families. The communities were not production 
units but rather supra-domestic units of social 
reproduction, within which there existed domestic 
production units. They evolved out of the ayllu, or 
kingroup, encountered by the Spanish conquerors and given 
legal standing under the Spanish colonial regime (after 
Pearse 1975)4. The ayllu was a community which occupied a 
specific territory and whose members were related to one 
another. It was the basic organisational and socio­
economic unit of Andean culture (Cusicanqui 1987)5. The 
ayllu was very similar to medieval European systems and 
consequently the Spanish perpetuated them, albeit in a 
modified form, because they were familiar with them.
The estates in pre-revolutionary Bolivia can be
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collectively classed as manorial estates, and they were 
called latifundios or haciendas. There was no single type, 
with wide variations existing, particularly from region to 
region (Barnes 1970)6 . The unproductive latifundios that
relied on tenant farmers were the usual type, and they 
accounted for 44.3 per cent of the cultivated area of 
Bolivia, but only 9.4 per cent of all production units 
according to the 1950 census. Despite the variety of 
latifundios, there were certain things in common, the main 
one being that the labour force was based on a service- 
tenure arrangement and a serf-like relation to the 
landlord. Service comprised, firstly, labour on the 
manorial farm in return for a plot of land; secondly, 
labour duties or impositions not connected at all with the 
productive process (usually domestic service); and thirdly, 
aljiri, the collection and portage of agricultural 
provisions from the latifundio to the market.
As a social structure the latifundio was made up of a 
stratified population of three groups of labourers. These 
were the sharecroppers or colonos who worked a system 
called colonato whereby they had from one to four hectare 
parcels of land at the margin of the latifundio called 
minifundios; the day labourers or peons; and the free peons 
or hutahuahuas who helped to sharecrop the colonos' parcels 
of land. The latifundio had a 'two-storey' economy, with 
commercialisation at the top, supplying food for the 
urban/mining céntres, and traditional subsistence at the 
bottom. Consequently there was an exclusive relationship
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of the latifundios with the market economy by means of 
trading their farm products; political and cultural 
isolation of the peasants ; and a patriarchal and 
centralised authority of the landowner (Garcia 1964)7.
The agricultural marketing system was poor prior to the 
revolution. Most products served à regional market only - 
an agricultural system typical of pre-capitalist markets 
where regions that produced surpluses of certain products 
were not able to meet the demand in areas where there were 
shortages. This situation was aggravated because the 
economy was based on a single mineral export (silver 
initially, and then tin). This single mineral export 
conditioned the transport system of Bolivia, which mainly 
comprised railways. The railway lines radiated out from La 
Paz to neighbouring countries like spokes of a wheel and 
there were no real communication lines developed 
transversely from 'spoke' to 'spoke'. This led to the 
country being dependent upon imported rather than home 
grown food.
The historical development of the latifundios in the 
Altiplano, and in other regions with high densities of 
Indian populations, was such that the estate owner had 
little control over the production process and was 
consequently hamstrung by the pace and techniques of 
traditional communal or family production, which continued 
to prevail on the latifundios. Legal ownership of the 
land, the colonial-type relationship of domination and the
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symbolic presence of the latifundio owner in the ritual 
calendar by which the production cycle was organised 
pointed to the duality of the typical Altiplano estate. It 
was possible to call upon surplus labour because of the 
despotic - paternalistic ascendancy of the latifundio owner 
over the organising bodies of the community "cloistered" 
within the latifundio (Cusicanqui 1987)8.
As described above, the latifundio owner could obtain extra 
labour from the tenant farmer thanks to certain 
complementary devices which attested to the Indians' lack 
of independence when it came to making decisions concerning 
production (Rojas 1978)9.
Further, given the latifundio owner's position in the 
community's political and ideological structure, it was 
possible to maintain tributary relationships (like shifts 
of unpaid domestic services, various forms of tithes and 
other obligations). Here the latifundio owner played the 
]fole not merely of landowner, but also representative of 
the State, and heir to colonial privileges. It is for this 
reason that the term "feudal", which is often used to 
describe the traditional latifundios in the Andean area, is 
not suitable, since their specific nature involves 
precisely this connection of income - labour relations with 
tributary relations and forms of subordination and 
discipline of the labour force which are clearly colonial 
in origin. According to Cusicanqui a much better term 
would be servile — colonial production relations
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(Cusicanqui 1987)10.
The economic options open to the owner on his latifundio 
were extremely limited. He could require his tenant 
farmers to perform additional unpaid tasks to increase the 
volume of production and to meet the fluctuations in demand 
for foodstuffs for the urban and mining areas, but whenever 
he tried to do this he was met with resistance. The 
Altiplano latifundio owners tried to compensate for these 
limitations in two different ways. Firstly, they imposed 
trade monopolies on the surpluses produced by individual 
tenant farmers; and secondly, they mortgaged their land in 
order to obtain capital for investments outside 
agriculture. Neither of these two courses of action was 
very effective, and in time the landed elite in the 
Altiplano became increasingly marginalised.
The historical development of the latifundios in regions 
other than the Altiplano, and in other regions with a high 
density of Indian populations, was quite different. For 
example, in the Cochabamba Valley region, there was a 
distinction between the high and the low valleys. In the 
high valleys there was a tenant farming system like the 
Altiplano, but it was less rigid and there were no 
tributary relations. In the low valleys, the dominant 
system was one of sharecropping. It was here that the 
agricultural production was linked to the domestic market 
which expanded at times, particularly during the mining 
booms. The booms produced a large group of small,
147
independent commercial producers called piqueros who 
competed with the estate owners in supplying the urban and 
mining centres, and competed very successfully (Dandler 
1969)11. The latifundios in this area tended to either 
stagnate or indeed collapse.
Even so, the crisis the latifundios were going through did 
not necessarily convince people of the need for a solution 
like the redistributive agrarian reform or the method this 
would imply. The method of selective modernisation based 
on income differential, that was already evident in the 
Cochabamba Valley, was certainly a possibility and, indeed, 
was the usual way of breaking up traditional estates in 
other Latin American countries. The fact that the large 
latifundios had to be destroyed in order to make way for; 
capitalist development in agriculture showed that the 
collective will of the Indian peasant masses was already 
present in history and that many future events would depend 
on their actions, as will be shown in the following two 
chapters.
Historically, changes have taken place which have had 
profound effects on the agrarian structure of Bolivia. In 
the nineteenth century the Indian peasant, the poorest 
element of society, was disproportionately taxed in the 
heaviest manner possible. In fact, until well into the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century Indian taxation was 
the largest source of the government's revenue (Klein 1969 
quoted in Havet 1985)12. During most of the nineteenth
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century, Bolivian politics was dominated by its landed 
elite, a direct result of the heavy peasant taxation. The 
central and local governments could not have collected the 
taxes on the peasants without the co-operation, or at least 
neutrality, of the landed elite. This was true even for 
the head tax on members of the free Indian communities. 
More specifically, the landed elite siphoned off the 
surpluses from the peasants that it directly controlled, 
while the central and local governments taxed the free 
Indian communities and marginally the rest of the 
peasantry.
In the nineteenth century, alliances of landowners 
controlled Bolivian politics through both the manipulation 
of the law and, above all, the application of force. 
Indeed the landed elite destroyed the free Indian 
communities. Prior to 1874 the number of peasants in 
communities was much larger than the third of the total 
population of Bolivia indicated by the 1950 census. This 
percentage declined for two main reasons; firstly, in 1874 
the laws of Ex-Vinculation were passed by the government, 
the aim being to turn the community peasants (communards) 
into peons on the latifundios; and, secondly, the 
development of latifundios during the decade 1890 - 1900, 
as a consequence of an increased world demand for silver, 
the development of a rail network to export the silver, 
and urban developments, both at the mines and along the 
railway routes, led to an increased demand for foodstuffs. 
This in consequence led to the expansion of commercial
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agriculture, and therefore as a response to the increased 
demand for foodstuffs in the national market, the 
latifundios expanded both the amount of their land and 
their labour in order to augment the quantities of their 
products. This confirms the fourth hypothesis of Frank, as 
stated in his article 'The Development of Underdevelopment/
VIZ :
"the latifundium ......  was typically born as a
commercial enterprise which created for itself the 
institutions which permitted it to respond to 
increased demand in the world or national market by
expanding the amount of land, capital and labour to
increase the supply of its products" (Frank 197 2)13.
It is estimated that between 1846 and 1900 the percentage 
of Indians who were members of free landowning communities 
declined from 53 to 27, and this decline reflected 
essentially a major growth in latifqndios (Klein 1969)14.
To summarise, therefore, two elements explain the 
encroachments of the landed elite on the free Indian 
landowning communities. The expanding market and transport 
for foodstuffs constituted the main cause, and the
political power of the landed elites provided the means.
Overall, during the period up to the revolution, 
particularly from the end of the nineteenth century, the 
peasants of Bolivia were marginalised socially,
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economically and politically due to their segregation with 
respect to the market, to the means of national 
communications, and to their lack of political and civil 
rights. This was exacerbated because they were also 
culturally marginalised as a consequence of their inability 
to speak Spanish, and the fact that the majority could 
neither read or write. According to Klein, the Bolivian 
Indians were almost totally unaware of the nation s 
existence and they formed a separate society with their own 
languages and cultures. Their relationships with the non- 
Indian society were confined to the economic sphere, and 
even here, they were almost exclusively rural, and largely 
subsistence farmers, leaving the urban centres 
overwhelmingly to the white and mixed Indian—white, or 
cholo, populations. These two societies were
hierarchically arranged, and the non-Indian minority, the 
only part of the nation truly aware of the national 
existence, totally exploited the Indian majority both 
through the discriminatory tax system, and even more 
importantly in its growing control over the land (Klein 
1969)15. In fact the peasants became increasingly 
irrelevant economically, and so almost inevitably did the 
landed elite. At the end of the nineteenth century the 
struggle for political control of central government 
developed between the tin entrepreneurs and the landed 
elite and the latter lost. However, given its tradition of 
social control, the landed elite resisted remarkably well 
politically, even at the national level.
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Consequently, prior to the revolution the peasants were 
subjected to separation in discrete landqroups (both 
communities and latifundios) and the management of their 
relationships with the rest of society was carried out by a 
class of person highly conscious of the necessity of 
maintaining them in subjugation and isolation.
Throughout the first part of this chapter the word 
'peasant' has been used frequently. It is now necessary to 
look at the concept of peasantry, and in particular at the 
Bolivian peasant. The actual definition of the term 
'peasant' has created endless controversy, and particularly 
depends on which dimension or dimensions of the 
relationship between peasantry and national society have to 
be emphasised and to what degree of exclusivity (Foster 
1967)16.
According to Shanin, four major conceptual traditions have 
influenced contemporary scholarship concerning peasants 
(Shanin 1971)17. The first of these is the Marxist class 
theory. Here the peasants are perceived to be the 
suppressed and exploited producers of pre-capitalist 
society. Contemporary peasantry therefore appears as a 
leftover of an earlier social formation, its 
characteristics reinforced by remaining at the bottom of 
the social power structure. The second major tradition is 
termo,6 the 'specific economy' typology and it has viewed 
peasant social structure as being determined by a specific 
type of economy, the crux of which lies in the way a family
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farm operates. This second tradition has many similarities 
with the first. The third major tradition, the 
ethnographic cultural tradition, stems from traditional 
western anthropology. Here peasants are representatives of 
an earlier national tradition, preserved as a 'cultural 
lag' by the intertia typical of peasant societies. This 
approach considers that the true nature of the relationship 
between peasant and national society is economic and/or 
political. Some authors like Wolf stress above all the 
economic dimension, and consider that 'peasant' refers 
mainly to an occupational status (Wolf 1966)18. Other 
authors, such a Witfogel, stress more the political 
dimension of the relationship: here 'peasant' refers mainly 
to a political status (Witfogel 1963)19. The fourth, and 
last, major tradition is rather complex. It is a 
traditional - functionalist tradition based on the work of 
Durkheim. The basic dualism accepted by Durkheim divides 
society into 'traditional' and modern or 'organic', based 
on a division of labour. Kroeber later placed peasant 
societies in an intermediate position as 'part societies 
with part cultures' (Kroeber 1948)20. This was turned by 
Redfield into the cornerstone of a conceptualisation 
accepted by the majority of American anthropologists 
(Redfield 1956)21.
Sociological definitions and models resemble two- 
dimensional sketches of a multi-dimensional reality. Each 
carries partial truth, each reflects necessarily only part 
of the characterised phenomenon. The reality is richer
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than any generalisation and that holds particularly true 
for peasant societies, highly complex social structures 
with little formal organisation.
In defining the term 'peasant' it is useful to distinguish 
between tribal cultivators, peasants and modern farmers 
(Stavenhagen 1975)22. Tribal cultivators live in 
relatively closed, self-contained societies, and while they 
may engage in trade or barter with other groups, they are 
not economically integrated into wider social units, that 
is to say, they have not undergone the structural 
transformations which result from contact with a capitalist 
economy - they are the 'primitives' in ethnological 
literature.
In contrast to tribal or primitive peoples, peasant 
societies do form part of wider economic, social and 
political units, with which they engage in special kinds of 
relationships. Peasant economies tend towards self- 
sufficiency and the household is the main unit for 
production and consumption, based on the intensive use of 
family labour.
It is mainly in regard to this latter element that 
'traditional' peasants are distinguished from 'modern' 
commercial farmers, who operate as entrepreneurs, buying 
and selling in a products and capital market (Wolf 1966)23. 
Peasants would thus occupy somehow an intermediate position 
between tribal segments on the one hand, and commercial
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agriculturalists on the other. For some theorists, 
peasantries are merely holdovers from precapitalist timeè, 
which tend to disappear as capitalism develops. While this 
may have been the case in Western Europe, the situation in 
Latin America is quite different. Here there are still 
many millions of peasants (whatever the specific definition 
employed) who are well integrated into the underdeveloped 
capitalist system.
Shanin argued that one determining factor was insufficient 
to describe a 'peasant', and consequently he proposed four 
main characteristics (Shanin 1971)24, which were agreed by 
Stavenhagen (Stavenhagen 1975)25. These were, firstly, the 
peasant family farm being the basic unit of a 
multidimensional social organisation. The self-
perpetuating family farm operates as a major unit of 
peasant property, socialization, sociability and welfare 
with the individual tending to submit to a formalised 
family-role behaviour. Secondly, land husbandry being the 
main means of livelihood directly providing the major part 
of the consumption needs; thirdly, specific traditional 
culture being related to the way of life of small 
communities ; and, lastly, the 'underdog position' - the 
domination of the peasantry by outsiders.
Within these general characteristics it is possible to 
recognise several specific groups. For example, in Latin 
America Wolf distinguishes between the peasant properly 
speaking and the subsistence cultivator, the share cropper,
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the landless agricultural labourer, the capitalistic 
agricultural entrepreneur etc (Wolf 1955)26. Such 
distinctions tend to be rather academic because there is 
considerable overlap between the categories, and because in 
Latin America the term campesino (peasant) is a generic 
concept whereby the mass of the rural population identifies 
itself27.
Landsberger and Hewitt define a peasant as ' any rural 
cultivator who is low in economic and political status. 
Low economic status denotes little access to economic 
inputs (such as capital, land and knowledge); little 
control over the management of these inputs (where to 
cultivate and when to work)? and little control over output 
and its distribution between the factors of production. 
Low political status likewise denotes little access to 
political inputs (such as votes); little control over the 
management of political affairs (over elected or appointed 
officials); and little control over the output of the 
political system (ie content of political decisions)' 
(Landsberger and Hewitt 1970)28.
Defining a peasant in this way makes the concept relative — 
it becomes a set of quantitatively variable dimensions. It 
also makes the concept a broad, inclusive one. It includes 
not only those who own the very little land they cultivate 
(the minifundistas), but also those who rent, sharecrop or 
give labour services in return for land, and those who work 
the land for wages. The adoption of a narrower definition
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like those proposed by Shanin and stavenhagen is 
inadvisable since numerous 'peasant organisations 
throughout Latin America did, and still do, in practice, 
contain members of all the disparate rural groups described 
above, one such example being found in Bolivia prior to the 
revolution.
The definition of a peasant that this thesis adopts 
combines the above definition of Landsberger and Hewitt's 
with an understanding that peasants are a class in their 
own right, and that this implies, firstly, a consideration 
of their socio-economic context; secondly an evaluation of 
their subjective views as a product of their historical 
experience and embodied in a plan of action; and, thirdly, 
forms of organisation, concrete expressions of class 
consciousness and identification of allies and enemies 
(after Dandler 1977)29. To a large extent in pre­
revolutionary Bolivia, because the majority of the Indian 
population lived in the countryside, the terms 'Indian' 
and 'peasant' were synonymous.
Once peasants are defined it is necessary to understand how 
they organised and expressed themselves concretely as a 
class in a specific historical context. Therefore, 
throughout this analysis of Bolivia up to and including the 
1952 Revolution, the role of the peasants as an active 
force within a broad populist movement; the organisation of 
the peasants and how they expressed their common 
objectives; and the relationship of the peasant to social
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change, following concrete political strategies, will be 
kept firmly in mind. Analysis, therefore, needs to be 
focused on the organisation, leadership and ideology of the 
Bolivian people, in particular, the majority who are 
peasants as defined above. Further, with respect to these 
three aspects (organisation, leadership and ideology), it 
is necessary to determine those elements contributing to 
the peasantry's cohesion as a class as well as those which 
restrain such a process (Alavi 1973)30.
To further our knowledge of the Bolivian peasant prior to 
the revolution it is also important to understand the 
ethnic and linguistic reasons for their marginalisation. 
The 1950 census established the composition of the 
population by using the language usually spoken. At that 
time 38 per cent of the Indians spoke only Aymara and 54 
per cent spoke only Quechua. Both Quechua and, to a lesser 
extent, the Aymaran language, are divided among numerous 
dialects which limited the Indians ability to communicate 
effectively with other Indians outside their immediate 
localities. And while Quechua and Aymara have many points 
of similarity in vocabulary and syntax, they are separate 
languages mutually unintelligible. A few other independent 
languages such as Uru and Guarani were spoken by a few 
individuals, most of whom also spoke Quechua and Aymara. 
Only about 6 per cent of the Indians spoke Spanish as a 
second language and they were found in and around the major 
towns and cities. The 1950 census also revealed that 65 
per cent of the population were classified as indigenous,
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with the remaining 35 per cent classified as non- 
indigenous. Unfortunately it is difficult to compare the 
1950 census with the one of 1900 in order to determine the 
evolution of the population's ethnic composition, since the 
two censuses use different, and in many respects, unclear 
categories.
These figures give only a vague idea of the complex web of 
social relationships that bound the different sectors of 
Bolivian society together. Well into the twentieth century 
it was a society marked by class-consciousness and colour­
consciousness (Demelas 1980)31, in spite of the advent of 
capitalism and the attendant transformation of the 
production process.
During the last twenty years, a number of studies have 
advanced our knowledge and understanding of peasant 
movements, and in general about the role of the peasants in 
the revolutionary struggles of the Third World. In an 
outstanding work on this subject. Wolf demonstrates that 
the most important revolutions of the twentieth century to 
date (Mexico, Russia, China, Viet Nam, Algeria, Cuba) were 
the outcome of the peasantry's active participation within 
the alliance of revolutionary forces, but adds, 
significantly, that the results of these revolutions were 
in the long run different from the expectations of the 
peasants who made them possible, although they achieved one 
of their fundamental aims, the recovery of land (Wolf 
1969)32. This thesis will now turn its attention
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specifically to the situation in Bolivia earlier this 
century, particularly to the role education played in 
social change bearing in mind that the majority of the
'actors' in the Bolivian situation were peasants.
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C H A P T E R  S E V E N
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BOLIVIAN SOCIETY UP TO 1936
This chapter will look at the historical development of 
Bolivian society up to the end of the Chaco War in 1936. 
The main aim is to outline the preconditions of the 
Bolivian Revolution which developed during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. This is because 
"the Bolivian Revolution was directed not only against a 
previous government, but against the institutions that had 
made that government possible and even inevitable" (Patch 
1960)1.
Following the Spanish Conquest of the Indian populations of 
the New World, the" area of Potosi, in what was Alto Peru 
was exploited for silver which was extracted and shipped to 
Spain. Alto Peru, which subsequently became the Republic 
of Bolivia in 1825, was organised to service Spain 
mercantilistic needs. But the conquistadores who had by 
force subjugated the Indians were, in the main, ill-suited 
to the peaceful process of imperial business. In the eyes 
of Spain they posed a potential threat to the orderly flow 
of precious goods between Alto Peru and Spain. For this 
reason, Spain sought to domesticate them with generous land 
grants. Thus was developed the landed component of 
Bolivia's ruling oligarchy.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century Bolivia's 
silver-exporting economy was consolidated and this put an 
end to a protracted recession that had blighted the early 
days of the Republic. For the first time since 
independence, the reinforced position of the obligarchy's
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export sector and new opportunities for expanded trade 
enabled the dominant Creole sectors of Bolivian society to 
launch an offensive against the Indian communities. Until 
then the Indians contribution to the central Government's 
modest budget had represented a considerable percentage of 
the total amount. But with the influx of revenue from 
trade and mineral exports, the relative importance of their 
tribute diminished.
The first real attack on the Indian communities was in 1866 
when the dictator Melgarejo tried to auction off their 
lands under the Decree of 20 March. The attack failed as a 
conseguence of a fierce Indian backlash. Subseguent 
attacks were less blatant and more effective. In 1874 the 
Laws of Ex-Vinculation were passed, as mentioned in Chapter 
Six. These laws declared the Indian community to be 
legally dissolved and stipulated that communal lands were 
to be subdivided. This made it possible for the 
latifundios to rapidly extend their holdings during the 
next forty years, particularly in the Altiplano. One 
important conseguence of this was the rise of the colonato 
system, worked by the colonos or share-croppers. Their 
numbers increased significantly, and they became a distinct 
group among the peasants. The colonos' relations with the 
others in the Indian communities was complex and at times 
conflictuel.
The national government of Bolivia was initially controlled 
by the Conservatives, but was taken over by the Liberals
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after the Federal Revolution of 1899. One consequence of 
this was the shifting of the centre of power from silver- 
rich Potosi in the south to La Paz where it has remained 
ever since. The Liberal Army owned its victory in large 
measure to the support of the Indian army led by an Aymaran 
called Willka. The Indian army troops sided with the 
Liberals during the first phase of the civil war, but they 
soon developed their own objectives, even though they were 
not always explicitly stated or clearly formulated. Their 
demands were four-fold; firstly, the redistribution of 
usurped communal land; secondly, resistance to the 
onslaughts of the landowners of Spanish descent; thirdly, a 
refusal to recognise the authority of either the 
Conservatives or the Liberals over the Indian troops; and, 
lastly, the establishment of an autonomous Indian 
Government under the authority of its principal leader. 
The rebels, therefore, clearly perceived their interests as 
being radically different from those of the other 
belligerents and they early on understood the intercaste 
nature of the Liberal-Conservative dispute.
The Indian forces were defeated and decimated. 
Nevertheless they had acted like a nation within a nation, 
and in their clash with the dominant Creole minority, they 
behaved as if it were an anti-colonial struggle. Indeed 
the crisis unleashed by the rebellion made the Creoles 
collectively conscious once again of the "Indian" as a 
colonial type.
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The Willka rebellion was to mark the end of an era. The 
breadth and coherence of the movement, together with the 
Indians refusal to accept any form of mediating mechanism 
which could translate their demands into terms that would 
be intelligible to, and be considered legitimate by, other 
sectors of society, were not to be found in subsequent 
confrontations during the next half century.
The Liberals that came to power in 1899 were the newer 
social elements brought into existence by the ancillary 
activities associated with silver. Liberalists embarked 
upon a policy of centralisation, standardisation, the 
continued building of an economic infrastructure, and the 
extinction of the 'indigenous race' (Cusicanqui 1987)2. 
The ideology which sustained and justified this course of 
action could be described as an imported, basically 
classical European liberalism or Social-Darwinism, heavily 
flavoured with French positivism, the former influence 
establishing a laissez-faire market principle, and the 
latter the notion of environmental control as the basic 
principle of administration (Malloy 1970)3. This ideology 
found an acceptable way to perpetuate the Liberals' 
entrenched racism (Demelas 1980)4. Quoting Antelo, Moreno 
commented: "The Inca Indians and mestizos have absolutely
no place in the gradual evolution of modern society. 
Sooner or later, in the struggle for existence, they are 
doomed to extinction under the reign of pure or purified 
whites" (Moreno 1960)5.
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The chief governmental concept of the Liberals was the idea 
that the state should supply the limited essential means 
within which private economic domains, based on the motive 
of individual profit, could flourish. During the period of 
the Liberal Government from 1900 - 1920 communal lands were 
expropriated at an increasingly rapid rate. Politicians, 
merchants and mining entrepreneurs acquired lands as a way 
to obtain capital, either through speculation or mortgages, 
to invest from time to time in short-lived non—agricultural 
business ventures. None of the state objectives of the Ex- 
Vinculation Acts, which affirmed the need to turn members 
of the Indian community into small landowners and let land 
become a freely negotiable commodity, were actually 
fulfilled. As has already been noted, the forced 
expropriation of communal land gave the estate owners 
increased power and promoted the spread of servile 
relationships in agricultural production.
Concomitant with the consolidation of the Liberal's power, 
Bolivia experienced the impact of a most important economic 
pattern: the last and definitive decline in silver and a
boom in tin. The industrial breakthrough in Europe and the 
United States, spurred on by the coming war, set off a 
tremendous demand for tin and Bolivia responded to this 
demand. The Liberals tied the nation's fortunes to this 
new source of wealth — tin paid for everything, and there 
was no real attempt at any internal industrial development. 
This led to a very skewed pattern of development because 
the exchange earned by tin was not touched except in
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minimal taxes, and therefore Bolivia had to rely on the 
investment decisions of the mineowners to experience the 
expected growth effects. But the tin magnates were 
internationalists and they took their money out of the 
country. Therefore, there was both minimal investment of 
capital surplus within the country, and a drainage of the 
national gold to pay for imports and to service the 
national debt. According to Malloy, "Under the Liberals, 
Bolivia was denied secondary growth impulses and, at the 
same time, its monetary stability was progressively 
undermined" (Malloy 1970)6.
In summary, then, during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, 
Bolivia underwent two fundamentally important processes. 
First, there was a process of political change which saw 
the creation of a modern centralised state oriented towards 
economic development and also the first outline of 
political conflict in which important structuring roles 
were played by class, party and interest groups. Secondly, 
through the silver and tin booms, the country sustained a 
strong burst of economic development and modernisation 
which saw the progressive rationalisation of economic 
organisation, the country's entrance into the international 
market, the appearance and influence of new theories and 
values, and the emergence of new groups and interests.
However, the process of development and modernisation 
during this time became increasingly reliant on the
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fortunes of the tin industry. As a result of this, the 
country experienced a very skewed pattern of development. 
The expansion of the tin industry eventually detracted from 
and curbed the development of other productive sectors. 
Finally, it began to dominate all aspects of the country's 
development, not only as a focal point of economic 
organisation and integration, but also as a primary cause 
of negative economic effects which led to stagnation in all 
other spheres of local activity. Malloy, for example, 
states that "During the forty year period from 1880 - 1920, 
Bolivia experienced a skewed and truncated pattern of 
development and modernisation with future growth based on 
the potential of one major industry - tin" (Malloy 1970)7.
This phenomenon of skewed development eventually resulted 
in a bifurcation of the country into two increasingly 
differentiated socio-economic systems. On the one hand, a 
system emerged based on the extraction and shipment of tin 
abroad (the 'national system'), while, on the other, there 
was an agricultural system based either on subsistence 
farming or on very low-level, regionalised, commercial 
activities (the 'local system'). There were, in effect, 
'Two Bolivias', but, despite the fact that a "citizan of La 
Paz or Santa Cruz is apt to speak of himself and think of 
himself as a Paceno or a Cruceno rather than a Boliviano" 
(Edelmann 1967)8, these 'Two Bolivias' were not separated 
into distinct unities. There was not a 'dual society' but 
an internally differentiated unit in which the parts (or 
subsystems) were locked into a relationship of 'internal
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colonialism' (Stavenhagen 1968)9. The 'national system' 
not only differentiated itself from the 'local system', but 
did so at the expense of it; the backwardness of the latter 
was due in large part to the manner in which the former 
developed. Thus the development pattern experienced by the 
country as a whole was skewed. From the political point of 
view, a key link between the two was a national elite 
stratum which dominated the apparatus of government and 
which had personal interests in both the urban and the 
rural systems. This elite stratum became, in effect, the 
only nationwide grouping in the country, and, therefore, 
one of the most important elements holding the two Bolivias 
together.
The national constitution stated that Bolivia was a unitary 
republic with sovereignty "vested essentially in the 
nation" (eleven 1940)10. All persons born in the territory 
of Bolivia were Bolivians. But to be a Bolivian was not 
necessarily to be a Bolivian citizen. To be a citizen one 
hand to, among other things, "be able to read and write, to 
own estate, or to have an income of 200 bolivianos, 
provided that this amount does not represent wages received 
for work as a domestic" (eleven 1940)11. If one was not a 
citizen as defined, one could not exercise public powers, 
vote, be a candidate, or hold public office.
By constitutional fiat, over 75 per cent of the population 
were not citizens of the republic of Bolivia. The entire 
agricultural Indian population was excluded, as were urban
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'floaters' and a large number of workers. Citizenship was 
primarily a middle and upper income group privilege. As 
these groups lived primarily in the cities, effective 
citizenship was mainly a character of the 'national system' 
thereby further reinforcing the fragmentation of the 
country.
A core characteristic of the pre-revolutionary political 
system was non-participation by legal process. One element 
of the history of the advancing European nation state - the 
Bolivian elite's direct model - was the increasing 
political awareness of the populations and their direct 
linkage to states through the advancement of the concept of 
citizenship. One of the main reasons for Bolivia's stunted 
growth was its open rejection of this form of incorporation 
into a national state community. At first, the ruling 
elite did not want a true national base; after the 
development pattern described above began to gel, it 
positively demanded non-involvement. Increasing the scope 
of citizen involvement would have meant an increase in 
demands on social resources. As the economic base began to 
take shape, however, the country had enough trouble 
accommodating the demands of already established groups, 
let alone incorporating any excluded groups. One of the 
pre-requisites of system stability therefore, was the 
passivity and non-involvement of the majority non-citizen 
population.
The pattern of social stratification was quite complex in
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pre-revolutionary Bolivia. The country could not be 
conceptualised in the classic tripartite class terms of 
upper, middle and lower, since there was no single class 
system (Patch 1960)12. Bolivia lacked a single social 
space in which groups could bfe structured systematically. 
The majority of the population were Indian peasants tied to 
a rigid stratification, one so rigid as to approximate a 
system of closed castes. The religious structure likewise 
placed a high value on the acceptance of the traditional 
patterns and emphasised the rewards of a future rather than 
a present life. This social immobilisation was further 
intensified by the absence of educational facilities for 
the peasants living on the latifundios. While the 
traditional social stratification operated to restrict 
their social mobility, their economic and geographical 
mobility was also severely hampered by lack of education, 
widespread illiteracy, a general inability to speak 
Spanish, and their ignorance of other opportunities and 
other regions.
The rest of the population was divided between the national 
bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie. The petit 
bourgeoisie were urban, but they were not a middle class 
group as such. They were not national in scope and they 
did not bridge the gap between the national and local 
•systems. This group encompassed those who rose in economic 
status during the years 1880 - 1920, but did not make it to 
the top. If filled out the occupational and status roles 
between the national bourgeoisie and the 'lower' groupings.
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Economically, the petit bourgeoisie was a vulnerable group 
relying on the smooth functioning of the national system to 
secure its position. But by grace of its role as the 
effective electoral body of the state, the petit 
bourgeoisie was the real source of continuing legitimacy 
for the relations of authority and political dominance 
operative in the country. The petit bourgeoisie was the 
bedrock support group of the pre—revolutionary socio­
political order. This relatively small and ill-defined 
grouping, encapsulated in the cities and only tenuously 
connected with the rest of the country, was the human 
foundation upon which the Bolivian 'nation state' stood.
As a product of recent mobility the petit bourgeoisie was a 
group with aspirations. These aspirations included 
entrance into the national bourgeoisie which it aped in all 
aspects of its life style. This urban middle sector was 
not a focal point of change - oriented activity in the 
sense of modernisation and development, at least in the 
pre-1935 era. Ideologically and aspirationally, it 
identified with the national bourgeoisie, an identification 
reinforced by its economic dependency. A factor of growing 
importance to the petit bourgeoisie's life situation was 
the closing of mobility channels which occurred with the 
levelling off of economic growth in the late 1920s.
By the late 1920s, after experiencing a period of 
considerable economic expansion due to the development of 
the tin industry, the tin industry itself declined, and in
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consequence Bolivia became increasingly immobilised 
economically, socially and politically. What existed was a 
society which was neither wholly modern nor wholly 
traditional, but neither was it transitional - in effect, 
the entire Bolivian economy ground to a halt. The economic 
immobilisation which came to grip Bolivia reduced the 
society's surplus and created a series of financial crises 
which developed after 1925 and culminated in the general 
bankruptcy in 1930. This severely arrested growth and 
development and resulted in a number of structural strains 
which, in turn, began to create serious problems for 
significant groups in Bolivian society.
The first of these problems centred around peasant 
struggles. After 1910 rebellions began to break out once 
again in several of the Altiplano provinces. For example, 
there was a rebellion at a regional level in Pacajes in 
1914; there was a small scale revolt of Indians and tenant 
farmers at Caquiaviri in 1918; and there were intermittent
skirmishes around Achacachi between 1920 and 1931. These
rebellions had two factors common to them. The first of 
these was the fact that they all took place along the edge 
of Indian community lands, which were constantly being
threatened by the expansion of the larger estates, and the 
second was that the leadership of the rebellions was 
invariably Indian. The rebellions themselves were
manifestations on the part of the Indian peasantry to break 
with the colonial/class order which had been reinforced by 
the State via political reforms introduced in the last
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quarter of the nineteenth century, and maintained by the 
Liberals throughout the first 20 years of the twentieth 
century.
The peasant movements for reform during the period 1910 
1930 had a number of demands common to them. They were 
aiming for the restitution of the communal lands usurped by 
Lhe latifundios; for the abolition of compulsory military 
service; for the suppression of the various surviving forms 
of colonial tribute; for the presence of Indian 
representatives in both the Congress and at the local 
government level ; for the establishment of community 
schools; and for free access to the agricultural markets. 
Many of these demands, although not explicitly formulated, 
were taken up again after the Chaco War as. will be 
demonstrated in Chapter Eight.
The second of these problems was a generalised economic 
squeeze on the petit bourgeoisie. The hardening of 
stratification lines made it more and more difficult for 
these groupslS to move vertically. Their location in the 
service sector of economy and their general dependence on 
salaries and fees rendered them particularly susceptible to 
fluctuations in the financial system. Thus, when the 
society began to experience chronic financial crises, these 
groups found it increasingly difficult to maintain the life 
style commensurate with their status and self-identity. 
For them, insecurity and debilitating effort merely to 
remain in their present social positions became the daily
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reality.
The third of these problems, and of more immediate 
significance in the late 1920s, was the situation 
experienced by the oncoming generation of elite and sub­
elite youth. By birthright, this generation expected high 
status, and through education they were prepared for 
entrance into appropriate roles in the liberal professions, 
politics and bureaucracy. Due to its overall declining 
economic capacity, Bolivia as a society was unable to 
maintain a sufficient number of high status roles at the 
requisite level to absorb this and succeeding new 
generations. The result was a gap between legitimate role 
expectations and the ability to realise them. This problem 
of status incongruence was reinforced by two other factors: 
the non-too-edifying comparison of Bolivia's overall 
position vis-a-vis that of other more developed nations; 
and, more importantly, the contradiction between the 
'official' notions of equality, citizenship and advancement 
by achievement and the actual reality confronting the 
country. The convergence of these factors fostered a 
generational split in Bolivia's elite and sub-elite strata.
The fourth dimension of cleavage and strain arose out of 
the disturbance of more traditional social groupings and 
the problem of incorporating new groups. Economic 
development in Bolivia's 'liberal' framework resulted in 
downward pressure on many of the traditional artisan groups 
and, at the same time, created newer worker groupsl4. The
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former responded with demands for alleviations of economic 
pressure, while the latter experienced the phenomenon of 
'rising expectations' and pressed demands for higher wages, 
better working conditions, the right to organise, and 
political representation. The traditional artisan groups 
were pushed down, but not completely superseded, and newer 
labour groups were created, though the foundations for a 
broad national working class failed to materialise. Hence 
the lower stratum of society was a compound of traditional 
and modern elements. Nonetheless, the lower stratum was 
becoming the source of increasingly strident demands for 
change, particularly after 1922 when firstly, it was learnt 
by experience that striking could achieve favourable 
government attention, and secondly, it was permeated by 
leftist (particularly Marxist) literature and ideas brought 
to the workers by the young intellectual elite drawn from 
the universities. This kind of combined movement and 
pressure from below is a characteristic feature of 
development and modernisation, and it needs an elite 
prepared to adapt to it — this did not occur in Bolivia.
Thus by the late 1920s the results of these structural 
strains and internal contradictions were apparent. 
Strikes, demonstrations and political violence were common. 
Even more important was the development of a combined 
artisan and labour movement which became progressively more 
radical and disruptive. Finally, there appeared a 
generalised movement among students and young professionals 
who began to raise serious questions about the legitimacy
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of the existing 'liberal' order.
Immobilism was the source of other severe strains, not the 
least of which was the growing tendency towards 
factionalisation within the ruling elite. As Kling has 
noted, in a static society in which the control of the 
basic sources of wealth ( in Bolivia, mines and land) 
becomes relatively fixed, there tends to develop a problem 
of the circulation of wealth among the elite (Kling
1965)15. Public office becomes an important means of 
horizontal circulation, and there is a tendency for 
politics to become an intra-elite struggle to control 
offices. This struggle became increasingly important in 
Bolivian politics during the 1920s. By natural processes, 
the ruling elite, in effect, was outgrowing the economic 
basis of its own eliteness. The result was a growing 
factionalisation of the dominant parties and a growing 
tendency for elite factions to employ violence against one 
another. At the very time that some adaptive and/or 
effective repressive action was required to effect wide 
social control, the ruling elite was exhausting its 
energies in mutually destructive struggles, one example 
being economic conflicts among the three large tin barons 
over their respective shares of the internationally imposed 
quotas.
In the face of demands for change and reform, the ruling 
elite became increasingly intransigent. The Saavedra 
Government (1921 - 1925) flirted with mild reforms, for
178
example, passing the country's first labour laws which 
included provision for an 8 hour day and compensation for 
industrial accidents. Saavedra also tolerated and 
legalised strikes and broadened the patronage systems of 
the small "democratic" oligarchy, giving a populist touch 
to Bolivian politics. However, when faced with growing 
political and economic demands, and being unable to satisfy 
them, he ordered the massacre of the followers of Jesus de 
Machaca in 1921, and then the miners of Unicia in 1923. 
Hernando Siles (1926 - 1930) , in the throes of the
financial crisis, raised a nationalist banner but sought to 
quash a university reform movement .
Both the governments of Saavedra and Siles attempted to 
broaden the elitist, exclusive social base of oligarchic 
political power, but without impinging on its social power. 
When Saavedra made timid attempts to raise taxes on the 
mining industry, the tin barons countered by
internationalising the capital of the companies they
controlled. During this time, the penetration of 
international finance, especially North American capital, 
into the Bolivian economy, was stepped up and diversified. 
The unfavourable contracts that the Saavedra Government 
accepted in order to extend the railway network in fact led 
to the denationalization of the State's main source of
revenue.
Thus, for all these reasons, the government's social 
measures accomplished little except set the stage for the
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mobilisation of the people, whose demands were being 
thwarted.
Even if sectors of the governing elite had wanted to adapt 
to the pressures for change, economic immobilism prevented 
the means. Ultimately, the elite's own precarious economic 
position and its tendency to factionalisation called into 
question its long-range ability to control, by any method, 
the political pressures building up around and within it. 
Thus the ruling elite were both increasingly unwilling and 
incapable of undertaking adaptive action.
Thus, by the late 1920s basic structural imbalances and 
overall immobilism in Bolivia were generating a series of 
important cleavage lines which, in turn, were generating 
demands for significant sectors of the society for some 
form of remedial action. These cleavage lines, on the one 
hand, were creating potentially strong movements of 
counter-system strength, while simultaneously weakening the 
ability of the ruling elites to innovate or resist. And 
yet, Bolivia, though, like many other states, especially in 
Latin America, could have carried on indefinitely like this 
- but two extra factors pushed Bolivia towards revolution.
In 1929 the world wide depression hit Bolivia particularly 
severelyl6. Then, after scarcely enough time to assess the 
full damage of the depression, the repressive Salamanca 
regime (1931 - 1934) led the country to the debacle of the 
Chaco War. On top of its other problems then, Bolivia
180
experienced, within a period of less than 5 years, a 
disasterous depression and a humiliating military disaster. 
"These two severely disjointing experiences functioned as 
accelerators, propelling Bolivia into a revolutionary 
situation" (Malloy 1970)17.
During the depression of 1929 - 1930 the financial
structure of Bolivia collapsed and she became bankrupt. In 
the 1929 budget 37 per cent of expenditure was earmarked to 
service the foreign debt and 20 per cent was allocated for 
military needs. The effects of the depression spread 
quickly through the active sector of the economy. 
Unemployment became widespread and chronic, forcing the 
national and local government to institute work projects 
(Klein 1969)18. Widespread lay-offs were followed by 
rising prices and acute shortages of food and other primary 
goods in the cities. With the country's reserves 
exhausted, imports were restricted, but the local 
agricultural sector was not organised to fill the gap. 
Thus the depression did not create problems so much as 
expose existing imbalances and contradictions.
The worsening economic crisis reflected itself in the 
political sphere. Strikes, demonstrations and civil 
disorders became daily occurrences. The artisan-labour 
movement expanded and became more radical despite 
governmental opposition. Student activities went in the 
same direction. Most significantly, there were
demonstrations and marches by petit bourgeoisie groups
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reacting to rising prices and shortages.
In 1930 a military junta came to power under the 
conservative and dogmatic leadership of Daniel Salamanca. 
He whipped up fear of an alien communist threat among the 
people and, at the same time, began to appeal to Bolivian 
chauvinism with talk of war. The preparation for war with 
Paraguay - something which had been simmering for many 
years - became an umbrella under which repression of 
internal opposition was justified. By these means, 
Salamanca attempted to divert the growing internal 
pressures demanding change.
Through the use of force, the strike movement was broken, 
the labour organisation demoralised and radical opposition 
disintegrated and went underground.
There is a limit, though, to how long a government can 
survive by repression, particularly when it is in the 
throes of an economic crisis and this crisis is affecting 
the well-being of groups like the petit bourgeoisie who are 
ordinarily the bedrock of its support. The Bolivian crisis 
was hitting just those groups, as was revealed by mounting 
protest activity among the government employees.
Whatever his reasons, it was in this context that Salamanca 
chose to lead his country into a major foreign war. The 
war "was a desperate attempt on the part of the oligarchy 
to live up to its self-image and dispel the nightmare of a
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country that was bankrupt and besieged by the "rabble"" 
(Cusicanqui 1987)19. The issue of the was the disputed 
territory between Bolivia and Paraguay, known as the Chaco.
This piece of arid wasteland, days from La Paz, was to be 
the arena in which an army consisting of Indians and 
mestizos from the high Andes would test the Bolivian 
national honour, and by extension, the reality of any such 
thing as a Bolivian nation. The Indians themselves were 
hijacked rather than drafted into the army and, although 
the war was fought on the basis of 'nationalism' , the 
Indians did not think of themselves as Bolivians.
The war begun in July 1932 and ended in victory for 
Paraguay in June 1936, with the loss of 65,000 Bolivians. 
From the beginning the Paraguayans out-thought and out­
fought the Bolivians, most of whom were fighting in a 
environment completely alien to them, and who were backed 
by a weak government and an incompetent military leader 
(Patch 1960)20. The war strained Bolivia's economy even 
further, and led to further governmental borrowing and 
consequent inflation.
The effect of the war on the different strata of Bolivian 
society was very dramatic, particularly with regard to the 
Indians. It was a strange experience for them to see 
unfamiliar areas of their country, to conceive of Bolivia 
as a nation, and to become the object of propaganda 
designed to persuade them that they were citizens of a
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single nation. According to Huitzer, "The participation of
many Indians (in the Chaco War) ..... caused a new
consciousness among the indigenous people about their 
relationship to the whites who often depended on them in 
critical situations" (Huizer 1972)21. The long-maintained 
equilibrium, which had depended on preserving the role of 
the Indians as serfs in a feudalistic society, had been 
disturbed.
A deep sense of frustration arose in the peasant soldiers 
as a result of their experiences during and after the war. 
The army enforced caste-like relationships, and with 
demobilisation they were confronted once more with the 
social stratification system of the latifundio. 
Consequently many of the Indians did not go back "jz-o their 
lands but remained in the cities where they joined the 
swelling ranks of the unemployed and underemployed. Many 
periodically returned to their homes where they tol^ of the 
new life they were leading. In the Cochabamba Valley, for 
example, the Indians formed a peasant union immediately 
after the war, the full implications of which will be 
discussed in a future section.
The Chaco War was obviously very costly for the country, 
but the peasants as a class were almost unaffected because 
they occupied a very secondary position in the creation of 
wealth at the national level (Havet 1985, quoting Wolf
1966)22.
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Overall, Bolivia was defeated in 1936 but it was neither 
the loss of lives nor the war itself which finally upset 
the country's social and economic equilibrium. It was 
rather the rise of a liberal image of the prospective role 
of the Indian within the nation and a new sense of 
participation, realised or otherwise, by the Indian 
population in the national life (Dandler 1971)23. Thus the 
war nationalised the "conscience" of Bolivia's population. 
The fact that the Indians and recruits of mestizo-Creole 
origin fought side by side served to heighten awareness of 
the country's unresolved problems and helped to develop a 
social conscience and a pro—Indian sentiment on the part of 
the Creole urban middle class. Concurrently, among the 
intellectuals there also arose a liberal image of the 
prospective national roles of the peasants, the miners and 
the urban poor (Patch 1960)24.
The war also had effects on some other social groups in 
Bolivia. Many of the elite and sub-elite youths who 
returned from the Chaco vehemently renewed their demands 
for change. Thus a generation of young officers, 
expressing the frustrations and demands of the war victims, 
entered the political arena. They were joined by others, 
as a consequence of the Salamanca Government's policy of 
conscripting people with known leftist views as privates in 
the army. These people utilised this experience to 
proselytise among their fellow soldiers. The consequence 
was that more people with left wing views returned from the 
war than had originally entered (Malloy 1970)25.
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The question of the war's impact on other worker groups is 
more difficult. Proscribed organisations emerged much more 
powerful and more radical than ever before. Strikes and 
demonstrations broke out in all major cities and had a 
hitherto unparalleled political impact. À general strike 
precipitated the overthrow of one president and made 
uncomfortable the tenure of others26. The psychological 
impact of the war no doubt contributed to the climate of 
popular agitation, but it should not be over emphasised. 
Account must also be taken of the economic crisis which 
followed the war, and that the overthrow of Salamanca by 
the field army in 1935 provided the opportunity for pent-up 
demands to be expressed.
In general the ending of the Chaco War led to pressures for 
change from below. After 1935 such movements came steadily 
under the leadership of more specifically worker groups, 
and after 1936 it became virtually impossible to turn the 
tide. The war, therefore, served as a catalytic agent in a 
period of new thinking which accompanied the introduction 
of Socialist and Marxist doctrines into Bolivia. A new 
stream of thought worked through the universities in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s establishing a philosophical 
basis of an ardent nationalism which found its expression 
in the disasterous Chaco War. Whatever the logic of the 
position, the effect of the sudden equality of combatants 
from all classes and the new knowledge of opportunities 
operated to break or weaken those barriers upon which the 
former system had rested. Klein went so far as to write
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that "this event (the Chaco War) is the primary catalyst 
for the 1952 revolution" (Klein 1969)27.
In retrospect, it can be said that the political stability 
of the pre-revolutionary order depended on three basic 
factors; a healthy and growing tin industry; a committed 
petit bourgeoisie; and minimal movement in those sectors 
consciously defined as outside the system (approximately 75 
per cent of the population). By 1936 the tin industry was 
in decline and showed no signs of recovery. The petit 
bourgeoisie, trapped in a static social and economic 
climate and then threatened with the possibility of 
decline, was becoming progressively more alienated. Almost 
an entire generation of youth, ordinarily destined to enter 
the national elite, had lost faith in the authority of the 
existing order. Movement, in the lower strata of society 
was reaching a level of organisational maturity which was 
to establish it as a permanent feature of the national 
political scene. Finally, the first faint stirrings of 
potential movement among the Indian peasants was rippling 
across the surface of the agricultural system.
Thus in 1936 the preconditions for a revolutionary 
situation were established in Bolivia. The existence of 
these preconditions did not guarantee that a revolution 
would take place, and in fact the revolution did not occur 
for another 16 years. One major reason for this time lag 
was the fact that the various discontented strata in 
Bolivian society in 1936 acted as divided, unauthentic
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groups. One essential ingredient was still missing: a way 
to spread their ideas or, in other words, the establishment 
of a common language which would make it possible for the 
community leaders to formulate and disseminate their set of 
demands, and which would infuse the rebellious actions with 
a sense of justice and legitimacy recognised as such in 
other spheres of society. As Friere has noted, the only 
mechanism by which such revolutionary action can be brought 
about is through the conscientization of the oppressed 
groups (Friere 1972)28. In Bolivia from 1936 onwards there 
was an attempt to raise the consciousness of the 
discontented strata of Bolivian society by means of an 
indigenal education programme, and in the following chapter 
this programme and its effects will be analysed.
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C H A P T E R  E I G H T
THE DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECT OF THE INDIGENÀL 
EDUCATION PROGRAMME IN BOLIVIA
This chapter will look in detail at the indigenal education 
programme and its effect on the growth of consciousness 
among the Bolivian peasants. The chapter will also attempt 
to locate the indigenal education programme within the 
wider context of the political, social and economic 
development of Bolivia during the period from the end of 
the Chaco War in 1936 until the immediate aftermath of the 
1952 revolution.
There have been a number of different definitions of the 
term "revolution", some succinct as, for example, Malloy's 
who defined a revolution as not being "an event, but a 
process of varying duration and outcome", which is 
completed when there is "movement from one authoritative 
political order, through a period when political order is 
in question, to a new authoritative political order" 
(Malloy 1970)1; and some more elaborate as, for example, 
Shanin who believed a revolution to be fundamentally an 
interaction characterised not solely by the acts of one 
class but by the dynamic interplay of the following facets: 
a major structural crisis of the society; a major crisis in 
the ruling elite and its legitimacy to govern; a 
"crystallisation" of classes expressed in an at least 
temporary increase in class self identification and a 
tendency to militancy across class lines; and an operation 
of revolutionary elites capable of providing leadership in 
a revolutionary struggle (Shanin 1972)2.
The definition adopted for use in this thesis attempts at a
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compromise between the general definition of Malloy and the 
more specific and deterministic definition of Shanin. 
Consequently a revolution, as defined here, is a dramatic 
social upheaval which results in the general rearrangement 
of the social, economic and political relationships within 
a society - it is, in effect, a period when the dominant 
hegemony is broken down and replaced by another. 
Revolutionary situations develop when significant segments 
of society become aware that the existing societal 
framework does not fulfil their desires or their needs, and 
they start demands for change. A revolutionary potential 
is reached when those discontented persons conclude that 
the existing political framework is the major obstacle to 
desired changes and that they, as an organised group, must 
act as the agents of change.
There have been many theories of revolution, particularly 
these based on cognitive psychology (for example, Gurr 
1970)3, structural - functional sociology (for example, 
Johnson 1966)4, or pluralist political science (for 
example, Stinchcombe 1965)5, which have tended to view the 
development of revolutionary situations as basically a two- 
step process. First, a pattern of events arises that 
somehow marks a break or change from previous patterns. 
This change then affects some critical variable as, for 
example, the cognitive state of the minds of the masses. 
If the effect on the critical variable is of sufficient 
magnitude, a potentially revolutionary situation occurs. 
Once this potentially revolutionary situation does occur, a
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variety of incidental events that a society could 
ordinarily absorb without collapsing, such as a war, may 
precipitate a revolution.
These theories suffer on a number of accounts. Firstly, 
the 'critical variable' is extremely difficult to observe 
in practice. This is because one cannot readily measure, 
for example, the cognitive state of mind of large masses of 
individuals, and thus it is very difficult to obtain a 
correlation between broadly defined "social change" and 
changes in the level of the critical variables. Secondly, 
if the critical variable is difficult to measure, then it 
is virtually impossible to specify the level that portends 
a potentially revolutionary situation. Thirdly, these 
theories fail to account effectively for the variations in 
outcomes of different revolutions.
Consequently, the framework proposed here rejects any 
deterministic cause and effect analysis, favouring the view 
that analyses must proceed in terms of interacting factors 
developing in a potentially sequential fashion over time. 
In addition, the framework proposed will incorporate within 
it the following points which the above-mentioned theories 
tend to ignore. Many of these points are specific to Latin 
America where revolutionary actions are 'populist', 
populism being defined as a political movement for reform 
which enjoys the support of the working class or the 
peasants, but does not result from the autonomous 
organisational power of either the working class or the
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peasants (Di Telia 1965)6.
Firstly, because the state is not merely an arena for 
conflict or a means of coercion, but an autonomous entity, 
and that there exists among states a diversity of goals as 
well as of structures, which affect the possibilities for 
revolutionary change, the state's role needs to be 
analysed. Secondly, the intrusion of international 
political and economic pressures needs to be included, 
because they may introduce incentives, or needs, that bring 
the state and its landlords into opposition with basic 
aspects of the agrarian, economic and political 
organisation of their society, thus creating an impetus to 
revolutionary change (Skocpol and Trimberger 1976)7. 
Thirdly, the raising of the levels of aspiration of the 
Bolivian peasants, occasioned by the indigenal education 
programme (the 'revolution of rising expectations') and the 
engendering of a subsequent status incongruence leading to 
a mass mobilisation needs to be studied (Di Telia 1965)8.
Fourthly, Bolivia, in common with many other Latin American 
countries, had an elite placed at the middle or upper- 
middle levels of stratification, impregnated with an anti­
status quo motivation. Many Third World countries 
typically lack middle sectors and are dominated by a small 
upper class. These provide the most fertile ground for 
various types of populism. The usually stagnant economic 
and social conditions, added to political repression by a 
conservative government, tend to drive many sectors of the
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middle class and the bourgeoisie into opposition. Even 
sectors of the army and the clergy are affected in this 
way. What is likely to happen depends on the exact 
identity of the groups driven into the reformist camp. 
They may either include numerous elements from the upper 
middle classes, the military and the clergy, or else they 
may only attract lower middle class individuals, including 
intellectuals. Another criterion which should be applied 
is whether groups attracted to the camp of reform are 
fairly widely accepted or, conversely, socially rejected, 
by the dominant social circles of the class from which they 
come. These two criteria are, according to Di Telia, 
important because they permit an assessment of the degree 
of radicalism of the anti-status quo populist movement. Di 
Telia suggests that when the second alternative of either 
criterion prevails the populism is more radical, and this 
view needs to be tested in the Bolivian context (Di Telia 
1965)9. Fifthly, it is necessary for an ideology or a 
widespread emotional state to develop in order to help 
communications between leaders and followers, and to create 
collective enthusiasm; and an understanding of the 
development of this ideology, either through the efforts of 
the indigenal education programme, or by other means, needs 
to be included. In conclusion, therefore, the analysis 
which follows will concentrate on both the various 
combinations of developing structural patterns internal to 
Bolivia, and, on its concomitant international pressures.
Therefore revolutionary movements in Third World countries
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are usually based on, firstly, some elements drawn from the 
urban working class, which is neither numerous nor well 
organised in such countries; secondly, support from the 
peasantry; and, thirdly, an elite of professional 
revolutionaries, mainly drawn from the lower middle class 
and intelligentsia, strongly at odds with their own class 
of origin, which tends to develop 'tough-minded' attitudes 
as a result. The reason for these attitudes can be either 
their own status incongruence, or the chasm between their 
aspirations - produced by their education - and job 
opportunities, or due to some strong ideology. Whatever 
the reason, this group is essential to the strength and 
fighting power of the movement. If the social conditions 
in the country do not produce such a group in significant 
numbers, no amount of training in leadership can replace it 
(after Di Telia 1965)10.
On the basis of these last three characteristics, the 
revolutionary movements of the Third World countries find 
themselves in a different category from Marx's traditional 
model of a revolutionary working-class party. It is not 
only that in place of the urban workers there are now 
peasants. Far more important is the prominent role played 
t>y the professional revolutionaries alienated in varying 
degrees from their class of origin.
Most anthropologists and historians are agreed that before 
the Chaco War the traditional equilibrium of Bolivian 
society was undisturbed (for example. Patch 196011, Dandler
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196912, and Klein 1969)13, and that Bolivia entered a
revolutionary situation towards the end of the war, a 
situation that lasted for 17 years (1935 — 1952). This 
extended period, though an important factor in escalating 
both the level of violence and the degree of change that 
the society was to eventually experience, was due in large 
measure to the fact that the discontented strata in
Bolivian society were not acting as a unified whole. This 
was mainly because of the distrust and resistance to change 
of the majority of them. But, as Huizer suggests, distrust 
is not an inherent peasant characteristic but the result of 
several ages of repression and can be one of the most
important promoters of change and development when it is 
utilised as a force bringing together peasants in a common 
struggle (Huizer 1972)14.
Turning specifically to the indigenal education programme, 
this programme grew up in Bolivia in the 1930s to meet the 
needs of the rural Indian population. Until 1931 rural 
schools in Bolivia were established solely in non-Indian
centres, and they took only white and mestizo children. 
The teaching in these schools was formal and academic: it
was completely rigid in its standards, and there was a 
predominance of memorising and passive listening, and a 
pre-occupation with abstract definitions.
In 1931 the first school for Indians was founded, along 
entirely original lines, by a team of pro—Indian teachers 
led by Professor Elizardo Pérez in Ucurena in the
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Cochabamba Valley. Other schools slowly followed, usually 
in neighbouring places, and the whole group of schools in a 
given district was named a Rural School Nucleus (Nucleo 
Escolar Campesino). This slow growth of schools continued 
until the ending of the Chaco War in 1936. From that date 
onwards the number of schools increase quite quickly as 
part of the rural sindicato (syndicate) development in the 
Cochabamba Valley.
There were three types of schools included in the indigenal 
education programme. These were, firstly, the 'complete 
schools' (the Central Schools of the Nuclei) in which each 
of the six years of the primary course was supervised by a 
separate teacher; secondly, the 'incomplete schools', where 
there were only three or four grades supervised by only two 
or three teachers; and, thirdly, the single teacher or 
sectional schools, where a sole teacher supervised the work 
of children in two or three different grades.
In order that as many Indian children as possible went to 
school many schools, particularly the single teacher 
schools, had a 'Double Day' system whereby some gtoups of 
children went to school in the morning and others in the 
afternoon. Consequently the rural families, whose economy 
often depended on having the children to help in the house 
or fields, could benefit from this 'Double Day' because the 
children were at home for half the daylight hours.
The training of the rural teachers was carried out in seven
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Rural Normal Schools spread throughout the country, of 
which the most radical was at Warisata, close to Achacachi. 
The course of instruction lasted 5 years, the first 2 being 
given to a widening of general education, the next 2 to 
pedagogic studies, and the fifth to continuous and 
systematic teaching practice, both in the schools and in 
the rural communities which were within the areas of 
operation of the schools. Consequently, the would-be 
teachers had the opportunity of practising teaching with 
both children and adults. The curriculum taught in the 
Rural Normal Schools included Education in Hygiene and 
Sanitation, Home Education, Fundamental Education, Rural 
Economy (Co-operatives and Agrarian Reform), Rural 
Industries and Rural Sociology.
There were five very important characteristics of the Rural 
School Nucleus. Firstly, the Central School identified 
with its wider community and acted as 'head and heart' 
making the problems of the small communities where the 
sectional schools were, its own problems; thus there was a 
coherent group attitude towards all problems. The 
sectional schools, in turn, felt themselves to be an 
integral part of a greater whole, and they had a sense pf 
responsibility to the Nuclear group. This mutual 
strengthening extended also to the pedagogic and technical 
aspects of the work done. Secondly, the same spirit which 
animated the Central School pervaded each affiliated 
school. Thirdly, the continuing concern of the Director of 
the Nucleus, in his capacity as administrator and
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supervisor, was for integration, and consequently there was 
a close bond between the dependent and main schools through 
the efforts of the teachers and the communal agencies. 
Fourthly, a group of specialist teachers - of farming, 
hygiene and rural industries - worked with the Director of 
the Nucleus outside the field of the class teachers and 
they taught solely the Indian parents. The authority of 
this group embraced the Central School, from which it 
originated, and the whole cluster of dependent schools. 
Consequently, one very important aspect of the indigenal 
education programme was the teaching and consequential 
awareness - raising of both the Indian children and their 
parents. Fifthly, the community participated actively 
through organisations such as the School Aid Boards, the 
'Amauta' Council (in the pre-Hispanic era the 'Amauta' was 
the Inca's wise counsellor) and the Local Authorities, on 
which it was represented. The School Aid Boards were 
legally constituted bodies whose members were elected 
directly by the residents to watch over the continuing 
progress of the school service. The 'Amauta' Councils were 
institutions founded in conjunction with the Nuclear School 
system; they were advisory bodies concerned with school and 
community activities in each locality.
All the schools were initially resourced on a self-help 
basis, with the local communities building the schools and 
the teachers' houses. The Government paid the teachers' 
salaries.
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À well equipped rural school had as its working area the 
classroom(s), the vegetable garden, a 'hygiene corner , a 
place for the preparation of food, a stream or fountain, 
and a hen coop or pigsty. The school curriculum itself was 
very broad and practical. It was centred initially on the 
community's needs, and farming and tool subjects were given 
first priority. Other aspects of the curriculum were 
health education (hygiene and sanitation), reading, writing 
and arithmetic and, in the higher grades in the Central 
Schools, the social and political aspects of agrarian 
]f0 form. These latter two aspects of the curriculum 
heightened the awareness of both the Indian children and, 
particularly, their parents, and correspond closely to 
Friere's notion of 'conscientization'.
Consequently, the main aim of the indigenal education 
programme was to bring the discontented strata, 
particularly the peasants, together by awakening them and 
raising their consciousness to such a level that they 
became an organised group receptive to the anti-government 
feeling which developed in post-Chaco Bolivian society. 
There had always been the existence of envy, jealousy and 
difficult interpersonal relations existing in peasant 
villages, and the indigenal education programme aimed at 
reducing these jealousies and internal conflicts by showing 
the peasants that they could face, in a united way, the 
forces which had kept them in a submissive and backward 
state. The belief of the programme was that the best way 
to utilise peasant distrust as a positive force was to
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engage the peasants in struggles through organised action 
for their most basic demand: land.
The implementation of a liberating education policy 
requires political power and the oppressed in society have 
none. Consequently, following the ideas of Friere, a 
distinction needs to be made between systematic education, 
which can only be changed by political power, and education 
projects, which should be carried out with the oppressed in 
the process of organising them, based on the practice, i^ ot 
of the act of transferring knowledge, but of knowing 
(Friere 1972)15.
The indigenal education programme effectively made this 
distinction by promoting the function of education as a 
raising of consciousness, particularly among the adults. 
Indeed it went further than this because, through it, the 
Indian peasants were able to perceive their personal and 
social reality as well as the contradictions within it; and 
they also became conscious of their own perception of that 
reality and were able to deal critically with it. Linked 
with this was the belief that theoretical 'conscious— 
raising' activities had meaning only when united with 
action directed at the structures to be transformed. Those 
thus educated came to a new awareness of selfhood and they 
began to look critically at the social situation in which 
they found themselves. Consequently, the newly educated 
groups became a potent force in pre-revolutionary Bolivian 
society, and their support was actively sought by the
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organised political parties of the Left.
In 1936 the first post-Chaco War government, headed by 
Colonel Toro (1936 — 1937), came into office amidst great 
hopes for a moral regeneration of the country. Toro 
proclaimed the "lofty and noble ideal of restoring 
Bolivia's economic sovereignty, putting a stop to misery 
and poverty, and giving the manual and intellectual workers 
back their human dignity" (quoted in Klein 1968)16. A 
decree was issued by the Ministry of Labour concerning 
compulsory union membership during Toro's time. The decree 
was corporatist in intent and it helped to speed up the 
organisation of workers throughout the country. The first 
unions/sindicatos of tenant farmers on the large estates 
were formed in the Cochabamba Valley, the objective of 
these unions being to lease church-owned and municipal 
lands, which until then had been administered under the 
colonato system. In fact the 1936 decree obliged 
'municipal and religious entities' wishing to sell their 
properties to give preference, in equal condition, to 
service—tenants in occupation of the lands who were able to 
organise themselves in an agricultural union. It was 
significant that the first unions were in the Cochabamba 
Valley. This was mainly because of the eagerness on the 
part of its rural population for contacts with new 
"cultural representatives - intermediaries" - teachers, war 
veterans, miners and urban workers (Dandler 196917, 
197118). Thus, the Union of Tenant Farmers of the Cliza 
Valley, which was set up on the estate of the monastery of
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Santa Clara and was run by veterans of peasant origin, had 
close ties with the rural school of Ana Rancho, which 
provided the tenant farmers with management advice. Also 
on the Vacas settlement nearby, which belonged to the 
municipality of Cochabamba, the teachers negotiated direct 
administration of the estate by the tenant farmers, and 
they established an education centre, based on the one at 
Ucurena (Dandler 1969)19. The Ucurenan school, meanwhile, 
the one created in 1931 by Professor Elizardo Perez's team, 
obtained government recognition and support during the Toro 
and Busch (1937 - 1939) administrations. The school itself 
was a Central School and it served a network of sectional 
schools which were organised in the neighbouring localities 
and estates.
However, the new arrangements worked for a few years only. 
For example, in 1939 a small group of landowners got 
together to destroy the nascent Cliza Valley sindicato and 
remove the threat to the customary pattern of landlord 
rule. With help from the government they prevailed upon 
the Santa Clara monastery to sell the land to them so that 
they could abandon the legal arrangement made by the 
sindicato and its helpers. They cleared the land and 
destroyed the houses of the peasants under the pretext of 
rationalising the cultivation. Those peasants who did not 
want to work again for the- estate were driven from the 
land, and 12 peasant leaders were confined to an isolated 
area of the country. According to Patch, "This attack on 
the syndicate members did more than any other act to unify
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the Indian population and awaken it to political life" 
(Patch 1960)20.
After this first defeat the Cliza Valley sindicato turned 
from the direct attempt to secure the land for the peasants 
to a programme of school building and other improvements 
designed to organise and prepare the peasants for what they 
now saw as an inevitable struggle with the landowners.
In this difficult period during and after 1940, the Cliza 
Valley sindicato became increasingly dependent on the 
leadership of the local school director Guerra (who became 
a member of the Stalinist PIR party), with assistance from 
various intellectuals from the town of Cochabamba, Guerra 
helped the peasants purchase some parts of the estate, 
although for a price higher than the landowners would have 
paid. About 2,000 peasants thus became the owners of one 
hectare plots and gained their independence. Guerra also 
helped peasants of surrounding estates to channel their 
complaints to the authorities about abuses by the 
landlords. The sindicato spread its influence and, in 
turn, helped in the founding of various smaller schools 
related to the Central School in Ucurena. By 1946, there 
were 41 such schools with 62 teachers and 2,100 pupils in 
the area. Such was the power of the school-un ion 
combination that in 1946 their pressure secured the 
appointment of an Indian peasant as "corregidor"21. 
Further, towards the end of 1946, Ucurena was chosen as one 
of the rural education centres to be assisted by the
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Service Cooperative Interamericano de Education (SCIDE, a 
joint American—Bolivian fundamental education agency).
The objectives of these sindicatos, as well as the 
activities of the schools and the pro-Indian teachers, were 
of course modest. The leasing and self-management of land 
that did not belong to the land-owning elite did not call 
the system of land ownership directly into question. 
However, because everything was so closely interrelated, 
even limited reforms were a threat to the landed gentry. 
The local structures of the oligarchy's power were as yet 
intact, and they were not prepared to given an inch to the 
Indian peasantry. Just as they had formerly extended the 
boundaries of the large estates and surrounded the 
communities, the local power structure now attempted to 
narrow the ideological gap generated by the Indian s 
protest movements. It was clear that in such a situation 
any measure taken by the State could cut two ways.
From the beginning of the century onwards, education had 
been one of the oligarchy's favourite themes when they 
talked about civilising the Indians. Usurped land and the 
ambitious plans for importing European settlers blended 
perfectly with another device for "eliminating the Indian", 
namely schooling. (In 1925 J Mollins stated: "The Indian
is traditionally conservative and is a prolific genitor; 
this means that if he is left to his own instincts, he will 
sooner or later become a social and political danger. The 
Indian must bp eliminated through education" (quoted in
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Parrenin and Lavaud 1980))22. During the cycle of 
uprisings in the 1910s and 1920s, the Indian peasantry saw 
the ambivalent issue of schooling as a way to reformulate 
its "reciprocity agreement" with the State (Platt 1982)23. 
By learning the language of their oppressors, the Indians 
hoped to combat the power of the local landowners and 
townspeople. These trends were amplified during the post 
war era and the Indian s network of urban contacts, their 
ideological points of reference, and organisational schemes 
became diversified.
Furthermore, the tolerant policy of the governments of Toro 
and Busch, which ignored the ideology on which the 
oligarchy was founded, helped to point up the emptiness and 
ambiguity of its proposals for civilising the Indian. It 
left more scope for popular demands. One can say that for 
the very first time, the "people" became part and parcel of 
political life following the Chaco War. Pro-Indian 
sentiment was becoming more explicit among middle class 
intellectuals. Meanwhile the sindicato movement of the 
tenant farmers of Cochabamba was broadening its appeal, and 
winning support from workers' federations, the student 
movement and the teachers.
It is important to realise, though, that the new current of 
ideas had more impact in some areas than others, and this 
was in part because of the indigenal education programme. 
For example, in the Cochabamba Valley the Quechua language 
in this region was already a product of several centuries
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of cross-breeding, and bilingualism in the towns was the 
norm (Quechua and Spanish).
The great geographical and social mobility of these Indians 
increased when the war veterans went back to the 
countryside. Further, a more open market structure, dating 
back to the domestic colonial market of the Potosi mining 
industry (Larson 1978)24, had been a considerable help in 
erasing inter—ethnic frictions and broadening the spectrum 
of relationships and alliances between the peasantry and 
other sectors of society. In the Altiplano, and the Puna 
de Norte in the south, on the contrary, the caste structure 
remained and this was much less vulnerable to the influx of 
these new currents; there was no indigenal education 
programme here and therefore the sindicato movement 
developed much later. In fact, in the province of 
Belisario Boeto in the south there was no protest activity 
at all prior to the 1952 revolution (Havet 1985).25
The post-war era also marked the end of the traditional 
party system and the rise of new popular and left-wing 
parties in Bolivia. Indeed, according to Klein, under the 
regimes of Toro and Busch, Bolivia's traditional political 
party system was destroyed and the way was prepared for a 
new revolutionary ideology and the eventual success of the 
1952 revolution (Klein 1965)26. From the late 1930s to mid 
1940s numerous political discussion groups sprang up with 
diverse ideological leanings, and they later joined 
together to form new parties. The most important were the
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Trotskyist FOR, a Workers Revolutionary Party; the 
Stalinist PIR, a party very popular with the peasants and 
school teachers in the Ucurena area; and the MNR 
(Movimiento Nacionalisto Revolucionario), a party formed by 
a group of intellectuals headed by Paz Estenssoro, 
comprising a mixture of liberal intellectuals and young 
army officers who were dissatisfied with the mishandling of 
the Chaco War. (The MNR party was the cornerstone of the 
'populist' movement as defined by Di Telia (Di Telia 
1965)27, which developed in Bolivia at this time because 
its power rested on mass mobilisation, an alliance of 
classes, and a diffuse ideology of reforms and social 
change.) Traditional Liberals and Republicans (and even 
Conservatives) buried the hatchet and joined together to 
draw up a pact called 'la Concordancia'. It was a sort of 
defensive withdrawal which turned them into mere agents of 
the mining-landowning circle. The extent of the
oligarchy's political isolation can be seen in its gradual 
loss of control over the instruments which had served so 
effectively to uphold its supremacy since the turn of the 
century. Both the army and the electoral system ultimately
turned against the oligarchy.
Meanwhile, the new political parties vied with each other 
for the allegiance of the Indians. (The Indians for the 
first time were perceived not as a threat but as a 
potential political asset.) The most obvious result of 
these efforts was the spread of a new form of peasant
opposition that was clearly inspired by the sindicatos,
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namely, sit-down strikes by tenant farmers on large 
estates. Throughout this time the word was spread by 
individuals who acted as agitators, many of whom had been 
taught to read, write and think by teachers employed on the 
indigenal education programme.
As a proof of their organisational ability, the First 
Congress of Quechua-speaking Indians was held at Sucre in 
August 1942, under the auspices of the Trade Union 
Confederation of Bolivia and the Worker and Student 
Federations of Sucre and O r uro. At this Congress, 
according to newspaper accounts, "peasants and workers, in 
a fraternal embrace, have joined in a common cause to make 
their aspirations and proposals for emancipation come 
true". The main resolutions included the abolition of 
compulsory personal service (the pongaje), restitution of 
usurped communal lands, and relief from taxes. The 
Penaranda Government (1940 - 1943), which was part of the 
cycle of military restoration initiated after the war, 
responded with a set of measures designed to control the 
movement, which the oligarchical press denounced as the 
result of "communist agitation in the countryside". In the 
February 1943 Supreme Decree the government ordered the 
following: "Article 1. All articles and paragraphs in the 
statutes of workers' and labour organisations that contain 
matters relating to agricultural work or peasant activities 
are declared null and void" (quoted in Antezana 1973)28.
Penaranda also set up a Legal Office for the Free Defence
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of Indians, in an attempt to limit the influence of the 
legal advisers of the anti-oligarchy political and labour 
organisations, and he enacted a State security decree, 
laying down penalties for "agitators who, by infiltrating 
the large estates and Indian communities, disrupt 
agricultural work and incite others to take part in work 
stoppages or in passive resistance".
Meanwhile, Aymara war veterans undertook the task of 
organising and arming the tenant farmers of the Chijjcha 
estate and encouraging work to rule strikes in Ayopaya in 
the Cochabamba Valley, as well as in several provinces in 
the department of Oruro. This was the prevailing climate 
when the second Congress of Quechua-speaking Indians was 
held, once again in Sucre, in August 1943. The objectives 
of the Congress were to organise sit-down strikes and to 
seek agreements with the workers in the towns and cities.
With the Villarroel coup d'etat in December 194 3, and the
formation of the RADEPA-MNR coalition government, the 
strikers were able to exert more pressure. Under
Villarroel's government the "peoples"movement reached its 
highest point, with an increased awareness and a highly 
organised peasantry. For example, in August 1944 Paz 
Estenssoro and Guevara presented to the National Convention 
a proposal for a moderate agrarian programme. Opposition 
from the majority of the Convention controlled by the 
powerful organisation of large landholders, the Sociedad
Rural Boliviana, was strong enough to block acceptance of
211
the proposal. But the MNR, led by Paz Estenssoro and 
Guevara, which defended the proposal, awakened the 
peasantry to the fact that they had allies. As a 
consequence, spontaneous uprisings were replaced by more 
effective methods for achieving land reform. Consequently, 
the MNR, which had won the support of the mine workers 
unions by denouncing the Catavi Massacre of 1942, and by 
taking the Ministers of 'la Concordancia' to task, set 
about organising unions of workers and peasants. This led 
to the First Indian Congress held in La Paz in May 1945 
fronted by Villarroel, Ramos and Mamani. The ideological 
impact of this Indian conclave, held at the seat of the 
Bolivian government, and in the presence of its highest 
authorities, was perhaps more important than any of the 
measures it adopted.
The Congress had approximately 1,000 delegates from all 98 
provinces. The main points of the agenda were abolition of 
unpaid personal services which the peasants had to render 
to their landlords; regulation of agricultural labour 
conditions and agrarian policy; and education. No radical 
measures were proposed by the peasant delegates, but the 
demands made were directed against the most abusive forms 
of servitude and lack of educational facilities. As a 
result of the First Indian Congress of 1945 government 
decrees were issued. In themselves these decrees 
(abolition of the free labour services on the large estates 
(the pongaje), regulations concerning masters' and tenant 
farmers' obligations and rights, and the obligation of the
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landlords to establish schools on the large estates) did 
not pose a serious threat to the ownership system or to the 
economic power of the landowners. Land reform as such was 
not dealt with. They were an affront only because they 
represented unacceptable state interference in the internal 
affairs of the iarge estates, and because they legitimated 
to a certain extent the Indian s questioning of the 
barriers of caste on which the tenant f armer—master 
relationship was based. This questioning destroyed the 
ideological foundations for disciplining the tenant 
farmers.
Even more outrageous was the fact that the President of the 
Republic, Villarroel, attended a meeting of the Indian 
"masses", because it was a foretaste of a new State 
programme in which the Indian peasants would play a major 
role. It is interesting to compare this situation with the 
Revolution of 1899. Now the oligarchy was faced with an 
increasingly overwhelming and intelligible entity (much of 
it a product of the indigenal education programme), whose 
demands could even be considered reasonable and worthy of 
attention, whereas in 1899 the stigma attached to the 
Indians and the idea that they were barbarians had been 
justification enough to resolve any conflict in the 
countryside with armed repression.
As on other occasions, the Indians brought to the State s 
attention their own framework of interpretation and the 
concepts they had personally developed concerning society
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and the State. The abolition of compulsory personal 
service, occasioned by the 1945 Congress, was seen as the 
end of slavery and submission, and as a guarantee on the 
part of the State that usurped land would be returned to 
its rightful owners. In the face of this basic act of 
injustice by the State, the position of the landowners 
looked like an act of disobedience, like individual 
intransigence against the common good.
The Villarroel-MNR government tried in vain to control the 
Indian agitators who were spreading the good news around 
the country and encouraging fellow Indians to set up 
sindicatos and seize land. The actions of the rural 
agitation went beyond the limits of party or union 
affiliation. Ramos, for example, in the Irupana region of 
the Yungas even called himself the "President of the 
Peasants".
On 21 July 1946 Villarroel was lynched by a city mob in La 
Paz. The inhabitants of the capital rejoiced at his 
downfall. They believed that this action, the killing of 
the "father" of the Indians, would save the oligarchy's 
power. The lynching of Villarroel triggered off a period 
of repression of the Indian agitators, and a new colonial 
subjection of the Indians and their territory. Riots 
occurred throughout the country. The Indians blamed the 
MNR - they believed that, like the Liberals in 1899, the 
party had resorted to the hateful expedient of taking 
advantage of the "ignorance" of the Indians (Antezana
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1973)29.
Rebellions occurred in late 1946 and early 1947. They 
originated in the Cochabamba Valley area. According to 
President Hertzog (1947 - 1949) it was "the most serious 
Indian uprising in our history". It was not an organised 
rebellion under a single command, and it did not occur in a 
simultaneous or co-ordinated way. In many cases rebellion 
was the result of relatively minor actions like, for 
example, the holding of a meeting to found a sindicato, or 
the setting up of a school, getting out" of hand and 
becoming violent. Nevertheless many of the estate owners 
became fearful and fled their properties.
The loaded ideological terms which contemporary historians 
used to record these events, as well as their use of 
sterotypes like, for example "Indian uprising", prevents us 
from perceiving the real diversity of the situations that 
generated conflict and the specific forms of alliances that 
the Indian peasantry forged with other sectors of society. 
In general terms there were two types of conflict. The 
first of these was in the regions with less inter-ethnic 
friction, and a more open market structure, which had 
received the benefits of the indigenal education programme, 
regions like the Cochabamba Valley. Here direct conflict 
between tenant farmers and landowners took the form of work 
to rule strikes. The sindicato leadership, the presence of 
urban activists and the legal advice given to the 
sindicatos, made it possible to set up bodies for
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negotiating with the landlords. The struggle took the form 
of refusing to pay land rent or modify the conditions of 
payment. In many cases, the Indians succeeded in obtaining 
the subdivision and sale of portions of the estates to 
tenant farmers.
The second type of conflict occurred in the Altiplano and 
in some valleys with large Indian populations. Here the 
situation was more complex. In these regions, the tension 
along the border between the large estates and the Indian 
communities, and the inter-ethnic friction between the 
raestizo-Creole towns and the rural areas populated by the 
Indians played a major role. Here, a new type of leader 
emerged; he came from somewhere outside the large estates, 
and combined the community tradition of self-defence with ^ 
broad range of labour union and urban contacts and 
experiences. In these regions, the principal form of 
struggle was the siege. The siege came from outside the 
boundaries of the large estates (by means of the symbolic 
destruction of boundary stones and signposts, bonfires 
etc), and it made the landowners flee. Later the siege took 
place inside the estates; the tenant farmers appropriated 
or destroyed the landlords harvests. Violent clashes 
occurred when landowners attempted to break the siege by 
calling in the local authorities. This second type of 
conflict was the more violent of the two; for example, in 
Ayopaya in 1947 (in the high mountain chain above the 
Cochabamba Valley), 10,000 Indian peasants took arms, 
forcing several landlords to flee, and killing at least two
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of them. This movement was headed by Indian rebel leaders 
who had contacts with leaders from other regions, and with 
miners from the Oruro district.
This uprising was one of many which occurred in 1947. The 
uprisings were supported by the Local Workers Federation 
(FOL), and its rural wing the Departmental Agrarian 
Federation (FAD). The FOL was probably the only union 
organisation which understood the Indian cause. The 
leaders of its FAD wing were, in the main, teachers, and 
they travelled throughout the country encouraging the 
organisation of unions, sit-down strikes and the founding 
of schools, and thus they made it possible to reach the 
most dispersed and most heavily controlled tenant farmers. 
Indian leadership and ideology continued to dominate the 
movement, as can be seen by the fact that the main demands 
of the movement in 1947 were more or less the same as those 
in pre-Chaco War times, namely the abolition of compulsory 
military service; abolition of the road service and other 
taxes; the restitution of community lands seized by the 
estate owners, and the setting up of schools in the 
communities and on large estates. Added to these demands 
were others, formulated as a consequence of their more 
recent history, namely legal recognition of the agrarian 
sindicatos, which came out of the Indian Congress of 1945,- 
and the pioneering experiences of the agrarian sindicatos 
of the Cochabamba Valley.
Although the objectives and methods of the various rebel
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centres of the 1947 uprisings were not alike, the official 
response was the same everywhere: indiscriminate violence,
the organisation of the army and the police against the 
rebels, (a special rural police corps was created) and the 
arresting of hundreds of Indian agitators and their exile 
to the tropical north of the country.
During the period 1946 — 1952 there was a restoration of 
oligarchical governmental rule in Bolivia. This coincided 
with the post-war economic effects on the country, 
particularly a decline in the demand for tin. This led to 
large numbers of miners being laid off. Many returned to 
their birthplaces, further increasing the pressure on the 
land, and they helped to disseminate the organisational and 
political knowledge of the sindicatos, which could thus be 
grafted onto the existing communal organisations.
The repression ended up by unifying the opposition. As a 
result of the MNR's defeat, and that of the labour movement 
in the 1949 civil war, Indian rebels from all over Bolivia 
rubbed shoulders with Movimientist political and labour 
leaders in prison cells and in exile. This gave rise to 
the first "peasant cells" of the MNR, whose members were 
recruited from among the independent community leaders who 
had participated in the 1947 rebellions. Movimientist 
influence increased in the countryside throughout the "Six 
Year Period", as it was called, between 1946 and 1952.
At least two more Indian Congresses were held
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clandestinely, in Potosi and La Paz, and the MNR, through 
its leaders, was already making its presence felt here. 
There was also one public Indian Congress in Pacajes 
Province in January 1952.
The relationship between the MNR and the Indian peasant 
movement prior to 1952 was basically ambiguous. There were 
no longer any references to restitution of communal lands 
in the Resolutions adopted at the Pacajes Congress; 
instead, there was an MNR package of proposals for 
modernisation, such as the creation of wholesale markets, 
the improvement of rural education, the re-establishment of 
the Free Defence Courts for Indians, and a request to the 
government to carry out a study on land reform (Antezana 
1973)30.
This ambivalence may go to explain the lack of connection 
between the two most significant events involving mass 
action during the "Six Year Period": the general rebellion 
of 1947, and the civil war of 1949. The civil war, led by 
the MNR and by dissident factions in the army, with the 
participation of miners, factory workers, railway workers 
and low income townspeople, received marginal support from 
the peasants, whether Indian or mestizo. On the contrary, 
the 1947 uprisings remained isolated from the most active 
nuclei of the organised labour movement, and especially 
from the miners, despite the extensive urban contacts of 
its leaders. This surprising lack of co-ordination points 
up the fragility of the "workers-peasant-middle class
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alliance" on which the MNR was attempting to build a 
populist platform.
The MNR's lack of receptivity to the demands of the Indians 
of the Altiplano and its resentful and paternalistic 
attitude towards a modest programme of State reforms 
instituted by the Pacajes Congress in 1952 also shown the 
extent to which the MNR and the old dominant caste were 
basically in agreement about the Indian peasantry. The 
Indians demands did not fit into the MNR's plan to create a 
culturally unified nation by means of inter-marriage, 
Hispanicization and the domestic market. The very idea of 
a racial melting pot proposed by the MNR, and unquestioned 
by the Left, then as now, presupposes a one-sided 
attachment to Western values, language and the thought 
processes of the Creole class; it precludes any form of 
multiculturalism or multilingualism. The Indian programme, 
in so far as it implied a strengthening of the Andean's 
ethnic sense of identity, therefore stood in the way of the 
idea of a "decent" mestizo-Creole nation cherished by the 
leaders of the party which was to head the 1952 
insurrection (Cusicanqui 1987)31.
Following the 1947 rebellion, the MNR tried to turn the 
Indian movement into a "peasant movement"; they set up 
structures for co-optation and union control to convert the 
rural masses. They were to be passive receivers of the new 
civilising proposals. Hundreds of Indian agitators were 
incorporated into this enveloping movement, which gradually
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caused them to change even their own perception of 
themselves. They slowly abandoned their ethnic attachment 
and assimilated the illusion of equality among 
citizens.
In the elections which were scheduled by the cabinet of 
Urriolagoitia (President 1949 - 1951) for May 1951, the
government was expected to control the outcome by legal 
means, since the franchise was restricted to literate 
males, largely urban dwellers who, it was thought, wouxd 
split their votes among several competing candidates. 
Under the constitution, if no candidate received an 
absolute majority, the Congress could choose the president 
from among the three candidates receiving the most votes. 
Since the Congress was dominated by the government it was 
assumed it would proceed to choose the government's
candidate Gosalvez.
The government party was more surprised than anyone when 
the votes gave Paz Estenssoro, the MNR candidate, 45 per 
cent of the 120,000 ballots cast, and the MNR also elected
six out of nine senators, and 10 out of 55 deputies.
However, in spite of the MNR's impressive showing in a
restricted electorate which was not generally regarded as 
favourable to it, Paz Estenssoro had not received an 
absolute majority. Although he had a 5 to 3 plurality over 
Gosalvez, there was no assurance that the Congress would 
not choose the government's own candidate as president.
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The suddenly, on : 6 May 1951, Urriolagoitia resigned, 
handed over the reins of government to a military junta and 
fled to Chile. The reason given by the junta for the coup 
was the necessity of keeping the MNR from power. The MNR, 
they proclaimed, was an alliance of Nazi, Fascist and 
Communist elements which would establish a dictatorial type 
of government, nationalise the mines and industry, and 
institute a campaign of terror. The junta lacked both 
positive leadership and positive support. It accomplished 
little, and its unity steadily deteriorated until in April 
1952 it fell when the leader of the national military 
police went over to the MNR. This precipitated the 
revolution of 9 - 12 April, with street fighting between 
the army on one side and the miners, workers, a rebellious 
police and other forces on the other, the latter being 
victorious.
About two weeks later, Paz Estenssoro returned from exile 
in Argentina and became president. Changes occurred in 
Bolivia relatively soon after the new government had taken 
power. A young generation of military and civilian leaders 
emerged to search for alternatives to transform Bolivian 
society. This ideological and revolutionary ferment was 
also evident among miners and other workers, whose 
struggles during the decade before the revolution were 
marked by such historical incidents as the Catavi Massacre 
in 1942, the founding of the Bolivian Federation of 
Mineworkers in 1946, and the launching of their famous 
Tesis de Pulacaua during the same year. Further, the
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peasants did not remain bystanders to these political 
currents. As described earlier in this and the previous 
chapter  ^ they had a rich history of organisational 
groundwork, rebellions and other attempts to seek their 
liberation during the 1930s and 1940s. The new government 
gave amnesty to the peasant leaders who were in gaols, and 
although the peasants did not participate in the immediate 
events of April 1952, as soon as the MNR assumed power the 
word spread that a new era was to begin for them. The 
revolutionary situation opened a growing opportunity 
structure for a variety of political agitators and 
organisers to make contact with peasants, mobilise and arm 
them, and search for leaders among them to proselytise 
about the revolution and the rights of the peasants. 
Certain rural areas soon became critical foci of agitation 
and mobilisation which influenced the scope and impact of 
the agrarian reform.
After the revolution there were two difference attitudes to 
the peasants taken by the MNR. One group, on the moderate 
right of the party, agreed that the peasants should be 
incorporated through suffrage, education and, above all, 
agrarian reform which was to be carefully studied and 
implemented in an orderly manner. Within this wing, some 
argued to limit the latifundio in size and eliminate free 
service obligations. In this moderate view, the sindicato 
was conceived as a labour union to act as a bargaining 
agent and only secondarily as a political instrument. The 
motto of this group was "order and work". The other group,
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on the left of the party, were inclined to model peasant 
sindicatos after labour and mining unions, primarily as 
political instruments which were armed and organised to 
support and radicalise the revolution. Their motto was the 
"land for the one who works". Consequently, the 
countryside became a vast arena of political mobilisation. 
The most dynamic organisers and agitators tended to 
associate with the various leftist groups (Dandler 1977)32.
In order to fully understand the effects of the revolution 
on the peasants, a fairly detailed analysis of the 
situation in the Cochabamba Valley, particularly the 
district of Ucurena, will be attempted. The district of 
Ucurefia had been an important centre for rural union 
activities ever since the 1930s, in part due to the raising 
of the consciousness of the peasants by the indigenal 
education programme, as has been showp previously in this 
chapter. In late 1952, the unionists had "taken it upon 
themselves to being a process of land redistribution whose 
influence spread rapidly" (Dandler 1969)33. Ucurena 
became a high priority area for the government, not only 
because of the urgent need to control any possible excesses 
during land distribution, but also because the smallholders 
there best personified the ideal of a plebeian-mestizo 
nation on which the MNR's philosophy for a unified culture 
was founded. Moreover, the union network that existed in 
the region was adequate for setting up patronage mediation 
structures which could quickly channel peasant support to 
the new government.
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Thus, one of the earliest networks of MNR political 
middlemen came into beirtg in the Cochabamba valley. It 
produced the first leaders of national importance who would 
set up the State-sponsored union apparatus needed by the 
government. These leaders came from a significant 
potential leadership pool among the peasants, many of whom, 
prior to 1952, had demonstrated leadership, developed 
political connections with the MNR and other political 
parties, or participated in the mining labour union 
movement. These leaders obtained their strength and 
credibility from either some form of legitimacy conferred 
from higher authority, or through mass mobilisation. Two 
peasant leaders soon eclipsed the rest. They were Rivas, 
the Assistant Mayor of Sipe Sipe, the sub-capital of 
Quillocollo, who was an MNR activist and former mine union 
leader, and was fluent in both Quechua and Spanish; and 
Rojas, who came from Ucurena, had fought in the Chaco War, 
worked with the school director Guerra in the 1940s, headed 
the sindicato of Ucurena in 1946, had ties with the FOR, 
and who was the undisputed leader of the Ucurena trade 
union in the high valley (Dandler 1977)34.
With the support of the newly established Ministry of Rural 
Affairs, Rivas established a Peasant Federation in the low 
valley, while Rojas consolidated his power among the 
sindicatos in the high valley, basing his leadership on 
personal charisma, a core of subordinates, advice from the 
left wing, historical experience of Ucurena as the 
country's first rural sindicato, and the fact that he was
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of peasant stock and was, therefore, a "real peasant" 
(Dandler 1971)35. Rojas, because of his previous political 
associations, did not count with the support of the 
provincial MNR leaders during his attempts to reorganise 
the sindicato in 1952. But he shrewdly promoted himself as 
the leader closer to the masses by identifying himself with 
the local colonos or landless. (The landless peasants who 
held usufruct plots on the latifundios became the most 
mobilisable forces in rural Bolivia during the agrarian 
reform process, confirming a significant distinction made 
by the Marx about class consciousness among landless 
peasants, in contrast to those who had land, namely that if 
you have nothing you have nothing to lose.) Rojas also 
drew upon the symbols and rhetoric of the revolution, 
reworked them with other culturally relevant symbols and 
effectively exploited the historical experience and 
notoriety of Ucurena, with the result that he presented a 
plan for action and all the while promoted himself as the 
leader closest to the peasants. In other words, an 
ideological programme was generated which expressed a 
sentiment of class consciousness.
The two leaders responded differently, with Rojas 
advocating direct action to appropriate the land and expel 
the estate owners, whereas Rivas, more bureaucratically, 
tried to achieve his aims formally by government approval. 
In a situation that was critical for the consolidation of 
the new government, and in the midst of acrimonious 
internal quarrels over the course that land reform should
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take, the direct appropriation of land, coupled with the 
organisation of sindicatos, and the beginning of armed 
peasant militia, threatened to be beyond the government's 
control. In January 1953 Rojas, supported by the FOR, took 
control of the regional Feasant Federation, thereby 
sparking off a crisis which compelled the government to 
abandon for the time being its plans for a bureaucratic 
subordination of the movement in the valleys. On 30 April 
1953, four months before the national agrarian reform 
decree (2 August 1953), the MNR under pressure ratified the 
appropriations in Ucurena and elsewhere in the Cochabamba 
Valley, thus consolidating Rojas's leadership and choice of 
methods.
The government then decided to win over Rojas. Thanks to 
an irresistible amount of personal favours, he was 
ultimately turned into a complaisant official of the MNR 
sponsored union movement. In 1953, the authorities 
recognised him as a regional leader; then he became 
departmental leader in 1954, a member of parliament from 
1956 to 1958 and Minister for Rural Affairs in 1959. The 
result of this governmental policy was the rise of two 
rival political and territorial powers in the Cochabamba 
Valley whose leaders sought continuously to interfere in 
one another's sphere of influence.
It is worth noting that the roots of Ucurena's militant 
stance was not so much based on a sudden ideological 
conversion of a few men or Rojas in particular; Ucurenos
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had a deep historical awareness of their struggle for land 
ownership and freedom from landowners, occasioned to a 
large extent by the indigenal education programme. They 
were convinced that they could settle for nothing less than 
a total re-distribution of the latifundios. When the new 
regime called for peasant support, Ucurenos were too 
impatient to accept further promises, studies and 
legalities. In short, they were ready to organise 
themselves and to act. They needed a leader and Rojas, in 
particular, fitted the bill.
Thus Ucurena, and its surroundings, provided what has been 
described as a 'revolutionary hearth' or 'focus' with 
experienced leadership and a network of organisations which 
could mobilise the peasants, not only by l^ndgroups, but en 
masse, and a peasantry with revolutionary thoughts (in 
terms of the existing social situation) and clear short­
term revolutionary objectives, namely the taking of the 
land by those who worked it. It comes about therefore that 
although Ucurena did not participate directly in the 
revolution on 9 April 1952, its success was the signal for 
insurgency directed at the Cochabamba estates and beyond, 
organised by the peasant leadership under Rojas, and 
carried out by both the peasants politically mobilised in 
the area, and the students.
The early meetings of the Ucurena sindicato organised task 
forces of peasants and young pro-MNR students from the 
Cochabamba Valley region, dispatching them to the farthest
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reaches of Bolivia. These task forces were supported by 
other marginalised Bolivians who had been mobilised by 
political movements within and on the edges of the new 
forces of power. They included, in particular, persons of 
peasant stock who had been detached from the land, and who 
lived in towns and cities but had not been absorbed into 
the citizens sector; left-wing students; and peasants who 
had been able to go through a partial personal emancipation 
through organised participation in political and union 
work, or through studying at radical education centres like 
the one in Warisata. Often these task forces or teams of 
organisers were the first to bring the news of the 
revolution to the remote Indian villages. Consequently 
events in each latifundio were precipitated by the news of 
the revolution, the changes in the local political set up 
occasioned by the revolution, and the arrival of the 
organisers at the latifundio itself.
Concomitant with this informal spreading of information 
about the revolution, the MNR itself created the Ministry 
of Peasant Affairs immediately after it came into power in 
April 1952. The Ministry was not a revolutionary peasant 
focus, but the Minister himself assembled his team with the 
help of members of the miners' union. Curiously, neither 
the formation of peasant sindicatos not agrarian reform 
were officially included among the objectives of this 
Ministry. However, these concerns became its main pre­
occupation, particularly after the considerable peasant 
pressure that was generated in the Cochabamba Valley had
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occurred in favour of radical reform. Consequently, in 
order to gain the support of the peasantry as a whole, the 
Minister of Peasant Affairs started a campaign to organise 
the peasants all over the country into sindicatos. Many of 
the mine workers who had worked in unionisation (most of 
whom were former peasants and spoke the indigenous 
languages) travelled all over the country, in this case in 
an official capacity, to help to create the peasant 
sindicatos. These sindicatos were then institutionalised 
by a commission of the Ministry of Peasant Affairs. The 
whole campaign culminated in the ceremony of the 
promulgation of the Land Reform Decree on 2 August 1953 in 
(appropriately) Ucurena, when between 100,000 and 200,000 
peasants from most of the regions of Bolivia, armed and 
organised into sindicatos, came to witness this important 
event. Thus the peasants from all over the country could 
see with their own eyes how their colleagues in the Ucurena 
area (and beyond) had already effective control over the 
lands which they had seized from the latifundio owners 
(Alexander 1958)36. This ceremony was very important 
because the peasantry in most of the country, despite the 
visits of the task forces and the miners, remained 
initially distrustful after the change of government 
because of their experiences with former "revolutions", and 
particularly with the severe repression which they had 
suffered since the fall of the Villarroel government in 
1946.
The Cochabamba Valley area, particularly the district of
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Ucurena, was the most advanced region in Bolivia in terms 
of rural sindicato development, but it was not the only 
one. In the Yungas, for example, a tradition of peasant 
organisation already existed prior to the revolution. A 
peasant leader called Callisaya had participated in the 
Villarroel Peasant Congress of 1945 and had suffered police 
persecution, threats of death and imprisonment since then> 
but he had continued to go from latifundio to latifundio 
initiating school developments, and organising the peasants 
into 'loose' unions (Pearse 1975)37. Also, after the 
revolution the POR, the Trotskyist Workers Revolutionary 
Party, organised sindicatos on many of the Yungas 
latifundios, and only ceased its activity when the MNR 
announced its intention of carrying out land reform 
(Delgado 1968)38.
The Land Reform Decree of August 1953 gave de jure 
recognition to the de facto changes which had taken place 
in some areas of the country, particularly in the 
Cochabamba Valley region. Effective land redistribution 
spread all over the country with the help of the 
sindicatos. Almost all the latifundios were distributed to 
about 300,000 peasants in less than a year. Only large 
properties which were run as efficient commercial farms 
rather than feudal estates were respected by the peasants 
in accordance with the land reform decree. In those 
enterprises, wages were paid and there was no obligation to 
render feudal services. In detail, the post 1952 agrarian 
transformation "consisted of 5,000 - 6,000 discrete
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episodic sequences involving, firstly, the subtraction of 
the patron as individual and as role; secondly, the 
reconstitution of an internal administrative structure; 
and, thirdly, the building of a new nexus between landgroup 
and society, including market relationships and 
administrative and political links" (Pearse 1975)39.
The question of the motivation behind the MNR government's 
promulgation of the 1953 Land Reform Decree, and the extent 
of its commitment to it, is debatable. Some authors, for 
example. Patch, consider that the MNR government's part in 
agrarian reform was limited. It was the unexpected 
organisation of the peasants, and their de facto 
expropriation of land in several parts of the country that 
forced the government to moVe swiftly (Patch 1960)40. 
Other authors, for example, Alexander and Carballo, 
consider that the government was turned to land reform 
before the peasant pressure had grown on a large scale. In 
other words, it was the government's initiative that 
created much of the subsequent pressure (Alexander 195841; 
Carballo 1963)42.
The effects of the 1952 revolution on the Bolivian 
peasantry was both extensive and profound, at least 
initially. Nevertheless it had a greater impact in some 
areas than in others. For example, the revolution affected 
the peasants of the Cochabamba Valley region very much 
indeed. The peasants there, who were very well organised, 
established relationships with the urban-Creole society as
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a whole, forcing it to accept somewhat more democratic 
forms of social management than it wished. The peasants 
were thus able to establish the terms of their 
incorporation into the new political structure that had 
emerged in 1952. This phase, which lasted roughly from 
1952 to 1958, culminated in the consolidation of a new 
structure for mediation between the peasant movement and 
the State. It was seen most clearly in the government- 
sponsored union machinery which, through the MNR, linked 
the more remote rural areas with the reorganised, 
consolidated governmental nucleus after the revolution. 
Further, unionisation and peasant mobilisation helped to 
restructure the 'mercantile space' which had been the 
subject of keen competition between peasant production and 
latifundio production.
Thus the peasants played a very active role in the 
Cochabamba Valley region, particularly immediately after 
the revolution, largely as a consequence of the raising of 
their consciousness by the indigenal education programme. 
They began to act as a class-for-itself because, firstly, 
they synthesised their own ideology, permitting relatively 
independent and previously unchartered actions ; secondly, 
they developed their own forms of organisation and 
struggle, acting not only politically, but also, at times, 
as armed militia: the sindicatos became an instrument of 
local government, asserted political control in the 
provinces and became the principal link between the 
peasantry and the national government; and, thirdly, on the
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basis of their ideology and political organisation, 
peasants made demands and asserted their influence in ways 
which constituted a power capability to be reckoned with 
(Dandler 1977)43.
Nevertheless, closer analysis reveals that this 
mobilisation gradually lost momentum over time, as 
political partners were sought within a context of shifting 
alliances, internecine strife within the MNR, and the vague 
overall ideology guiding the entire evolutionary process. 
The leaders were concerned at times with their own image, 
and securing legitimacy from above. Moreover, matters 
other than agrarian reform were considered only fleetingly.
Therefore the peasants of the Cochabamba Valley region were 
not passive bystanders to the revolutionary movement. But 
their role was limited by the populist movement itself and 
the very nature of the revolution. Indeed, a paradox of 
peasant movements in the Third World is that the peasants 
begin to act as a class—for—itself in the marxist sense 
only when they find forms of organisation and ideology 
adequate to satisfy their demands and when they mobilise 
within a revolutionary struggle; however, this struggle can 
be sustained and revolutionary goals reached only when the 
peasants are allied to a national revolutionary movement.
In contrast, the effects of the 1952 revolution on the 
peasants in the Altiplano, for example, while still 
significant were much less extensive. This was mainly
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because inter-ethnic frictions continued to prevent the 
relationships between the sindicatos and the political 
parties from functioning democratically. Peasant union 
power was quickly supplanted by the paternalistic 
manipulation of the MNR bosses. Furthermore, the 
organisation of social life in the Altiplano was still 
strongly linked to the continuation of the Andean community 
(the ayllu). Nevertheless the post-reform era saw 
increased commercialisation of the production of the 
community members and former tenant farmers. It is worth 
noting that one of the most important demonstrations in the 
region had been organised in defence of the country fair 
which gave the peasants free access to the market, and 
which consequently threatened the landowners' all-embracing 
trade monopoly. With the presence of both unions and armed 
militia, it was no longer possible to destroy the country 
markets as the latifundio owners of the Altiplano had done 
in the past. An impressive number of new villages and 
fairs sprung up around the countryside reflecting the 
phenomenon of active commercialisation of the family 
production of community members, former tenant farmers and 
smallholders.
Therefore the accession to power of the MNR party in 1952 
did not represent, as had many of Bolivia's previous 
revolutions, "A mere changing of the palace guard, and the 
transfer of political incumbency from one clique to 
another" (Heath, Erasmus and Buechler 1969)44. The 
revolution of 1952 was the basis of a profound social
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revolution. It destroyed to a large extent the economic 
and political systems that constituted the support of the 
traditional ruling class, and it almost completely 
destroyed the power of the former elite and resulted in 
immediate and significant modifications of political life 
and government policy which have subsequently been codified 
in constitutional changes (Dunkerley 1984)45.
After the 1952 revolution greater freedom for the peasantry 
resulted. Expressions of this freedom included the absence 
of overt landlord domination, the destruction of the system 
of free labour, and the extension of the right to vote to 
illiterate people. (The voting population rose from 
126,125 in the last election of 1951 to 931,888 in the 
first election after the electoral law was passed (Wells et 
al 1966)46.
There were, though, failures in other areas. One of the 
basic problems created by the 1952 revolution was the fa^t 
that its plan for cultural unification failed. A country 
of Indians ruled by large landowners was supposed to 
disappear with the revolution. The latter were tb be 
turned into democratic progressive-minded members of the 
middle class, while the Indians were to become Hispanicised 
citizens capable of participating in a growing domestic 
market. The term "Indian" was to disappear thanks to 
inter—marriage, schooling, migration to the cities, and the 
dismantling of the traditional Indian communities, to be 
replaced by the word "campesino". These dreams were short-
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lived. After the triumph of the 1952 revolution, the 
democracy instituted thanks to the popular militia, and 
both the government-sponsored and the other unions in the 
countryside, gave way over time to patronage and vertical 
control by the government party, and the notion of Indian 
civil rights tended to disappear as subtler forms of the 
old oligarchical-colonial discrimination and domination 
came to the fore.
There were also adverse effects on other areas of Bolivia's 
economy besides agriculture during the post-revolutionary 
period, particularly in mining on which sector the country 
depended heavily. Although the major tin mines were 
nationalised after 1952, the dependence on foreign 
controlled markets remained the same or worsened. The tin 
industry was a high cost, low quality industry, with 
decaying capital investment, producing above world tin 
prices. Inflation, which was serious before the 
revolution, became astronomical afterwards (From 1952 -
1956 Bolivia's inflation rate was the highest in the 
world) , and this effectively wiped out much of the 
government's resources, and a large proportion of the 
middle class (Zondag 1966)47.
These factors meant that, while the destruction of the old 
regime was relatively simple, creating a new and 
functioning society was very difficult. The net result of 
this economic crisis was that the MNR leadership decided to 
turn to North America for aid on a massive scale in order
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to support themselves in power while reconstructing the 
economy.
While the mine workers continued to struggle for more 
radical and fundamental changes in Bolivian society, the 
peasant sindicatos, after they had benefited from land 
reform, were on some occasions utilised to appease or even 
combat the miners. They Were used increasingly as shock 
troops against the labour movement, and they were plunged 
into factional strife that was encouraged by the various 
splinter groups of the increasingly divided MNR. This was 
particularly the case after 1964.
Before the revolution Bolivia's peasants suffered 
oppression and exploitation at the hands of the few large 
landowners who controlled almost all the arable land in 
Bolivia. After the revolution, though, the power that was 
once concentrated in the hands of the large landowners 
became diffused among various rural elite groups who 
continued, by largely illicit means, to extort wealth and 
deference from the peasants they controlled.
The new peasant union power therefore had to face the 
resurgence of class and colonial forms of domination in the 
new bourgeois State. The structure of the union apparatus 
itself reflected the tensions in this process. In one 
sense, unionism was the main means of exercising the new 
citizen status acguired by the Indian peasantry after the 
revolution. However, in another sense, and particularly in
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]f0 gions like the south and. the Altiplano, it was merely the 
continuation of the age-old efforts to civilise the 
colonised Indian masses by the dominant Creole caste. 
These regional ambiguities and disparities in regard to the 
meaning of peasant unionism became more obvious over time. 
The reconstitution of the oligarchy after 1952 led to a 
general deterioration of the union apparatus as an 
instrument for the political representation of the Indian 
peasants. Corruption, pseudo-leaders imposed from the top, 
and union manipulation deprived these new citizens, who 
officially were "free and equal", of their place in society 
and in the power structure. The democracy of the armed 
militia during the initial phase thus gave way to forms of 
peasant power that were increasingly symbolic. Any 
attempts to show ideological independence were 
systematically marginalised, and potentially dangerous 
sectors were subordinated. This process undermined and 
finally blurred the original democratic character of the 
peasants participation in the revolutionary movement. The 
fact that patronage was used to subvert the unions also 
reflected a form of contempt for the Indian by the Creoles, 
who still viewed him as a second-class citizen.
Therefore the Bolivian Land Reform Decree had been a 
powerful tool of social o r d e r , an apparatus aimed at 
diffusing and neutralising potential unrest. The Land 
Reform Decree was the socialising arm of the new political 
order in the rural areas. In particular, it directed the 
peasants away from seeking control of the local, and
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eventually, the national, power structure. It directed the 
peasants towards control of land, which was the main power 
base of the traditional manorial landowner. This giving of 
the land to the peasants diffused the largest part of any 
potential feelings of frustration among the peasants (after 
Havet 1985)48.
Once the land problem had been dealt with and the 
government-sponsored union structure had been consolidated, 
the second phase of the revolution revealed the basic 
inconsistencies of the new State's proposals, reflected in 
the growing political polarisation of the peasant union 
movement. Most of the peasant leaders decided that they 
would side with the right wing factions that dominated the 
MNR and with the leaders of the civilian and military 
bureaucracies that succeeded one another in power, though a 
minority was constantly tempted by the organised labour 
movement. The tension between these two possible alliances 
split the union movement.
In summary, it can be said that in Bolivia the peasant 
organisation initially grew and became strong as a direct 
consequence of the raising of the peasants consciousness by 
the indigenal education programme, uncontrolled by the 
government. Only later, was it institutionalised as part 
of the national political system after this system had 
undergone considerable and drastic change. The peasant 
organisation had a certain influence on the creation of a 
new political structure which arose after the revolutionary
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changes. The peasants initially won significant benefits, 
mainly connected with the redistribution of land. As a 
result, the majority were so indebted to the new system 
that they supported it in spite of the fact that the flow 
of further benefits was very small. They continued to live 
at the margin of society although somewhat better off than 
previously.
The peasants and their organisations were helpful in 
bringing about a change in the traditional social 
structure, opening up possibilities for a more dynamic 
development of the country as a whole. However, after the 
transfer of most or part of the political power from the 
traditional elite into the hands of more dynamic groups 
(generally the middle sector), the peasantry was 
neutralised as a political force. Rather, emphasis was 
placed on consolidation and institutionalisation of the 
peasantry's role as political supporters of the new elites. 
Consequently, the initial phase, particularly from 1952 - 
1958, can be described as a process of active subordination 
of the Indian peasants to the State, under the auspices of 
the Cochabamba agrarian movement which formed the backbone 
of the union apparatus set up after 1952. The peasantry 
took on the role of historical actor and was able, 
initially, to dictate the terms and conditions of its 
participation in the new power structure, but, over a 
period of time, it lost this initiative.
In conclusion, the peasants of Bolivia were awakened by the
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indigenal education programme, in particular by the efforts 
of the teachers, many of whom were trained at the radical 
Warisata school. Many of these teachers went on to become 
peasant union leaders at the provincial, departmental and 
national levels, and they were instrumental in building up 
relationships between the peasantry and the revolutionary 
Left, and creating links between the rural and urban 
dwellers.
Prior to the indigenal education programme the social 
immobility typical of the Bolivian class structure was 
intensified by the absence of education facilities for the 
peasants living on the latifundios. While the traditional 
social stratification operated to restrict their social 
mobility, their economic and geographical mobility was also 
severely hampered by lack of education, widespread 
illiteracy, and their ignorance of other opportunities and 
other areas.
The indigenal education movement itself combined a critique 
of the existing, and very limited, educational provision 
with a radical political and socio-economic perspective. 
Education was thus regarded as a process for and on behalf 
of the peasants which emphasised collective rather than 
competitive individual effort and common rather than 
private goals. Thus it achieved a sense of class 
consciousness and a peasant counter-hegemony that posed a 
great threat to public order during the period 1936 - 1952.
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C H A P T E R  N I N E
CONCLUSIONS
The process of educational development during periods of 
upheaval, when the dominant hegemony is losing its grip, 
raises with particular sharpness the general problem of the 
relationship between ideology, education and social change. 
For these period of upheaval are among the rare historical 
moments when the weight of existing institutions and 
practices lightens to permit radical educational 
development. In Bolivia the period of upheaval at the end 
of the Chaco War permitted the development of the indigenal 
education programme.
Bolivia entered a revolutionary situation in 1935, and 
perhaps the most important confirmation of this new 
situation was the reappearance, in a more aggravated form, 
of the generational split first apparent in the 1920s. The 
humiliation of the war was a profoundly disassociating 
experience for Bolivia's elite and sub-elite youth, and 
after 1936 most of this generation were implacably 
alienated from the prevailing political order. One of the 
main symptoms of a revolutionary situation in a society is 
the phenomenon of the 'desertion of the intellectuals'. 
Intellectuals play an important social role in developing 
and maintaining political values and concepts. The 
transference of the allegiance of the intellectuals, 
therefore, weakens the value structure of the existing 
system and opens a period in which new definitions of 
political structure and purpose vie for allegiance. 
(Gramsci, in particular, argued that the intellectuals are 
very important especially at an early stage. He had a
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belief in the political role of the intellectuals and in 
their potential to provide an ideological counter-attack to 
the social hegemony and state domination of the existing 
hierarchy (Gramsci 1971))1. The generational split that 
reappeared after the war confirmed the desertion of 
Bolivia's intellectuals.
The immediate post war period was one of "ideological 
effervescence" (Malloy 1970)2, and the nation's young 
intellectuals, in looking for explanations for Bolivia's 
problems, attempted to formulate new ideological images; 
Through these images, the youths began to attack the 
prevailing pattern of political thought and to bid for the 
allegiance of various publics. Through their control of 
the urban educational apparatus, counter-groups were able 
to influence younger students in the secondary and primary 
schools and to convert the universities into bastions of 
anti-government activity.
It was this reinforcement and broadening of the 
generational split that was the most critical result of the 
Chaco War. The phenomenon cut through the centre of the 
existing contrbl structure and aggravated the revolutionary 
situation. It strengthened the pressures building for 
change by providing an ideological focus and a pool of 
leadership. Also, it weakened the already debilitated 
ruling elite stratum by denying it the energies of its own 
younger generation. Of critical importance in this latter 
dimension was the destruction of the unity and discipline
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of the army, which severely reduced its effectiveness as a 
mechanism of defence for the prevailing order.
In Bolivia, then, the major source of counter-elites was 
not the marginal or suppressed sectors of the society, but 
the pre-existing elite and sub-elite sectors. The rupture 
of the elite and sub-elite sectors is a common occurrence, 
particularly in underdeveloped or partially developed 
societies; and, as has been explained previously in Chapter 
Eight, such splits are important in generating the 
'populist'—type movements which are the most common form of 
counter-sentiment in these societies (Di Telia 1965)3. The 
Bolivian situation indicates further that these splits 
arise from a combination of "status incongruence and the 
demonstration effect, and can be severely aggravated by an 
experience such as defeat in war" (Malloy 1970)4.
However, a society like Bolivia's which has become 
immobilised in a transitional state is less vulnerable to 
class-based counter movements than to the formation of 
cross-sectoral alliances. This is because the most 
important structural weakness of such a society is its 
inability to maintain cohesion at the upper and 
intermediate layers of stratification. Pressure here, 
especially along generational lines, creates fissures in 
the very core of the society's control structure, leading 
to a further weakening of the society's ability to maintain 
coherence, and to the anomaly that counter-elites and 
counter-publics are produced from within the existing elite
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and sub-elite strata. If these counter-groups are 
unable to achieve reform they will then tend to reach 
across stratification lines and form cross-class blocks5.
This is what happened in Bolivia. The elite and sub—elite 
counter groups, realising that they were unlikely to 
achieve their desired radical reforms on their own, 
(j0 Y0 ]Loped a cross—sectoral alliance aimed at removing the 
blockages to change. It was a 'national popular movement 
based on the belief that the various discontented strata in 
Bolivia needed to act as a unified whole. It was therefore 
realised that it was only possible to achieve radical 
social change by incorporating into this movement the 
workers and the peasants; and in fact "this bloc (the 
workers and peasants) played the largest role in 
radicalising the revolution in its early days" (Malloy 
1970)6.
There was, therefore a necessity for the development of a 
peasant movement in Bolivia after the Chaco War, a movement 
that was, in part at least, in sympathy with the 
aspirations for radical social changes of the dissatisfied 
elite and sub-elite groups. In summarising the development 
of this movement it is useful to consider whether peasants 
are revolutionary or not. One tradition regards the 
peasants as the proletarian vanguard capable of producing a 
revolution. This view is primarily derived from an 
analysis of the class struggles and contradictions in 
European capitalist societies. The other tradition takes
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into account the peasantry as an essential factor in the 
revolutionary struggle. According to this view, conditions 
for a socialist revolution are ripe in Third World 
countries and, although in these cases peasants do not 
necessarily replace the proletariat, they form a major 
sector in the alliance of revolutionary forces. Barrington 
Moore, for example, adopts this latter view arguing that 
although peasant involvement in a more generally 
revolutionary context will no doubt accelerate the tempo 
and broaden the changes a society will go through, it is 
doubtful that a peasantry can either initiate or accomplish 
a broad revolutionary process by itself. Whether it is 
stimulated by a guerrilla movement that leads to an 
insurrection, or by an outburst following an insurrection, 
the revolutionary potential of the peasantry is dependent 
upon contact with other social sectors and a weakening of 
the existing control structure by counter-groups in the 
urban sphere (Barrington Moore)7. In Bolivia during the 
period in question, it can be argued that the peasantry, 
particularly those in the Cochabamba Valley region, played 
an active role within the revolutionary process as part of 
a coalition of forces, where the organisations of the 
mining proletariat nevertheless were the vanguard forces. 
Consequently in Bolivia the peasantry was not the passive 
element of rural France in 1789, as described by Marx (Marx 
1973)8, but neither was it the active force of the Chinese 
Revolution of 1949 or of the Indochina War of the 1960s. 
The peasants in Bolivia played a dynamic role in the 
revolution, but only as part of a populist alliance of
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different social sectors.
Peasants are a group or class within society that are quite 
difference from any other group or class. Shanin 
recognised this and, in exploring the important 
relationship between class consciousness and organisation, 
he used the term 'low classness' to contrast the peasant 
class consciousness and its political organisation with 
respect to the rest of the proletariat. According to 
Shanin this was in part due to the more immediate nature of 
peasant demands as well as the peasantry's socio-political 
weakness:
"peasants in their struggles tend to fight for land 
rather than for broader political aims and have an eye 
on the local day-to-day concerns rather than to care
for general long-term concepts and ideologies ....
The vertical segmentation of peasants into local 
communities, class and groups and the differentiation 
of interest within these communities themselves has 
made for difficulties in crystallizing nationwide aims 
and symbols and developing national leadership and 
organisation ..... " (Shanin 1971)9
Similarly Hobsbawm argues that the proletariat tends to 
assume a more solidary, persistent and militant stance in 
the long run than do the peasants; at the most, he 
continues, a peasant movement has a regional scope or may 
have a national impact when the movement develops in one or
252
two strategic regions or produces highly mobile armed 
groups (Hobsbawm 1973)10. According to this view peasants 
generally depend on outside leadership and direction in 
order to exercise influence at the national levelll.
There are, according to Huizer, a number of factors which 
are necessary for a peasant movement to develop (Huizer 
1972)12. These factors are in addition to the overall 
organisability of the peasants implied in their resistance 
to the culture of repression. Modernising influences are 
one of the initial pre-requisites and in Bolivia the most 
important of these was the Chaco War, a war which brought 
frustration rather than improvements to the majority of the 
peasants.
In the actual process, a very important first step is the 
creation of awareness among the peasants of their basic 
interests and grievances, and of the possibility that 
united action can be undertaken to defend those interests. 
According to Illich, "It can be a genuinely new and 
emotionally charges experience for a Latin American peasant 
to learn that his own identity as a peasant is socially 
^^tg^^lned and that he as an individual has the capacity to 
play an active role in shaping the society that defines 
him" (Illich 1972)13.
A practical difficulty in creating this awareness is the 
fact that, although peasants may see or feel the need for 
overall change (in particular the abolition of land tenuie
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conditions), they do not clearly visualise the ways and 
means through which this can be realised. It is at this 
crucial point that urban leaders (such as Guerra, the 
school teacher in Ucurena) become important. They can 
channel the vague awareness of a need for change into a 
more concrete awareness of ways and means to change through 
organised effort. The method of promotion of these aims is 
through education campaigns, and this was one of the main 
functions of the indigenal education programme. Existing 
general grievances or needs of the peasants, without being 
particularly acute at a certain moment can become so 
through abusive acts of the landlords and through teaching 
or explaining. The growth or creation among the peasants 
of awareness of their basic needs and of the possibilities 
of demanding and struggling for the fulfilment of these 
needs is the process of conscientization. Conscientization 
is based on the view that those who, in learning to read 
and write, come to a new awareness of selfhood and begin to 
look critically at the social situation in which they find 
themselves and they often take the initiative in acting to 
transform the society that has denied them this opportunity 
of participation. Education is therefore regarded as a 
subversive force (Freire 1972)14. The most important 
aspect of this process of creating awareness in Bolivia 
referred to the need to break through the impact of the 
traditional land tenure and power system, and the means by 
which this break may be accomplished.
One of the obstacles to the awareness of the need for
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radical change in cases where there are no blatant abuses, 
is the fact that the traditional system has some more or 
less continuously applied defence mechanisms which prevent 
the peasants from seeing their situation clearly. Since 
the culture of repression has prevailed for ages, certain 
elements have come up under this system which try to soften 
its impact - this is the role of patronage. Landlords, as 
long as they are solidly in control, try to maintain the 
image of being gbod fathers. Such apparently benevolent 
patronage can be created easily since the latifundio system 
generally is the only frame of reference for the peasants 
who grew up on it. Belonging to it was not a question of 
voluntary choice but simply one of ascription. One is born 
into it and one has practically no way of escaping from its
impact.
It is clear that an important condition for the formation 
of a representative organisation of peasants is to break 
through the closedness, dependence and coercion of the 
traditional patronage system. This can generally only be 
done by the active stimulation of dissent and conflict and 
the creation of new loyalties outside and conflicting with 
the traditional ones.
The creation of dissent to overcome the traditional 
influence of the landlord implies the promotion of 
awareness of the peasants' rational interests as contrary 
to the traditional bonds existing in the latifundio system. 
In Ucurena, the fear and intransigence of the landed elite
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was a help in this respect. In fact the lawlessness and at 
times violent opposition from the landlords which the 
peasants encountered when they tried to form a 
representative organisation within the traditional social 
climate, practically forced them to greater internal 
cohesiveness out of the need for self-defence or 
resistance.
In the sociology of conflict it is easier, according to 
Coser, to form a group when there is an opposing force than 
to form a group when there is no opposition (Coser 1956)15. 
Thus, the fact that the formation of representative peasant 
organisations is strongly opposed and creates a conflict 
situation can be interpreted positively as a fact which may 
help to strengthen the cohension of the new group.
As a result of the acute need for the defence of common 
interests, interpersonal conflicts which always exist in 
peasant communities tend to diminish. However, some basic 
consensus within the peasant group before a conflict 
becomes open is an important condition for achieving 
cohesion in the face of an outside threat. This, again, 
shows the importance of conscientization. If this basic 
consensus does not exist, an outside threat may cause 
general apathy rather than internal cohension.
It is important to note that, while in some respects 
peasant organisations in their formative stages can draw 
lessons from the syndical struggle of urban workers, there
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is considerable difference between a peasant movement and 
an urban labour organisation involved in conflict. This 
further shows the immense importance of the 
conscientization programme because while most industrial 
labour conflicts are solved in Latin America within the 
prevailing system, leaving the social structure of 
enterprises as such intact, solutions to the basic problems 
in rural areas can only come about through changes in the 
social structure. In labour conflicts, there is often a 
basic consensus between employers and workers, which can be 
maintained in spite of a conflict over details such as the 
size of wages. Between the majority of the landlords and 
the peasantry, however, such consensus generally exists 
only if maintained by coercion.
The second of the factors which plays a role in the 
dynamics of the growth of the peasant movement is the 
availability of a charismatic leadership with some previous 
organising experiences able to rally the peasants around 
the need to abolish the land tenure conditions. The role 
of leadership is very important, because the following of 
peasant leaders has to grow in competition or even conflict 
with the already existing ties of the latifundio system. 
According to Blasier, "social revolution breaks out only in 
the presence of a revolutionary leadership" (Blasier 
1967)16. Usually this leadership group is made up of men 
who in one way or another belonged to the social strata of 
the elite (Freire 1972)17. In Bolivia, though, the 
dominant leader who emerged in the Cochabamba Valley region
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after the 1952 revolution was Rojas, who while having some 
previous organisational experience, both in Ucurena and in 
Argentina, was from the peasantry, and indeed he made 
political capital out of this aspect of his background.
Further, the leader who has built a network of 
relationships outside his immediate locality can channel 
resources and favours to his followers in return for 
political support and loyalty. At the same time, this 
political intermediary maintains close relationships as a 
'client' with individuals in high positions. Consequently, 
peasant leaders gain power when they begin to act as 
brokers between the rank and file of the peasantry and the 
bureaucratic institutions surrounding them (Wolf 1969)18.
Seeing that a radical agrarian reform was the only solution 
for the existing rural inequalities, but that the majority 
of the peasants had not yet realised it, the leaders tried 
to create awareness of this need. (According to Freire, 
the leaders must get unity among the oppressed and unity of 
leaders with the oppressed. Since the unity of the 
oppressed involves solidarity among them regardless of 
their exact status, this unity unquestionably requires 
class consciousness (Freire 197219.) This was done not 
only through conscientization, teaching and explaining the 
social implications of rural underdevelopment, but also 
through the struggle itself. By showing time after time 
that the landlords would not grant moderate, legally 
guaranteed demands and civil rights, it was easily
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demonstrated to the peasants that only radical changes in 
the rural power structure could lead to fulfilment of their 
demands and redress of their grievances.
This escalation of awareness through the struggle for civil 
rights and other basic needs had considerable success. It 
had the added advantage that the peasants learned gradually 
to overcome their traditional fear of opposing the rural 
elite; they started facing their opposition on issues where 
justice and coiAmon sense were so overwhelmingly on their 
side that they felt they could take the risk. These were 
also the issues where the attitude of the landlords was 
most flagrantly in conflict with law and order, and the 
landlord's refusal to give in to legitimate demands 
diminished their traditional prestige in the eyes of their 
workers and public opinion.
In many areas, peasants had never contemplated the 
possibility of using means more radical than a petition or 
an appeal to justice. Radical means had not been tried 
consistently and their uselessness was almost accepted as a 
fact of life. Once it was demonstrated that following 
through on a case with dedicated legal help made the 
landlords uneasy and intransigent, the use of more radical 
means, like strikes and the peaceful occupation of land, 
appeared to be more feasible.
One of the first things peasants organisations, opposing 
the traditional latifundio system, try to organise for
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their members is the kind of services like schools that 
landlords sometimes provide for their peasants to tie them 
to the latifundio and oblige them to conform to a basically 
disadvantageous and exploitative system. Once such 
services are taken care of through means outside the 
monopoly of the landlord, the true characteristics of the 
patron—worker relationship on the latifundos and the need 
and possibility to break with it becomes more obvious. 
Therefore peasant leaders process an explicit sense of 
exploitation shared by peasants as a class into an 
awareness of their political capacity to act as a unified 
force.
The third of the elements which plays a role in the 
dynamics of the growth of the peasant movement is thé
alliance with urban supporters who link the organisation 
with forces at regional or national level. This is 
important because isolated peasant movements do not work 
unless they have contact with urban sympathisers who are
willing to be allies in the struggle against the
traditional and vested rural interests. The linkage of 
local peasant organisations with a wider framework of 
mutual or outside support, or a combination of both, is a 
crucial factor in the success of new groups. For example, 
the message of the UcureiTa sindicatos was supported and
spread by the school teachers and the miners, and later, 
the growing movement was related to political parties 
working at the national level such as the MNR. In fact, it 
is very difficult to isolate peasant organisations or their
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leadership from the broader societal context. Their 
ideology includes symbols and important elements of urban 
and mineworkers' class consciousness, and of political 
parties as well as of the diffuse populist ideology and MNR 
rhetoric. (NB According to Van den Berghe, in most 
underdeveloped countries teachers play a more important 
role and enjoy more power and privileges relative to the 
mass of their countrymen than they do in developed 
countries (Van den Berghe 1978)20.
An important advantage of the federation of local unions or 
other community or peasant organisations is that it is a 
defensive step in the break up of the traditional social 
system dominated by the latifundio. The peasants become 
aware that in other communities in neighbouring areas 
people have the same problems. This psychological factor 
may help to overcome an initial fear of resisting or 
breaking with the local system.
An additional psychological effect of the broadening of the 
peasant organisations beyond the community level is the 
feeling of power which people get when belonging to a 
large-scale regional movement. An example to illustrate 
this is the First Indian Congress in La Paz in 1945. Here 
the peasants for the first time in their lives got a 
feeling of power and importance when they had a regional 
meeting and marched in their hundreds through the streets 
of an important city to represent their interests and show 
themselves as a unified body. Mass meetings and parades of
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this type have an important function during the formation 
process of a peasant organisation? to strengthen the self 
esteem of the peasantry and to impress public opinion.
As the peasant movement grows, a process of consolidation, 
and of gaining strength, generally will follow, usually
through the holding of regular meetings. The question of 
leadership becomes very important at this stage. Initially 
a charismatic and altruistic leader is needed, but once the 
movement becomes larger, organisational discipline is 
needed because strategic moves to gain certain benefits
become equally or more important for the members than to 
follow a charismatic leader. A type of leader is then 
needed who inspires active and sustained participation 
rather than a "following". Thus the peasant movement needs
to be institutionalised - in Bolivia, the process of
structuring the movement took place after the peasant 
federation in the area where it originated, Cochabamba, had 
shown its power. National political leaders, particularly 
Paz Estenssoro, used the MNR party and its activities to 
spread the peasant movement into the whole country and to 
institutionalise it into a national framework related to 
MNR interests.
The political role of the peasant organisations in their 
struggle for land can sometimes be violent. Only after 
agrarian reform was well under way in Bolivia was peasant 
participation channelled through newly created 
institutions, such as trade unions. This was a direct
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result of the lawlessness and culture of repression 
prevailing in the rural areas and the severe obstacles 
created by the opposition of traditional vested interests 
to orderly and institutional, yet dynamic, reform of the 
land tenure structure. And it conforms to the philosophy 
of the indigenal education movement that theoretical 
'conscious-raising' activities have meaning only when 
united with action directed at the structures to be
transformed. According to Carroll, " ..... a certain
amount of violence, unrest and disorder are unavoidable and 
even necessary for successful reform measures" (Carroll 
1964)21.
The whole issue of escalation of peasant demands as a 
reaction to landlord intransigence clearly demonstrates 
that peasants are not revolutionaries by birth, but neither 
are they the passive victims of traditional or modern forms 
of patronage. According to Freire, all peasants have the 
ability to achieve the consciousness of being oppressed 
individuals and from this individual consciousness can 
develop, given the right guidance, a class consciousness 
(Freire 1972)22. It was this aim which was central to the 
philosophy of the indigenal education programme in Bolivia.
It seems that clear-cut, radical demands for land 
distribution or restitution, and leadership which in a 
rather uncompromising way leads the peasant in the struggle 
for these demands, ensures a strong cohension in the 
organisation and active participation of the peasants.
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There is no guarantee, however, that effective political 
peasant participation will continue after this main demand 
has been fulfilled. Often peasant organisations develop 
strongly during the height of the struggle for land reform, 
but soon after are partly or wholly neutralised. The 
effect of the Bolivian peasant movement was, for example, 
rather limited after 1953. The force of the peasants was 
neutralised more or less successfully by the middle-sector 
elites making the peasant organisations dependent on the 
distribution of benefits through a political patronage 
system that had been created essentially to serve classes 
other than the peasantry. The peasant organisational 
structure could possibly have been used to mobilise the 
peasantry behind a national development effort. 
Particularly after the radical land distribution, there was 
great enthusiasm among the peasants for new undertakings at 
all levels. But efforts were deliberately undertaken by 
the middle-sector elite to calm and control this fervour 
rather than to channel it in effective ways.
One very important, and ironic, neutralising factor was 
probably the extension of basic formal education in Bolivia 
after 1953. There was an attempt at a complete re­
organisation of the Bolivian education system, "designed 
both to extend opportunity and to make education more 
relevant to the needs of the different sectors of the 
population and the changing needs of the country ' 
(Alexander 1958)23. Out of this effort came a specific 
rural education programme administered by the Ministry of
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Peasant Affairs. This education programme, unlike the 
earlier indigenal education programme, functioned as an 
instrument which was used by the new middle-sector elite to 
facilitate the integration of the younger generation into 
the logic of the peasant system and bring about conformity 
to it. (NB The fact that the peasant mobilisation was 
neutralised after 1953 lends credence to the view that 
conscientization is a "permanent critical approach to 
reality in order to discover it and discover the myths that 
deceive us and help to maintain the oppressing dehumanising 
structures" (Freire 1972)24. According to Freire, 
revolution must be permanent and it must be cultural 
revolution — a continuous cultural self-criticism of men in 
society and the world. In this way Bolivia can be 
contrasted with Communist China where there was both a 
conscious attempt to take culture as always problematic and 
to question it? and an ideological commitment to a radical 
reform programme and a mobilisation of the peasantry rather 
than a neutralisation of them).
Therefore education and the raising of peasant 
consciousness, particularly at the all important 
preliminary level, played a major role in stimulating the 
peasant mobilisations. For the peasantry to be a vanguard 
of revolutionary action, for it to develop a 'class- 
struggle' of which Huizer (1972)25 believes it capable, the 
raising of peasant consciousness is essential. In fact 
without it, other motivating forces in peasant 
mobilisations are of little value and no lasting influence.
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Blanco notes that
"We consider each success a step forward mainly 
because the way it has been achieved educates the 
peasants ....
We always show that the authorities are the class 
enemies of the peasants, and that if they have made 
some concessions, it is not because of their 'sense of 
justice' but because of their fear of the wrath of the 
masses .....
The best thing we gain from each victory, aside from 
the victory itself, is the lesson for the masses. 
Each triumph serves to give them more confidence in 
themselves, in the power of their limited action. 
Each triumph serves to show them that we are ip a way 
of exploited versus exploiters. With this criterion 
even defeats can be educational" (Blanco 1972)26.
Formal education in developing nations seeks to 
"indoctrinate the oncoming generation with the basic 
outlooks and values of the political order" (Key 1963)27 
and as such is a mechanism which seeks to maintain the 
status quo. If education is to be used as a means of 
social change in developing societies then it must act as 
an agent which actively alters the status quo rather than 
maintains it. In Bolivia between 1930 and 1953 there 
developed a movement, the indigenal education movement 
which, because of the social and political circumstances 
which were prevalent immediately after the Chaco War, does
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appear to have constituted a mechanism for social change. 
The education movement was effective in raising the 
consciousness of those it sought to educate to such a level 
that they became receptive to the anti-government feeling 
which developed in post-Chaco Bolivian society. This group 
became a potent force in the pre-revolutionary society and 
their support was actively sought by the organised 
political parties of the Left. The education movement, 
through the conscientization of the peasants, was also 
responsible for the raising of the political, social and 
economic aspirations of this group of people to such a 
level that they actively sought to participate in Bolivian 
society on a more equal level. These factors led them to 
become a potent force in the immediate post-revolutionary 
rural activities of 1952 and 1953 to such a extent that 
they become largely responsible for forcing the 
revolutionary government to formulate a land reform 
programme which was instrumental in bringing about a major 
change in the social structure of Bolivian society. In 
this way it can be seen that in certain circumstances 
education movements in developing societies need not 
"indoctrinate the oncoming generation with the basic 
outlooks and values of the political order" but can, 
rather, seek to radically alter these outlooks and values 
and create a new political order. In Bolivia these 
circumstances existed and the indigenal education movement 
developed into an active agent of social change with 
revolutionary potential.
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PRESIDENTS OF BOLIVIA 1921 - 1952
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Bautista Saavedra
Felipe Guzman (provisional)
Hernando Siles
Junta Militar de Gobierno
Daniel Salamanca
Jose Luis Tejada Sorzano
David R Toro
German Busch
Carlos Quintanilla
Enrique Penaranda
Gualberto Villarroel 
Tomas Monje Gutierrez 
Enrique Hertzoz 
Mamerto Urriolaqoitia 
Junta Militar de Gobierno
Dates Party
1921-25 Republican
1925-26 Republican
1926-30 Republican
1930-31 Republican
1931-34 Republican 
1934-36 Liberal
1936-38 Military Socialist
1938-39 Military Socialist
1939-40 Coalition-Conser­
vative
1940-43 Coalition-Conser­
vative
1943-46 RADEPÀ-MNR
1946-47 PURS-PIR coalition
1947-49 PURS-PIR coalition
1949-51 PURS-PIR coalition
1951-52 Military
Parties
MNR Movimiento Nactionalista Revolutionario 
National Revolutionary Party
PIR Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria ; Left 
Revolutionary Party
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PURS
RADEPA
Partido Obrero Revolucionario : Workers
Revolutionary Party
Partido de la Union Revublicana Socialista : 
United Republican Socialist Party
Razon de Patria : Reason of the Fatherland
(secret organisation of young military 
officers which spearheaded the coup of 1943)
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